State v. Burke

Citations: 238 Ariz. 322; 360 P.3d 118; 723 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 30; 2015 Ariz. App. LEXIS 259Docket: 1 CA-CR 14-0438

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; October 8, 2015; Arizona; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Richard Taylor Burke, Sr. appeals his conviction for willfully refusing to comply with a police officer's lawful order, a violation of Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 28-622(A) (2012). The appeal stems from a traffic stop where Burke, after failing to stop at a stop sign, disregarded police instructions not to move his vehicle and called 911 before exiting the car, leading to his arrest. Burke contended that A.R.S. 28-622(A) is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. However, the Maricopa County Superior Court affirmed his conviction, emphasizing that their jurisdiction is confined to reviewing the facial validity of the statute, not its application to specific facts. The court concluded that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague on its face, thereby upholding the lower court's decision. The ruling is consistent with prior case law, which restricts review in such appeals to facial challenges.

The constitutionality of statutes is reviewed de novo, with a presumption of constitutionality. The burden is on the challenger to prove a statute's unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. To successfully challenge a statute's facial validity, the challenger must show that no circumstances allow for its constitutional application. Burke claims A.R.S. 28-622(A) is unconstitutionally vague and cannot support a criminal conviction. However, before addressing this claim, the court must determine if Burke has standing. Generally, a defendant cannot challenge a statute as vague if it provided fair notice of criminality for their actions. Nevertheless, when a facial challenge is made, this requirement does not apply. Burke's challenge focuses on the statute's alleged vagueness and lack of limiting language, granting him standing.

A statute is deemed unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide individuals with a clear understanding of what is prohibited, thus violating due process. While absolute precision is not required, statutes must convey a definite warning of prohibited conduct. For Burke’s facial challenge, he must demonstrate that there are no circumstances under which the statute could be validly applied.

Section 28-622(A) prohibits individuals from willfully failing or refusing to comply with lawful police orders. Burke argues that the term "wilfully" is unconstitutionally vague, asserting that Arizona law recognizes only four specific culpable mental states: intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, and with criminal negligence. He claims that using any other term, including "wilfully," renders the statute void for vagueness. The court rejects this argument, stating that the Arizona Legislature has defined "wilfully" in A.R.S. 1-215(41) as being aware of one's conduct or the circumstances involved, and this definition aligns with the term "knowingly" in A.R.S. 13-105(10)(b). The court also notes that even though Section 28-622 is found in Title 28, the definitions in Title 13 apply unless specified otherwise.

Burke further contends that "wilfully fail" is contradictory and includes situations of inevitable necessity. The court clarifies that the statute mandates a knowing refusal to comply, not merely an unintentional failure to obey; thus, "wilfully" implies an affirmative decision against compliance. Burke's argument is deemed insufficient as he must demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional in all potential scenarios, which he fails to do. The court points out that many situations exist where a defendant can willfully disobey an order, disproving Burke's claims about vagueness. Overall, the court concludes that the terms "wilfully fail" and "refuse to comply" are adequately defined and not constitutionally invalid.

Burke contends that the term "lawful order or direction" in A.R.S. 28-622(A) is unconstitutionally vague. He cites City of Seattle v. Rice, where the Washington Supreme Court deemed a similar term insufficiently specific. However, the court later repudiated this reasoning, asserting that citizens can rely on statutory and common law interpretations of "lawful." Other jurisdictions have also upheld the clarity of the term "lawful order," rejecting claims of vagueness. The court notes that while "lawful order" is not explicitly defined, its ordinary meaning is clear enough for reasonable individuals to understand it requires compliance with police instructions that are legally authorized. Furthermore, Burke argues the statute lacks specific time constraints for compliance, but the court agrees with the State that such limitations are unnecessary and could hinder the law's intended flexibility. Thus, the statute maintains its constitutional validity.

The omission of a temporal limit in a statute does not necessarily create unconstitutional vagueness, as mere uncertainty about the scope of prohibited conduct does not violate fairness principles inherent in the vagueness doctrine. A statute is not void for vagueness if it reasonably informs individuals of the prohibited actions, even if determining the limits of the statute can be challenging. In this context, A.R.S. 28-622(A) is deemed sufficiently clear, providing adequate notice to individuals of what conduct is prohibited. Additionally, the argument that the statute lacks minimal enforcement guidelines, potentially leading to arbitrary enforcement by law enforcement officers, is rejected. Clear statutory language does not render a law unconstitutional merely due to the potential for arbitrary enforcement. The statute must define prohibited conduct with reasonable clarity, and while selective prosecution may occur, it does not invalidate the statute if it conveys a definite warning regarding prohibited behaviors. The expectation is that public officials will act fairly and impartially, and potential misapplication does not suffice to deem the statute unconstitutional.

Burke cites several cases, including United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, Derby v. Town of Hartford, and Coates v. City of Cincinnati, to argue that A.R.S. 28-622(A) is vague and lacks guidance for law enforcement and citizens due to a supposed temporal deficiency. However, these cases, which focus on loitering statutes, are deemed unpersuasive as they differ significantly from the statute concerning failure to comply with lawful orders. The referenced cases also involve restrictions on constitutional rights, such as free assembly and association, which are not applicable here since Burke does not claim A.R.S. 28-622(A) infringes on such rights. Additionally, the crime prevention aspects of loitering laws may clash with the Fourth Amendment's requirement for probable cause for arrests. Given that the statute's language provides clear notice of prohibited conduct, it is upheld as not unconstitutionally vague. The conclusion affirms the judgment based on these points.