Kevin McCloud pleaded guilty to robbery and operating a vehicle without the owner’s consent, stemming from a carjacking incident that resulted in a fatality. He was sentenced to a total of 25 years in prison, including consecutive terms for the various charges. McCloud later sought postconviction relief, arguing that the two charges constituted the same offense, which would violate his constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals rejected his claim, asserting that the offenses were distinct and cumulative punishments were permissible under state law. McCloud’s appeal for a writ of habeas corpus contends that the state court misinterpreted the double jeopardy implications. However, the Circuit Court noted that any potential error was based on state law, which falls outside the purview of federal habeas review.
McCloud's appeal followed the circuit court's denial of his motion, leading to a judgment of conviction and subsequent postconviction motion rejection by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court's decision on December 13, 1999, in an unpublished opinion (State v. McCloud, No. 98-2961-CR). The appellate court addressed McCloud's double jeopardy claim, confirming that the Double Jeopardy Clause allows for multiple punishments if authorized by the legislature. It determined that the Wisconsin legislature intended to permit separate penalties for robbery and operating a vehicle without the owner's consent.
Using the "same elements" test from Blockburger v. United States, the court found that the two offenses were not the same, as each required proof of distinct elements: operating a vehicle without consent necessitated proof of driving the vehicle, while robbery involved using force and the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle. The court noted that Wisconsin's constitutional protections against double jeopardy align closely with those under the Fifth Amendment, leading to a unified analysis without differentiation between state and federal provisions.
The court concluded that there were no factors indicating legislative intent against cumulative punishments, thereby presuming such punishments were authorized. Consequently, McCloud's consecutive sentences for both offenses did not constitute double jeopardy. After the Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to review his case, McCloud sought a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied by the magistrate judge, who affirmed that neither offense was a lesser included offense of the other for double jeopardy purposes. McCloud was granted a certificate of appealability, with the court recognizing that his case did not involve the typical double jeopardy protections against serial prosecution.
The relevant protection discussed is against multiple punishments for the same offense in a single proceeding, as governed by the Double Jeopardy Clause. This clause permits multiple punishments for the same offense if authorized by the legislature, which has sole authority to define offenses and prescribe penalties. In the case of McCloud, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals determined that the legislature had authorized cumulative punishments for the offenses of robbery and operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent (OAWOC). The court found that these two crimes did not constitute the same offense under the Blockburger test and concluded that there were no circumstances to rebut the presumption of legislative intent for multiple punishments.
McCloud argued that OAWOC is a lesser included offense of robbery, asserting that one cannot steal a vehicle without driving it in some form, including towing or pushing. He contended that both offenses involve asportation—moving property—and therefore should be treated as the same. However, the court's potential error, if any, was grounded in state law, focusing on the legislature's intent concerning the offenses. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not impose limitations on the legislature's authority, nor is there a federal constitutional standard dictating how actions should be classified as single or multiple crimes. Thus, the critical inquiry for the Wisconsin Court of Appeals was strictly about legislative intent, a matter of state law.
McCloud's double jeopardy claim raises a federal question centered on the intent of the Wisconsin legislature regarding multiple punishments for robbery and operating a vehicle without the owner's consent. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals determined that the legislature intended to authorize multiple punishments for these offenses, and this finding is binding. In contrast, the Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the Ohio Legislature did not intend for cumulative punishments for similar offenses. The Missouri Supreme Court has recognized the intent for cumulative punishment under its statutes. The use of the Supreme Court's Blockburger test by state courts does not provide a federal court with authority to evaluate legislative intent; rather, it serves as a tool to assess whether two offenses are considered the same for double jeopardy purposes. The Blockburger test's results can create presumptions regarding legislative intent, but these can be overridden by clear evidence from legislative history. While the Blockburger test is informed by federal standards, it does not grant federal courts the power to reassess state courts' interpretations of state law. The Wisconsin court's determination that multiple punishments were authorized means there was no double jeopardy violation in McCloud's case. Federal intervention would only be warranted if the state court disregarded legislative intent or misapplied the Double Jeopardy Clause. The conclusion that the two offenses are distinct, allowing for separate punishments, is deemed plausible.
McCloud's attorney acknowledged an absence of Wisconsin case law opposing the Court of Appeals' ruling. The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent multiple punishments in a single proceeding as long as they are legislatively authorized. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals determined that the offenses for which McCloud received consecutive sentences were distinct and that the legislature intended to allow multiple punishments for these offenses. Consequently, the cumulative punishments imposed on McCloud aligned with legislative intent and did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Although McCloud argued that the state court incorrectly found the offenses to be distinct, this determination is a matter of state law beyond federal review. Therefore, the district court's decision to deny McCloud's habeas corpus petition was affirmed.
