Tommy C. Cox was convicted on two counts related to the transportation and solicitation of an individual under 18 for prostitution, violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 2423(a) and 2422(a), and pleaded guilty to two counts of credit card fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3). On appeal, Cox contended that the district court erred by not requiring the Government to prove he knew the transported individual was underage and claimed the court abused its discretion by allowing evidence of his credit card fraud at trial. The appellate court affirmed the district court's rulings, stating that the Government is not required to prove knowledge of the victim's age under § 2423(a) and that the admission of credit card fraud evidence was appropriate. The case arose from an incident where an unauthorized credit card was used to rent hotel rooms, leading to Cox's arrest. Evidence presented at trial included testimony from Quantan Champion, a minor whom Cox involved in prostitution, detailing how Cox facilitated and profited from Champion's sexual services.
In spring or early summer 2006, Cox relocated from Chicago to Atlanta, initially leaving Champion behind. Later that fall, Cox returned to Chicago, found Champion, and brought him to Atlanta, where Champion testified that Cox continued to exploit him by advertising his services and arranging meetings, similar to their arrangement in Chicago. Champion eventually returned to Chicago and rejected Cox’s attempts to bring him back to Atlanta, ceasing all prostitution thereafter.
Following Cox's arrest, a grand jury indicted him on four counts: Count I charged him with transporting a minor for prostitution under 18 U.S.C. 2423(a), Count II with persuading a person to travel for prostitution under 18 U.S.C. 2422(a), and Counts III and IV with credit card fraud violations under 18 U.S.C. 1029(a)(3). On October 23, 2007, Cox pleaded guilty to the credit card fraud charges. Subsequently, the Government filed two motions in limine: one asserting that it need not prove Cox knew Champion was a minor for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. 2423(a), and the other seeking the admissibility of credit card fraud evidence in relation to Counts I and II due to its close connection to the primary offenses. The district court granted both motions on October 31, 2007, confirming that knowledge of the victim's age was not necessary for conviction and that the credit card evidence was relevant and admissible.
Cox's motion for reconsideration was denied on November 5, 2007, and a jury found him guilty on Counts I and II on November 8, 2007. Before oral arguments for his appeal, Cox submitted a pro se motion questioning the effectiveness of his counsel, which was denied. An emergency motion to delay the oral argument due to potential counsel conflict was also denied. During the oral argument, counsel Weidenhammer indicated a possible conflict but proceeded with the case. Shortly after, Cox filed a motion to substitute counsel, which was later withdrawn, with Weidenhammer stating any issues had been resolved. The court found no reason to relieve Weidenhammer, emphasizing that Cox could not raise substantive issues while represented and advising against claiming ineffective assistance on direct appeal.
Weidenhammer has appropriately addressed the issue raised by Cox’s pro se filing without compromising legal ethics or representation standards. He has followed the communication and strategic decision-making rules, as well as those regarding the termination of the attorney-client relationship, and has maintained candor before the court. No conflict necessitates his withdrawal from the case.
Cox contends that under 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), the government must prove that a defendant knew the victim was under 18. The statute states that transporting a minor for prostitution or related activities is punishable by significant penalties. Cox argues that the term "knowingly" applies to the victim's age, suggesting it is an element of the offense. However, this court, aligning with the Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, concludes that knowledge of the victim’s age is not required. The court interprets "knowingly" as modifying only the act of transporting, not the minor status of the victim. Cox's argument is deemed grammatically unreasonable, as it would require an illogical application of the adverb. Additionally, a comparison to 18 U.S.C. § 2421, which has similar language but does not include an age element, supports the conclusion that "knowingly" applies solely to the act of transportation. Thus, there is no redundancy in the statute’s wording when analyzed correctly.
The interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) suggests that its provision regarding the age of individuals transported for prostitution serves as an aggravating factor, enhancing penalties specifically to protect minors from sexual exploitation. Unlike 18 U.S.C. § 2421, which already prohibits transporting any individual across state lines for prostitution, § 2423(a) is intended to impose stricter penalties when minors are involved, reflecting congressional intent for heightened protection of minors. The Supreme Court's ruling in *United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.* established that certain statutes require knowledge of a victim's age, but this requirement does not apply uniformly to all statutes. In the context of § 2423(a), defendants are already aware that transporting individuals for prostitution is illegal, which diminishes the need for an additional mens rea regarding age. Past rulings indicate that knowledge of a victim's age is not a prerequisite for conviction under certain statutes, aligning with the intent behind § 2423(a) to simplify prosecution while ensuring minors receive special legal protection. The interpretation of statutory language, as addressed in *Flores-Figueroa v. United States*, underscores that context matters, and does not necessitate a different reading of § 2423(a) from the one proposed.
Justice Alito's concurring opinion highlighted that certain appellate court decisions interpreting 2423(a) do not necessitate proof of the defendant's knowledge of the victim's age, suggesting a potential deviation from the Court's ruling in Flores-Figueroa. The district court correctly determined that the Government did not need to prove that Cox was aware Champion was a minor.
Cox contended that the district court erred by allowing evidence of his credit card fraud, related to Counts III and IV of the indictment, arguing it was inadmissible "other crimes" evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). This rule generally prohibits the use of such evidence to demonstrate a person's character to suggest they acted in accordance with that character. However, the court noted that evidence closely related to the charged crime is admissible if it meets the relevancy standards of Rule 401 and does not violate Rule 403 by being overly prejudicial.
Cox claimed the credit card fraud evidence was irrelevant and merely served to depict him as a criminal. The court disagreed, stating that this evidence was vital in countering Cox's defense claim that he was not a pimp due to his lack of financial resources. The prosecution needed to demonstrate that Cox had the means to finance the hotel gatherings for prostitution, thereby supporting its case against him. As such, the district court's admission of the evidence was deemed appropriate, and the court affirmed the district court's judgment.
