Barnes, Joseph v. Briley, Kenneth

Citation: Not availableDocket: 04-3215

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; August 23, 2005; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Joseph Barnes, an Illinois state prisoner, filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several employees of Stateville Correctional Facility. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed his case, citing a failure to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). Barnes appealed the decision. 

He has been incarcerated at Stateville since 1997 and became concerned about potential hepatitis exposure during a 1999 CDC study on communicable diseases. After his request for testing went unanswered, he filed a pro se complaint against the CDC in October 2000, alleging exposure due to poor sanitation and inadequate medical responses to infected inmates. The district court allowed his FTCA claim to proceed in February 2001 after determining he had exhausted his remedies.

In May 2001, Barnes initiated the prison grievance process regarding the denial of his hepatitis test request. After no response, he escalated the grievance, which was ultimately denied by Warden Kenneth Briley based on a recommendation that deemed it untimely. Following further appeals and grievances, including one in November 2002 that reiterated his request for testing and treatment, Barnes continued to pursue administrative remedies. His grievance was denied again in early 2003, but he was tested for hepatitis in March 2003, subsequently receiving a positive result in May, without having received any medical treatment. The appellate court reversed the district court's dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings.

On December 5, 2003, the director of Stateville denied Mr. Barnes' grievance. Earlier, in August 2003, Mr. Barnes sought to dismiss all claims against the CDC and file an amended complaint asserting violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against current Stateville defendants. The district court approved this motion. The amended complaint claimed the defendants exhibited deliberate indifference to his medical needs, violating the Eighth Amendment, by neglecting his grievances, not testing him for hepatitis, and failing to treat him after a positive test.

The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing Mr. Barnes did not exhaust the prison grievance process prior to filing his original complaint. The district court granted the motion, citing that a prisoner’s lawsuit must be dismissed if administrative remedies are not exhausted. The court noted that Mr. Barnes did not file any grievances before his original complaint on October 10, 2000, and grievances filed during the lawsuit did not meet the exhaustion requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).

Mr. Barnes appealed the dismissal. The defendants questioned whether the dismissal was final and appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Dismissals for failure to exhaust are typically without prejudice, allowing for reinstatement unless it’s too late to exhaust remedies. The district court did not clarify if the dismissal was with or without prejudice, but it was presumed to be without prejudice. Dismissals without prejudice are usually not appealable, but if a plaintiff cannot remedy the defects in their complaint, it may be treated as final. Given Mr. Barnes had no further remedies to exhaust, the identified defect was irreparable, making the dismissal effectively final for appellate review.

The standard of review for a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is de novo, meaning the appellate court will evaluate the case anew, favoring the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations.

Affirmation of dismissal occurs only if it is clear that a plaintiff cannot prove any facts to support their claim for relief, as established in Lee v. City of Chicago. Mr. Barnes asserts he exhausted his administrative remedies under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) concerning his 1983 claims prior to amending his complaint. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) mandates that prisoners must exhaust all available administrative remedies before filing actions related to prison conditions, making exhaustion a prerequisite for any lawsuit. Failure to exhaust leads to mandatory dismissal. The exhaustion process allows prison officials to address complaints before litigation, potentially resolving issues amicably.

Mr. Barnes argues that he was not required to exhaust remedies for his 1983 claims before filing an original Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) complaint. However, the defendants contend he cannot satisfy the exhaustion requirement by addressing grievances post-filing, regardless of the differences between his original and amended claims. Additionally, Barnes claims there were no available remedies related to his 1983 claims when he filed the FTCA claim, pointing out the inability of a state agency (IDOC) to remedy actions against a federal agency (CDC) and that his 1983 claims did not exist at that time.

The court concluded that Mr. Barnes complied with the PLRA by initially filing exhausted claims against the CDC and later, after an investigation by new counsel, pursued the grievance process for different claims against new defendants. He exhausted those remedies before dismissing his FTCA claims and substituting his 1983 claims. His actions demonstrated compliance with the PLRA’s purpose, as he made repeated requests for necessary medical testing and treatment through the grievance system. The district court's expectation for Mr. Barnes to exhaust remedies not yet relevant to his existing complaint was deemed unreasonable. The defendants' argument that he failed to exhaust the grievance system before amending his complaint due to not receiving a final denial was rejected.

A prisoner, Mr. Barnes, was unable to bring a suit under Section 1983 until after the prison administrative review board issued a final decision on his grievance, which occurred on December 5, 2003. The defendants did not inform the district court of this decision or argue a lack of final disposition regarding the grievance, leading to a waiver of this argument on appeal. Initially, Mr. Barnes did not allege a cause of action against state defendants, so he was not required to exhaust administrative remedies concerning them. His amended complaint was treated as a new complaint, necessitating the exhaustion of remedies only after its filing. 

Defendant Dr. Joseph Smith claimed Mr. Barnes’ claims against him were procedurally defaulted due to the untimeliness of the initial grievance. However, Mr. Barnes' subsequent grievance, which did not name Dr. Smith but addressed ongoing medical treatment issues, effectively restarted the grievance process. The Illinois Administrative Code did not require naming individuals in grievances, and the language of the November grievance suggested past failures by Dr. Smith. Therefore, Mr. Barnes could pursue his claims against Dr. Smith. 

Lastly, the defendants Krolikiewicz, Schonaur, and Ruffin argued that Mr. Barnes' claims of deliberate indifference to his medical needs should be dismissed due to their lack of involvement in his care. However, this merits inquiry was deemed premature as the district court had not yet addressed the case's merits. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.