United States v. Saul Garcia

Citation: Not availableDocket: 07-3964

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; September 1, 2009; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Paula Alvarez, Dustin Decker, and Saul Garcia were implicated in a drug conspiracy spanning from Chicago to Indianapolis, as outlined in a second superseding indictment returned by a grand jury on June 20, 2007. This indictment included twenty-one individuals charged with various offenses, including conspiracy to distribute over 500 grams of methamphetamine as per 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. A jury convicted Alvarez and Garcia, while Decker entered a guilty plea. The appeals court consolidated their cases for review, noting the distinct roles each defendant played in the conspiracy.

Alvarez primarily contested both her conviction and sentence, while Decker focused solely on his sentence. Garcia's counsel submitted an Anders brief seeking to withdraw from representation. The court upheld Alvarez's conviction and the sentences for both Alvarez and Decker, granting Garcia's counsel's motion to withdraw and dismissing his appeal.

Alvarez, who was forty-four years old and living near Chicago, turned to Jorge Baltista and his wife for support following her separation from her husband. Baltista, a methamphetamine distributor, manipulated Alvarez, who claimed ignorance of his illegal activities. Testimony revealed that shortly after her arrival in Indianapolis, Alvarez participated in transporting drug proceeds and methamphetamine multiple times. The evidence against her was substantiated by witness accounts detailing her involvement within weeks of meeting Baltista, who had begun distributing methamphetamine through a network of local dealers, including those implicated in the case.

On December 28, Alvarez agreed to return to Whiting after receiving approximately $45,000 from Baltista, who claimed it was for drug transactions, although Alvarez was uncertain about the specifics. Hernandez testified that Alvarez had seen the cash prior to wrapping and initially thought the amount was only $20,000. Alvarez expressed confidence about not being apprehended due to perceived gender biases in policing. Recorded phone calls between Baltista and Lupillo revealed plans to send money with Alvarez, with Baltista emphasizing the urgency on December 27. 

Two weeks later, on January 10, 2007, Hernandez informed Baltista of counting $19,460 in drug proceeds, which Baltista later gave to Alvarez for delivery to Lupillo. The following day, Alvarez hand-delivered the money to Lupillo's girlfriend while Hernandez waited nearby. After learning of an arrest related to drug activities, Hernandez felt unsafe and temporarily relocated with her children back to Whiting with Alvarez.

On January 18, Baltista requested a ride to Chicago from Alvarez, informing her it was for drug pickup, though the specific type was not disclosed. They met with individuals including Eden Soto and Enano at a restaurant, where Alvarez waited in her car. Baltista falsely introduced Enano as his son and instructed Alvarez to drive him to her home in Whiting. During the drive, Alvarez planned to claim they were mother and child if stopped by police. After waiting at her house, they were called to meet Baltista for dinner and later traveled to a gas station. Alvarez left her car running with the keys inside while they entered a store. Baltista's drug source, Lupillo, then drove away in Alvarez's car, and upon returning, Lupillo indicated to Alvarez that methamphetamine was in her vehicle's trunk.

Alvarez initially intended to return to Whiting but took Enano to an Indianapolis apartment per Baltista's instructions. Enano retrieved about five pounds of methamphetamine from her trunk, which he and Eden Soto later distributed among their conspiracy group. Afterward, Alvarez informed Hernandez that she had just returned from Chicago and had dropped off a man who removed drugs from her car. The DEA arrested her shortly thereafter. At trial, Alvarez altered her account, claiming ignorance of the drug conspiracy and denying any trip to Whiting on December 28, while admitting to traveling to Chicago with Hernandez on January 11, though she denied involvement in any money exchange. 

During cross-examination, Alvarez was questioned about her lack of curiosity regarding the events surrounding her transport of Enano, whom she did not believe to be Baltista's son. Despite spending over six hours with him, she did not inquire about his identity or their destination, nor did she question the instructions given to her. She also stated that leaving her keys in the ignition while a stranger drove her car was not unusual. The jury found her guilty of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.

The probation office's pre-sentence investigation report (PSR) recommended no aggravating or mitigating role for Alvarez but suggested a two-level enhancement for obstructing justice, leading to a total offense level of forty and a recommended imprisonment range of 292 to 365 months. Alvarez objected to these calculations. During the January 4, 2008, sentencing hearing, the district court determined her base offense level to be thirty-eight but reduced it to thirty-four after recognizing her minor role in the conspiracy. The court also imposed a two-level enhancement for obstructing justice due to findings of perjury, resulting in a final offense level of thirty-four and a sentence of 168 months in jail.

Alvarez's appeal emphasizes her claim of being an unwitting participant manipulated by Baltista. She argues that the government failed to prove she knew she was transporting drugs, but the standard for sufficiency of evidence is stringent, requiring that the evidence be viewed favorably towards the government, and her challenge is considered "nearly insurmountable." The court's deference to the jury's verdict typically results in such challenges rarely succeeding.

The evidence in the record supports a jury's finding that Alvarez conspired to distribute narcotics. The government needed to prove that she knowingly and intentionally agreed with at least one other person to distribute a controlled substance, as outlined in 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. A conspiracy charge requires substantial evidence that the defendant was aware of the illegal objective and agreed to participate, but knowledge of the specific drug type or quantity is not necessary. 

Testimony indicated that Alvarez was aware of Baltista’s drug operations, with both Baltista and his wife confirming discussions with her about the business. Hernandez testified that Alvarez delivered cash to Lupillo’s girlfriend without fear of police intervention. Alvarez's suspicious trip to Chicago, for which she was informed by Baltista was solely for retrieving drugs, further implicated her. Witnesses, including Enano, indicated that Alvarez was aware of transporting illegal drugs and even inquired about their presence in her vehicle. 

Alvarez's claims that the evidence was incredible or inconsistent do not affect the appeal review, which does not assess witness credibility; that responsibility rests with the jury. Sufficient evidence was presented for a jury to find Alvarez guilty.

Additionally, Alvarez challenged the district court's “ostrich” or “conscious-avoidance” jury instruction, which conveys that a defendant cannot escape liability by ignoring the truth if they suspect involvement in criminal activities. This instruction clarifies that deliberate avoidance is not a lesser standard than actual knowledge but an alternative means of proving it.

Alvarez challenges the court's jury instruction on two grounds: its accuracy and the evidentiary basis for it. Both challenges are rejected. The court's instruction was deemed an accurate statement of the law, despite Alvarez's claim that it failed to inform the jury of the necessity for her awareness of a "high probability" of trafficking illegal drugs. Since Alvarez did not object to the instruction's form during the trial or propose alternative language, the review is conducted under a plain error standard, which is highly deferential and only addresses significant errors affecting substantial rights. The instruction given defined actual knowledge and deliberate avoidance as equivalent, allowing the jury to infer knowledge from a combination of suspicion and indifference. This aligns with established precedent and pattern jury instructions, and the court found no error in its application. Although Alvarez referenced cases from other circuits advocating for the inclusion of "high probability," the court maintained that the existing instruction sufficiently required the jury to consider her strong suspicion and indifference to the truth. Regarding the evidentiary basis for the instruction, the court found no abuse of discretion, affirming that the evidence presented at trial supported the issuance of the ostrich instruction when viewed favorably for the government.

An ostrich instruction is applicable if (1) a defendant asserts a lack of guilty knowledge regarding the illegality of her actions, and (2) the government provides evidence suggesting that the defendant intentionally avoided the truth. In Alvarez's case, she claimed ignorance, necessitating an examination of whether sufficient evidence indicated her deliberate ignorance. Such evidence can include both overt actions and psychological avoidance. The instruction is justified if the evidence allows for an inference that Alvarez consciously disregarded her suspicions about her involvement in criminal activity, as opposed to mere negligence. The instruction is not suitable if the evidence only supports a binary choice between actual knowledge and none at all. 

The court has previously upheld the use of the ostrich instruction in cases where defendants, under suspicious circumstances, claimed ignorance of the contents of packages they transported. In Alvarez's situation, the evidence indicated she acted suspiciously during a trip to Chicago, where she left her keys in the ignition and allowed a stranger to drive her car. Her actions, alongside other circumstantial evidence, allowed a jury to infer that she deliberately avoided confirming her involvement in drug trafficking, thus justifying the district court's decision to issue the ostrich instruction.

Regarding sentencing, Alvarez contested her classification as a minor participant in the conspiracy, her sentence enhancement for obstructing justice due to perjury, and the district court's assessment of sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). All her arguments were deemed unsuccessful.

Alvarez was granted a two-level reduction in her sentencing as a minor participant in a drug conspiracy, but she argued for a four-level reduction as a minimal participant. The district court's finding was reviewed for clear error, given that such reductions are rarely reversed unless there is a strong conviction of a mistake. A minimal participant is defined as one of the least culpable individuals in a group, typically lacking knowledge of the enterprise's scope, while a minor participant is less culpable than most but not minimal. The court found no error in designating Alvarez as a minor participant, emphasizing that a defendant's involvement does not warrant a reduction simply because others were more engaged. Previous rulings indicated that proximity to conspiracy leaders or active roles, such as drug transportation, typically preclude reductions. Testimony highlighted Alvarez's significant assistance to the conspiracy, her closeness to its leaders, and her trustworthiness for transporting drugs and money. The district court noted her lesser culpability compared to others but concluded that her level of involvement did not qualify her as a minimal participant. This conclusion was upheld without finding clear error.

Alvarez challenged a two-level increase to her offense level for obstructing justice under U.S.S.G. 3C1.1, arguing that the district court did not specify which aspects of her testimony were deemed false. The court found her testimony was contradictory to credible witnesses and wiretap evidence, determining it was intentionally misleading. The legal standards for applying the obstruction enhancement require proof of false testimony given willfully, not due to confusion or mistake. The court confirmed it found all elements of perjury: falsity, willfulness, and materiality. Although Alvarez contended the court failed to identify her specific false statements, prior rulings indicate such specificity is not mandatory. The district court's references to her trips, related wiretap evidence, and her role were sufficient. 

Regarding the reasonableness of her sentence, Alvarez argued against the court's analysis of the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). The court's role is to impose a sentence based on these factors, and appellate review is for abuse of discretion. Sentences within the Guidelines range are presumed reasonable. The district court sentenced Alvarez to 168 months, within the range of 151 to 188 months, applying the Guidelines correctly and considering the relevant factors. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion and upheld both her conviction and sentence.

Dustin Decker, an Indianapolis methamphetamine dealer, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute over 500 grams of methamphetamine, as defined under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 846. At his plea hearing, a federal agent provided testimony regarding two significant methamphetamine recoveries from Decker's residence and indicated that Decker received weekly deliveries of approximately five pounds of methamphetamine intended for resale from October 2006 to January 2007. Decker contested the weekly quantity, asserting he only received a total of seven to eight pounds throughout the conspiracy. The probation office's Presentence Report (PSR) adopted the government's facts, disregarding Decker's claims, and assigned a base offense level of thirty-eight, which Decker accepted in his Sentencing Memorandum while requesting a reduction for his minor role in the conspiracy under U.S.S.G. 3B1.2(b).

During sentencing, the district court confirmed the PSR's base offense level, and Decker's counsel did not object to the drug quantity but argued for the minor role reduction. After applying a two-level increase for firearm possession and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the court established Decker’s final offense level at thirty-seven, resulting in a sentencing range of 235 to 293 months. Decker was sentenced to 235 months and subsequently appealed, contending that the district court miscalculated his base offense level by attributing excessive methamphetamine to him.

The appeal necessitates determining if Decker waived or merely forfeited his challenge regarding the base offense level, as waiver precludes appellate review, while forfeiture allows for plain error review. The distinction hinges on whether Decker made a deliberate decision not to assert his right, as emphasized in relevant case law. Decker argues that his counsel's remarks did not constitute a waiver, citing a precedent indicating that a statement of non-objection does not automatically imply relinquishment of rights. However, the interpretation of that precedent may not be as broad as Decker suggests.

The court determined that the defendant failed to strategically object to a sixteen-level sentencing adjustment, suggesting attorney deficiency rather than a deliberate choice. The absence of a strategic reason led to the conclusion that the defendant forfeited his challenge, despite counsel's acceptance of the Guidelines calculation. While a lawyer’s statement of no objection to the Presentence Report (PSR) does not automatically imply waiver, it may do so depending on the context. The court evaluates whether the failure to object was accidental or intentional by reviewing the entire record. In Decker’s case, the court found he waived his objection to the drug quantity calculation because his counsel explicitly acknowledged Decker's potential sentencing based on the entire conspiracy's drug trafficking and asserted no challenge for strategic reasons. The record indicated that Decker was aware of the PSR, his right to object, and had no further objections during court proceedings. This aligns with previous cases that established waiver under similar conditions. Decker chose to emphasize his minor role in the conspiracy rather than challenge the drug quantity, reflecting a strategic decision that resulted in waiver of unpursued arguments. The court concluded that Decker intentionally waived his challenge to the drug quantity calculation. Additionally, the excerpt introduces Saul Garcia, another drug dealer found with evidence of drug transactions after his arrest, including a ledger and firearms.

Garcia was convicted on September 18 for conspiracy to distribute over 500 grams of methamphetamine, having a prior drug-related felony conviction. On December 3, he was sentenced to 380 months in prison for being responsible for fifteen kilograms or more of methamphetamine, with sentence enhancements for firearm possession and obstruction of justice. Garcia's counsel moved to withdraw due to the absence of non-frivolous grounds for appeal, supported by a brief under Anders v. California. The court's review was limited to issues raised in that brief since Garcia did not respond.

Counsel raised concerns about the district court's evidentiary rulings, but these were forfeited due to lack of objection at trial, and no plain error was found. Regarding the sufficiency of evidence, the court determined that there was ample evidence for a reasonable jury to convict Garcia. The court also addressed Garcia’s requests for new counsel, finding that the lower court properly assessed these requests and did not abuse its discretion. 

Finally, the court reviewed issues related to Garcia’s sentence and concluded that the drug quantity was correctly calculated, and the enhancements were justified. The court affirmed both Garcia's conviction and sentence, granted counsel's motion to withdraw, and dismissed the appeal. Decker's challenge regarding drug quantity was also waived and affirmed.