The case involves appellants Hakim Iddir, Hadjira Iddir, Juan A. Llivi, and others, who, after winning the Diversity Visa Lottery, applied for immigrant visas, which would allow them to seek citizenship. They completed all necessary application steps but received no adjudication from the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) within the required year, leading to automatic denials of their applications. The INS subsequently informed them that they would need to reapply and potentially win the lottery again for a chance at citizenship. Frustrated, the appellants sought writs of mandamus in two district courts to compel the INS to adjudicate their applications. Judge Gottschall dismissed the Iddir case on the grounds of mootness, while Judge Guzman dismissed the Kudina case due to lack of jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(B). The appellants appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissals based on different reasoning than the district courts. The case highlights the operation of the Diversity Visa Lottery Program, which allocates a limited number of visas to individuals from countries with historically low immigration rates to the U.S., with significant demand exceeding available visas in recent fiscal years.
Eligible immigrants must apply for the diversity visa lottery within a thirty-day period, after which a random selection occurs. Lottery winners are notified in the summer and provided with instructions to apply for an immigrant visa, which must be completed by the end of the fiscal year in which the application is submitted. For example, an applicant chosen in 1995 had until September 30, 1996, to finalize their application. Those selected who are in the U.S. can petition for an adjustment of status, but must complete the process before the deadline, as visas can only be issued within the relevant fiscal year.
The 1998 DV Program had 97,319 entries for 55,000 visas, with only 51,000 actually distributed. Hakim and Hadjira Iddir and Juan A. Llivi, selected in the 1998 lottery, faced delays in their applications. Llivi was informed of a significant wait in September 1997 and was only notified of an interview in December 1998, after the fiscal year had ended, leading to his petition's denial due to expiration. Similarly, the Iddirs received a wait notice in September 1997 and were contacted again in October 1999, with their interview occurring on May 3, 2000, also after the fiscal year ended, resulting in a denial based on expiration. They claimed this delay was due to a misplaced file.
Tatiana Kudina, selected in the 1999 lottery, applied in December 1998 and was informed in February 2000 that her application had expired. The Malukas, selected for the 1998 lottery, and the Sanchezes, selected in 1999, faced similar issues of delayed adjudication. Maria Niculescu was interviewed on the last day of the fiscal year and received permanent resident status, but her children were denied adjustment due to interviews occurring after the fiscal year. The Ogunkoyas, selected in 1996, submitted additional documentation upon request but were later informed that their application had expired, resulting in denial.
Mario Romanovic and his wife, Marija, were selected under the 1998 Diversity Visa (DV) program but had their applications denied on July 14, 1999, after interviews. Nelly Victoria Suyo, selected in the 1997 lottery, submitted her application in January 1997, which was denied on February 19, 1999. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) delayed hearing the plaintiffs’ petitions for adjustment of status until after the designated period, ultimately rejecting them based on the expiration of time rather than merits. Criticism of the INS highlighted its notorious administrative issues and backlogs in processing applications, particularly noting the time-sensitive nature of DV Program applications. Despite instructing applicants not to contact them to avoid delays, the INS failed to process applications and may have even lost one.
Jurisdictional standards dictate that dismissals for lack of jurisdiction are reviewed de novo, with courts accepting well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), federal courts generally lack jurisdiction to review certain decisions made by the Attorney General regarding relief under § 1255. However, the INS asserted that this statute barred jurisdiction over DV Program applications, a position the Solicitor General later reversed, acknowledging that courts may hear cases where the INS fails to adjudicate an application. The inquiry into jurisdiction remains significant as the current circuit addresses these issues in this specific context, emphasizing that clear congressional intent is required to limit federal judicial review.
A presumption exists in favor of judicial review of administrative acts, supported by various Supreme Court precedents. Courts typically resolve ambiguities in favor of aliens, allowing jurisdiction to hear grievances. The term “judgment” appears multiple times in the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), often referring to court orders, suggesting that in section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), it pertains only to discretionary decisions. This section bars review of actual discretionary decisions for relief as specified; however, it does not preclude review of claims involving administrative inaction or oversight. The INS's reference to "denial" did not constitute a decision on the merits but rather indicated a failure to act on applicants' eligibility. The INS claimed it was unable to issue visas after a certain time elapsed, which does not divest the court of jurisdiction over claims of administrative delay. This distinguishes the situation from cases where the INS has made a formal decision regarding relief.
Appellants’ applications for adjustment of status under section 1255 could be classified as a “judgment” or “decision” under section 1252(a)(2)(B) if denied on merits. However, if a Diversity Visa (DV) Program lottery winner's application is not heard and subsequently denied due to expiration, it does not constitute a “judgment” or discretionary decision barring review.
Immigration plaintiffs typically must exhaust administrative remedies before seeking federal court relief, as per statutory requirements and an established administrative review process (8 U.S.C. 1252(d)). However, exhaustion may be excused under certain conditions: 1) unreasonable delay or indefinite timeframe; 2) agency incompetence; 3) futility due to agency bias; or 4) substantial constitutional questions. The appellants have demonstrated that at least three exceptions apply, particularly highlighting an indefinite timeframe for administrative action, as the government has no timeline for potential removal proceedings.
The government claims that any related claims can be pursued in future removal proceedings, yet simultaneously states it cannot grant visas to the appellants due to expired DV Program visa numbers, rendering further administrative action futile. Therefore, the appellants are not required to exhaust claims through an unproductive administrative process.
Regarding mandamus, district courts possess jurisdiction to compel federal agency action under 28 U.S.C. 1361, provided the plaintiff shows: 1) a clear right to relief; 2) a duty on the part of the defendant; and 3) the absence of other adequate remedies.
The appellants possess a clear right to have their cases adjudicated based on the statutory language established by Congress regarding the Diversity Visa (DV) Program. The statute employs nondiscretionary terms such as “shall,” indicating mandatory duties for the Attorney General in administering the program, which includes issuing immigrant visa numbers in a specified random order. This contrasts with other statutes that allow for discretion, underscoring the binding nature of the directives. Precedents confirm that statutory commands must be interpreted as requiring action without room for discretion. Furthermore, applicable regulations mandate the processing and selection of immigrants, reinforcing the conclusion that the appellants are entitled to adjudication of their applications.
The question of whether the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has a duty to adjudicate these applications is more nuanced. The INS argues that visas expired at the end of the fiscal year, thus negating the possibility of issuing them regardless of adjudication outcomes. However, appellants highlight past instances where the INS adjudicated DV Program applications beyond the fiscal year’s conclusion, suggesting a precedent for adjudication despite expiration.
The district court in Nyaga highlighted the intertwined issues of duty and potential relief within a unique statutory context, noting that while federal courts cannot grant citizenship, they can compel the Executive to execute Congressional commands. The INS is tasked with administering the Diversity Visa (DV) Program and has a statutory duty to process applications in a timely manner, as confirmed by relevant statutes and case law. However, the appellants’ claims are deemed illusory because, even if the INS adjudicated their applications now, the issuance of visas is not possible due to statutory deadlines which limit eligibility to the fiscal year for which applicants were selected. Consequently, the INS lacks the authority to provide the relief the appellants seek, and the absence of a clear duty to adjudicate their petitions means that a mandamus remedy is not appropriate. Although the INS acknowledges other potential paths to citizenship for the appellants, this does not excuse the agency's failure to act. The appellants can reapply for DV Program visas, seek private bills from Congress for relief, or lobby for amendments to the immigration statutes to allow for visa issuance despite delayed adjudications. Ultimately, the court affirms the dismissals of the appellants’ cases due to a lack of mandamus jurisdiction.
Chief Judge Flaum concurs with the majority's judgment affirming the district court's decisions, stating that there is no statutory bar to jurisdiction and that the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies is excused due to futility. However, he argues that the cases should be addressed on mootness grounds, asserting that the INS's inability to issue visas after the relevant fiscal year renders the plaintiffs' claims moot. Flaum emphasizes that federal courts lack the authority to resolve issues that do not affect the litigants' rights. He distinguishes between lack of mandamus jurisdiction and mootness, concluding that it is the INS's incapacity to grant effective relief, rather than a lack of duty, that renders the claims nonjusticiable. Citing relevant statutes and regulations, he notes that individuals selected in the Diversity Visa (DV) program are only eligible for visas until the end of the fiscal year in which they were selected. Consequently, he believes the district court lacked Article III jurisdiction to address the claims, as no live case or controversy existed, and supports affirming the district court's decisions on mootness grounds.
