A series of 911 calls reporting gunshots in Indianapolis led police to arrest Anthony Hampton, who was in a white SUV. Witnesses described seeing Hampton and another man near the scene of the shooting, including specific details about their clothing. The police arrived shortly after the calls and received further descriptions from witnesses, including one who later identified Hampton but did not initially report his recognition or that the man was armed. Officers stopped the SUV, arrested Hampton, and found two guns inside. Hampton was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon. After enhancements due to his prior felony convictions, he was sentenced to 387 months in prison. The court affirmed his conviction, establishing that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and that Hampton possessed the firearm. However, the court determined that one of Hampton's prior convictions, for criminal recklessness, did not qualify as a "violent felony" under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), necessitating a resentencing.
Hampton was observed wearing a blue shirt with yellow stripes and appeared disheveled and sweaty. During a search of the Jeep he was in, police discovered two firearms: a black Ruger handgun under the driver's seat and a chrome Smith & Wesson revolver near the rear seat. A witness, Keith Moore, who was on a nearby rooftop, called 911 to report the incident he witnessed, including a man firing a large, silver handgun at an apartment building. Moore identified Hampton as the gunman when taken to the traffic stop scene. Additionally, an orange Nissan Murano with bullet holes was found in the Subway parking lot; Hampton's girlfriend testified she had lent him the car without bullet holes prior to the incident. The district court denied Hampton's motion to suppress the Smith & Wesson revolver. After a two-day trial, a jury convicted him. The court applied sentencing guidelines, resulting in an offense level of 38 due to Hampton's extensive criminal history, ultimately sentencing him to 387 months in prison.
Hampton's appeal includes challenging the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing the officers lacked reasonable suspicion for the stop based on 911 calls. He asserts that the call did not provide a reliable basis for suspicion and questioned the credibility of witness Anthony Smith, noting a prior conviction for false reporting. The court reviews motions to suppress by assessing legal questions de novo and factual questions for clear error.
Hampton's stop is analyzed under the standards set by Terry v. Ohio, which allows police to initiate an investigatory stop with reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Officers must cite 'specific and articulable facts' to support their actions rather than rely on a 'mere hunch.' The reasonableness of the stop is assessed through the totality of the circumstances. Hampton argues that Smith, as an anonymous tipster, did not provide sufficient grounds for reasonable suspicion. However, in Florida v. J.L., the Supreme Court ruled that anonymous tips require reliability indicators to justify a stop. Unlike J.L., where an anonymous tip reported only a gun's possession, Smith's report of multiple gunshots in broad daylight indicated an ongoing emergency. Previous rulings, including United States v. Drake and United States v. Hicks, support that emergency calls carry a presumption of reliability and require less verification before police action. In Hampton's case, multiple 911 calls about shots fired and a fleeing gunman established a clear emergency. Even if the emergency had technically ended before Smith's call, the detailed information he provided allowed officers to assess his credibility, justifying the stop and frisk.
Smith provided a location for police accountability regarding the accuracy of his information and identified himself after police stopped Hampton. He relayed detailed descriptions of the 'shooter’s' movements and expressed fear of being seen. Police verified Smith’s report by observing a white SUV with out-of-town plates in the vicinity he described. While there were inconsistencies in Smith’s account compared to other 911 callers, all reported critical details: multiple gunshots, involvement of two black men, the shooter lurking between buildings, and fleeing on foot toward 38th Street. Although the 911 operator did not initially ask if Smith had witnessed the shooting, the corroboration from other callers made it reasonable to believe he had. Smith was the only caller providing specific information about the gunman’s location and remained on the line until police apprehended Hampton.
Hampton's argument that earlier inquiry into Smith's background would undermine his reliability is rejected, as dispatchers do not conduct background checks during active emergencies. Police acted on the knowledge available at the time, and subsequent information does not affect the legitimacy of their actions. It is clarified that 911 operators did not determine reasonable suspicion; they relayed information that the police used to establish it, which included reports from multiple callers. The officers were aware of two black men involved in the shooting and identified a suspect vehicle. The rapid evolution of the situation was evident, and Smith’s detailed account aligned with other reports, providing a basis for police action. In cases involving vehicle stops, proximity to the crime and vehicle description are key factors in establishing reasonable suspicion. The officers had a justified basis to stop the Jeep in which Hampton was a passenger, given the immediate threat to public safety.
Hampton's claim that the district court improperly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal due to insufficient evidence is reviewed de novo. He argues the evidence was inadequate because the government did not establish constructive possession and the testimonies of Smith and Moore were insufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude he possessed the gun. The burden of proof lies heavily on Hampton, and the evidence must be viewed favorably towards the government; a conviction can only be overturned if no reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
To uphold a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the government must demonstrate either actual or constructive possession of the firearm. Actual possession occurs when a defendant has physical control over the weapon, while constructive possession requires the defendant to have the power and intent to control the item, either directly or through others. Mere proximity to the firearm is insufficient; a connection between the accused and the gun must be established.
Hampton contends that the government only showed his proximity to the gun, disputing the credibility of the witnesses’ testimonies. He highlights discrepancies in the descriptions of the gun and challenges the reliability of Moore’s account due to his distance from the incident. However, the government presented adequate evidence of both constructive and actual possession. Two guns were recovered from the Jeep where Hampton was a passenger, with the Smith & Wesson found within his reach. Testimony indicated that Hampton was seen holding a gun prior to entering the vehicle, establishing a nexus between him and the weapon.
Evidence presented by the prosecution established that Hampton had actual possession of a firearm, despite arguments regarding the weakness of the government's case for constructive possession. Witnesses Smith and Moore confirmed seeing Hampton with a gun, with Moore specifically noting Hampton placed it in his waistband before entering a white SUV. Legal precedents, such as *United States v. McNeal*, support that circumstantial evidence can affirm possession. The court dismissed Hampton's claims about discrepancies in the witnesses' descriptions of the gun's color, emphasizing that it is not the court's role to reconcile such inconsistencies, which should be determined by the jury. The jury found the witnesses credible despite the defense's attempts to undermine their testimony. Consequently, the court upheld the jury's verdict regarding the sufficiency of evidence for possession.
Regarding sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), the district court classified Hampton's prior conviction for residential entry as a violent felony, relying on *United States v. Gardner*. However, following the Supreme Court's ruling in *Begay v. United States*, which clarified the definition of violent felonies, Hampton contended that residential entry no longer qualifies as such. The court indicated it would review the classification of violent felonies de novo, referencing the ACCA's definition, which includes crimes involving the use or threatened use of physical force or presenting a serious potential risk of physical injury.
In 1996, Hampton was convicted of residential entry under Indiana law, defined as knowingly or intentionally breaking into another's dwelling, classified as a Class D felony. This offense lacks the physical force element necessary to qualify under a specific subsection of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and is not listed among the enumerated offenses. Therefore, it must be evaluated under the residual clause, which pertains to crimes that pose a serious potential risk of physical injury to others.
The Supreme Court's decision in Begay is referenced, where it determined that DUI does not qualify as a "violent felony" under the ACCA, as it does not align closely with the listed violent offenses. The Court emphasized that such crimes typically involve purposeful, violent conduct, contrasting with the nature of DUI.
The inquiry into Hampton's residential entry conviction focuses solely on its statutory definition, rather than the specific facts of the case. Although residential entry is categorized alongside burglary in Indiana law, it does not fulfill the definition of generic burglary due to the absence of required intent to commit a felony within the dwelling. However, the critical question under the residual clause is whether the offense presents a serious potential risk of physical injury.
The conclusion drawn is that residential entry poses a risk comparable to burglary, as both situations could lead to violence if the offender is confronted. Supporting cases illustrate that similar offenses, like fleeing from an officer or third-degree burglary, qualify as "violent felonies" due to the inherent risks they present. Thus, the government can argue that residential entry meets the criteria for enhancement under the ACCA's residual clause.
Hampton’s counsel was unable to provide an example of a residential entry that poses less risk of violence than burglary, emphasizing that such conduct is intentional as required by the statute, which mandates 'knowingly or intentionally' breaking and entering into a home. This act is deemed inherently aggressive, creating a significant risk of violent confrontation between the burglar and the homeowner. Therefore, residential entry qualifies as a 'violent felony' under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).
Additionally, the inquiry revealed complications regarding one of Hampton's prior convictions for criminal recklessness. The district court used three felonies—resisting law enforcement, residential entry, and criminal recklessness—to classify Hampton as an armed career criminal. Although neither party raised the issue of the criminal recklessness conviction during sentencing or appeal, recent case law indicates that such a conviction may not qualify as a predicate violent felony under the ACCA.
The court sought input from both parties on the applicability of recent precedents (Smith and Woods) to the criminal recklessness conviction. The government argued that Hampton had waived this issue, which requires the intentional relinquishment of a known right. However, the court determined that Hampton had merely forfeited the issue, as he did not intentionally abandon it. Since the relevant cases were decided after Hampton's sentencing and opening brief, he did not affirmatively waive the argument concerning the classification of the criminal recklessness conviction. The government acknowledged that if there was no waiver, a remand would be necessary, which the court agreed with, allowing for plain error review due to the failure to timely assert the issue.
The district court erred by enhancing Hampton’s sentence based on an incorrect classification of criminal recklessness in Indiana as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). Without this conviction, Hampton lacks the necessary felony convictions for sentence enhancement. His classification as an armed career criminal imposed a minimum sentence of fifteen years and elevated his offense level from 28 to 34 under the guidelines. Consequently, the case is remanded for resentencing. Although the court has previously corrected plain errors not raised by defendants, such actions were taken only to assist defendants who had sought review on other grounds. The court affirms Hampton's conviction but vacates his sentence and remands for resentencing.
