Gayle Schor, Kristine Mulcahy, and Angela Shue (plaintiffs) filed a class action lawsuit against the City of Chicago, challenging the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance prohibiting the use of wireless telephones without a hands-free device while driving (Municipal Code of Chicago, Ill. 9-76-230). The district court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and denied the plaintiffs' request to amend their complaint, deeming any amendment frivolous under Rule 15(a). The ordinance, effective July 8, 2005, classifies violations as "equipment violations" rather than "moving violations" and outlines specific exceptions. The plaintiffs had received citations for violating the ordinance, with varying outcomes in their contests of those citations. They alleged multiple constitutional violations, including Fourth Amendment rights, Equal Protection Clause violations, and claims against Mayor Richard Daley and the City for false arrest and malicious prosecution, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The district court dismissed all claims, including additional challenges raised in the proposed amendment, leading to the affirmation of the judgment by the appellate court.
The City defendants did not invoke the defense of claim preclusion, which they could have, given that the plaintiffs had opportunities to present their arguments in administrative proceedings and appeals to state court. This defense was forfeited, allowing the court to focus on the plaintiffs' claims on appeal, which include two primary arguments: the district court's dismissal of their complaint for failure to state a claim and the refusal to allow them to amend their complaint.
In reviewing the dismissal, the court applies a de novo standard under Rule 12(b)(6), accepting the plaintiffs' factual allegations as true.
1. **Fourth Amendment Claim**: The plaintiffs argue that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated during a traffic stop, asserting that the police lacked probable cause due to an ineffective cell phone ordinance. However, the court finds that if an officer has an objectively reasonable basis to believe a traffic law has been violated, probable cause exists. The officers observed the plaintiffs using their mobile phones without a hands-free device, constituting a valid traffic violation. The plaintiffs provided no compelling argument against the City's authority to enact such an ordinance. Consequently, the court upheld the dismissal of the Fourth Amendment claim.
2. **Equal Protection Claim**: The plaintiffs allege a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the "class of one" theory, claiming they were treated differently from similarly situated individuals. To succeed, they must demonstrate intentional differential treatment without a rational basis. While the plaintiffs were indeed treated differently, they were violating a valid ordinance, which justified the officers' actions. The court concluded that the distinction between the plaintiffs and non-ticketed drivers was rational, leading to the dismissal of the equal protection claim.
City liability for constitutional violations requires a plaintiff to show an underlying constitutional violation to hold a municipality accountable under § 1983, as established in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services. The plaintiffs failed to allege a plausible constitutional violation by Mayor Daley or the officers, thus precluding any basis for municipal liability, supported by City of Los Angeles v. Heller.
Regarding the Illinois Vehicle Code, the plaintiffs claimed that the City must post signs for local ordinances, such as Chicago's cell phone law. However, the court found that it need not address this state-law claim since all federal claims were dismissed prior to trial, as per 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and there was no indication of abuse of discretion in the district court's decision.
The district court also denied the plaintiffs' request to amend their complaint to include two new theories challenging the Ordinance's constitutionality, citing untimeliness and futility. One theory claimed an infringement of the constitutional right to travel, which is recognized under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; however, the court noted that the plaintiffs did not establish how the Ordinance violated this right. The second theory argued the Ordinance was void for vagueness. The court upheld the district court's denial of leave to amend, indicating no abuse of discretion occurred in that decision.
The plaintiffs argue that the Ordinance restricts their right to travel by requiring motorists to be aware of local regulations that may differ from those in neighboring municipalities and by implying that using mobile phones while driving is permissible in emergencies. The court counters that the Ordinance does not prohibit travel but regulates driving, similar to licensing and registration requirements. The plaintiffs can utilize alternative transportation if they wish to use their phones. Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to show any plausible infringement on their right to travel, justifying the district court’s denial of their request to amend their complaint.
Additionally, the plaintiffs claim the Ordinance is void for vagueness, asserting that terms like "use" and "hands-free" are unclear. However, to succeed on a vagueness claim, they must demonstrate that the law is unconstitutional in all its applications. Since the plaintiffs admit to using a cell phone without a hands-free device, they cannot argue vagueness regarding conduct that is clearly prohibited. The court finds it unreasonable to assert that the Ordinance is vague when the plaintiffs themselves recognized their actions were in violation. Consequently, the district court’s refusal to allow this amendment is upheld, affirming its judgment.
