United States v. Dexter Betts

Citation: Not availableDocket: 08-3555

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; August 12, 2009; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Dexter Wayne Betts pleaded guilty to distributing over fifty grams of cocaine base, with increased penalties applicable to crack cocaine. He contested the government's classification of the substance as crack during sentencing, but the district court, after a two-day hearing, determined it was crack and sentenced him to 140 months in prison. Betts argued that the evidence was insufficient and cited ambiguous judicial comments as a flaw in the court's finding. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court's judgment, noting that the judge appropriately relied on the testimony of an experienced investigating officer, Sergeant Ronald Kimble.

The background of the case involves an undercover investigation by the Chicago Police Department into an open-air drug market. On September 9, 2006, Sergeant Kimble arranged to purchase half a kilogram of crack from Betts's co-defendant, Timothy Person. During the transaction, Betts provided two bags containing a white, rocky substance, which were sold to Kimble for $11,000. After the sale, Betts was arrested with $7,200 in pre-recorded bills. Initially charged with conspiracy to distribute crack, Betts later pleaded guilty to distribution, disputing the classification of the substance as crack for sentencing. 

At sentencing, the government presented two witnesses: a forensic chemist who analyzed the substances and determined their composition, and Sergeant Kimble, who testified based on extensive experience with crack cocaine. The chemist confirmed the presence of cocaine base but did not definitively categorize it as crack, while Sergeant Kimble's extensive experience supported the government's claim. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not err in its determination, affirming the sentence.

Sergeant Kimble testified to purchasing two large chunks of a white, rocky substance, which he identified as crack based on his experience. In contrast, defense expert Wayne Morris, a forensic scientist, argued that the substance was not crack but a non-crack form of cocaine base, citing Betts's method of production that involved minimal water and a lack of filtering. Betts corroborated this by explaining how he and co-defendant Antwan Ramsey mixed powder cocaine with procaine and sodium bicarbonate to enhance quantity and sold it for less than market price for crack, despite customer complaints about quality. The government presented FBI Agent Jeffrey Moore, who recounted Betts’s admission during a proffer interview that he and Ramsey cooked powder cocaine to produce crack, affirming the accuracy of the criminal complaint's references to "crack." The district court ultimately classified the substance as crack based on the totality of evidence, including Sergeant Kimble's testimony, and imposed a ten-year minimum sentence under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Betts appealed, contesting the sufficiency of evidence for the classification of the substance and the judge's statements regarding the legal distinction between crack and cocaine base. The appellate court noted the government’s burden to prove drug type by a preponderance of the evidence and confirmed the district court's finding was not clearly erroneous, emphasizing that a reversal would require a firm conviction of a mistake.

Crack is classified as a specific type of cocaine base, and enhanced statutory minimum sentences for distributing fifty grams or more of "cocaine base" under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) apply solely to crack, not other forms of cocaine base. Sentencing guidelines similarly specify that enhanced penalties apply only to crack. Given the significant disparities in sentencing, it is essential for the government to provide evidence that a substance is crack, as there is no precise chemical definition for it. Courts assess whether a substance is crack based on factors like chemical testing, appearance, packaging, pricing, and seller representation. In this case, the district court relied on Sergeant Kimble's experienced observations to conclude that the substance was crack, supported by chemical analysis indicating the presence of cocaine base and sodium bicarbonate or procaine, common in crack. Agent Moore's insights and Betts's own admissions further reinforced this determination. Betts contested the reliance on Sergeant Kimble, arguing that the sergeant could not identify the production method of the substance. Courts can, however, utilize insights from experienced individuals in the drug trade to assess whether a substance is crack. Betts also argued that expert testimony indicated his production method lacked typical characteristics of crack production. The court has historically refrained from adopting a strict definition of crack or a specific production method to prevent evasion of legal penalties through minor adjustments in drug processing.

The district court dismissed the credibility of Betts’s expert witness, finding that the expert's reliance on Betts's own inconsistent description of the substance's production did not align with chemical analysis, which indicated the substance was cocaine base. Betts argued that comments made by the judge during sentencing constituted reversible error, claiming the judge improperly considered external evidence to undermine both his and his expert’s testimonies. The judge stated that based on his experience with similar cases, Betts’s testimony about the production process was inconsistent with the established scientific understanding of how cocaine base is formed. 

While a sentencing court has broad discretion regarding the evidence it considers, it must ensure such evidence is reliable. Although the rules of evidence and the right to confront witnesses are relaxed at sentencing, courts should not rely on undisclosed evidence that prevents rebuttal opportunities. The judge's reference to expert knowledge was not deemed reversible error, as the court provided adequate reasoning for rejecting Betts’s account, and the parties were allowed to present evidence. The court's determination of credibility is given significant deference, and sufficient evidence supported its findings. Furthermore, the judge acknowledged that while the process yielded cocaine base, it does not necessarily equate to crack cocaine, which could impact the sentencing given the disparity between crack and other forms of cocaine base.

The judge recognized that crack is a specific form of cocaine base, describing it as "merely a physical form of cocaine base that’s smokable." The court appropriately accepted Sergeant Kimble’s identification of the substance as crack and found that the evidence presented did not contradict this identification. The determination that no other evidence suggested a different classification aligns with the standard of review, which does not indicate clear error. Although the government's evidence lacked specifics to differentiate the substance from other cocaine base forms, it was sufficient to meet the "more likely than not" standard established in United States v. Branch. The cumulative evidence, including chemical analysis, the undercover officer’s identification, and Betts’s own admissions regarding his dealings with crack, substantiates the court’s conclusion. Consequently, Betts’s sentence is affirmed.