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Supreme Laundry Serv v. Hartford Casualty

Citation: Not availableDocket: 07-1781

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; April 4, 2008; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

Narrative Opinion Summary

In a dispute between Supreme Laundry Service, L.L.C. (Supreme) and its competitor, Coinmach Corporation (Coinmach), over the installation and maintenance of laundry machines in residential buildings, the central legal issue revolved around Supreme’s insurance coverage. Supreme's insurer, Hartford Casualty Insurance Company (Hartford), refused to defend Supreme against Coinmach's counterclaims, arguing that the insurance policy's coverage was limited to claims by natural persons, not corporations. The district court sided with Hartford, granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings. However, upon appeal, the court found the insurance policy ambiguous, as Illinois law requires the term 'person' to be interpreted in its ordinary meaning, encompassing both individuals and corporations. This ambiguity compelled Hartford to defend Supreme, as the allegations potentially fell within the policy's coverage. Furthermore, Hartford was barred from contesting policy defenses due to its failure to defend or seek declaratory judgment. The appellate court reversed the prior judgment, obligating Hartford to reimburse Supreme for defense expenses and remanded the case for additional proceedings.

Legal Issues Addressed

Contractual Estoppel in Insurance Defense

Application: Hartford is estopped from asserting policy defenses due to its failure to defend Supreme or seek a declaratory judgment on its obligations.

Reasoning: Hartford is estopped from asserting a policy defense to coverage because it failed to defend Supreme in the underlying lawsuit.

Exclusion Clauses and Ambiguity

Application: The ambiguity in Exclusion 7, related to the connection between the counterclaim for trespass and the validity of the contract, necessitates Hartford's duty to defend.

Reasoning: The ambiguity in Exclusion 7, stemming from the connection between the counterclaim for trespass and the validity of the contract with the Association, necessitates Hartford's duty to defend.

Insurance Policy Ambiguity and Duty to Defend

Application: The court found the policy ambiguous regarding whether 'person' included corporations, leading to the determination that Hartford had a duty to defend Supreme against Coinmach's claims.

Reasoning: The court found the policy ambiguous regarding this limitation and determined that Hartford had a duty to defend Supreme against Coinmach's claims, leading to a reversal of the district court's judgment.

Interpretation of 'Person' in Insurance Policies

Application: Illinois law requires the term 'person' to be interpreted in its plain, ordinary meaning, which includes both natural persons and corporations, thus affecting the coverage under the CGL policy.

Reasoning: Illinois law mandates that insurers must defend claims that potentially fall within the policy’s coverage. The term 'person' in the policy is undefined, leading Illinois courts to apply its 'plain, ordinary and popular meaning' based on dictionary definitions, which include both natural persons and corporations.