A jury convicted David Scott, Carl Buchholz, and Gregory Sumpter for possession with intent to distribute marijuana, violating 21 U.S.C. § 841. Additionally, Scott and Buchholz were convicted of carrying a firearm during a drug trafficking offense under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). The defendants appealed their convictions on several grounds, but the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgments.
In the summer of 1996, Chad Little, along with Scott, Sumpter, and Buchholz, sought to procure marijuana in the St. Louis area. Little contacted a college friend, who was secretly cooperating with law enforcement, leading him to DEA officer Kelly Cain. Little negotiated to obtain up to 300 pounds of marijuana for resale, funding the venture with contributions from Scott, Sumpter, and Buchholz, alongside his own $500 and a motorcycle. The plan included carrying firearms for protection during the transaction.
On May 6, 1997, the group traveled to Lincoln, Illinois, to purchase the marijuana but was arrested upon arrival. Post-arrest, both Buchholz and Sumpter provided statements detailing their involvement. Buchholz mentioned assisting in renting a trailer for the motorcycle, while Sumpter discussed his understanding of the deal and his role in inspecting the marijuana. Little later pleaded guilty, while the other defendants maintained their not guilty pleas, proceeding to trial.
During jury selection, concerns arose regarding Juror 99's comments about defendants' access to juror questionnaires, prompting the court to question her privately, as requested by the defense counsel.
Juror 99 expressed curiosity about the defendants' access to juror questionnaires but felt that her concerns were addressed, believing she could remain fair and impartial. After the juror's questioning, the defense requested her removal for cause, which the district court initially indicated it might grant if the defendants agreed to a trial with eleven jurors. However, upon reevaluation, the court determined that the juror's curiosity did not justify a for-cause challenge and denied the request.
During the trial, key testimony came from Little and several drug enforcement agents, leading the defense to focus on discrediting their credibility. To counter this, the Government called Special Agent William Scheitlin to testify about Little's cooperation in a separate investigation, which resulted in indictments and guilty pleas. The district court instructed the jury that this testimony did not imply the defendants' guilt but was only to support Little’s credibility.
The defense also challenged the credibility of the arresting officers, arguing that the statements attributed to Buchholz and Sumpter were based on prior briefings and not direct quotes. They questioned the officers' investigative methods, including the lack of audio or video recordings and the disposal of original notes.
At the instruction conference, the defendants proposed a jury instruction based on Pattern Federal Jury Instruction 5.11, emphasizing that mere presence at a crime scene or association with conspirators is insufficient for establishing guilt. The district court decided to provide part of this instruction, specifically the first paragraph of (a) and all of (b).
In closing arguments, the Government sought to characterize Buchholz’s and Sumpter’s statements as confessions, which the defendants opposed, but the district court permitted the argument to be made to the jury.
Defendants were permitted to present counterarguments during closing statements, where the Government's attorney attempted to frame statements as confessions and addressed credibility challenges against witness Little and law enforcement officers. The Government asserted that the defense's claims implied that Inspector Eck and Officer Burke committed perjury. The jury ultimately convicted the defendants on all counts.
On appeal, the defendants contended that the district court improperly allowed the Government to bolster Little's testimony, specifically through Special Agent Scheitlin’s remarks about Little’s past cooperation in a St. Louis case. The district court referenced the precedent set in United States v. Lindemann, ruling that the testimony was admissible as it rehabilitated Little’s credibility after it had been questioned. The court defined "bolstering" as evidence offered solely to enhance a witness's credibility without a prior attack, which is generally inadmissible. However, when credibility is attacked, rehabilitation evidence is permissible.
In Lindemann, it was established that if a defense suggests a witness is biased, the Government may introduce evidence to counter that bias. The Federal Rules of Evidence allow for this type of testimony as long as it meets relevance and prejudice standards. The court concluded that Scheitlin’s testimony was relevant as it rebutted claims of bias and self-interest, and the jury was instructed not to infer guilt from the testimony about other cases. The discussion also referenced United States v. Curry, which further addressed the admissibility of a witness's prior cooperation.
In Curry, similar to Lindemann, the defense challenged the credibility of a cooperating witness by alleging she falsely implicated the defendant for a favorable plea deal. The Government was allowed to inform the jury that the witness's testimony also implicated another co-conspirator who had already pleaded guilty. The appellate court found that the district court's admission of this testimony was not an abuse of discretion. It explained that when a cooperating witness's testimony could lead to multiple convictions, it creates significant credibility "chips." The witness's history of successful cooperation was deemed relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402, as it increased the likelihood of her truthfulness regarding Curry.
In the present case, Little provided information about the defendants and others, giving him multiple bargaining chips in plea negotiations. Special Agent Scheitlin's testimony about Little’s cooperation reduced the probability of Little lying out of self-interest. The evidence was relevant and presumptively admissible under Rule 402. The district court also issued a cautionary instruction to mitigate potential undue prejudice, adhering to Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence.
The defendants acknowledged the precedents set by Lindemann and Curry but argued they were distinguishable. They claimed that in Lindemann, the witness testified about his own cooperation, while in this case, an agent testified about Little’s cooperation, which they argued impacted the witness's state of mind. The court dismissed this as a material distinction, noting that extrinsic evidence can be used to bolster a witness's credibility. The defendants also contended that the witness's cooperation in unrelated cases should not be relevant; however, the court maintained that successful cooperation in other cases indicates the witness likely had valuable information and was less prone to lying. Finally, the defendants argued that Little's prior cooperation had diminished value since he had completed his sentence on the St. Louis charges. The court found no basis in the precedents to support this distinction either.
Burns’ extensive involvement in prior cases provided him with considerable leverage during plea negotiations, highlighting that the relevant period for evaluating his credibility is when the plea deal was made, not when he testified. Little’s cooperation in both the St. Louis investigation and the current case at the same time renders his prior sentencing irrelevant for assessing evidence supporting his credibility. The district court's admission of Special Agent Scheitlin’s testimony was justified as the evidence was admissible and not overly prejudicial. Even if there had been an error, it would be deemed harmless due to overwhelming evidence against the defendants and multiple corroborating witnesses supporting Little’s credibility.
Regarding instructional error, the defendants argued that the district court improperly excluded part of Pattern Instruction 5.11, specifically the 'mere association' clause, which they claimed was essential for a fair trial. The court recognized that a defendant is entitled to jury instructions reflecting their defense theory if it accurately states the law, is evidence-supported, is not already included in the charge, and its omission would prejudice the defendant. Although the refusal to include the 'mere association' instruction was reviewed de novo, the district court possesses significant discretion in determining the language of instructions. The court found that the instructions provided sufficiently conveyed the principle that mere association with criminals does not imply guilt, adequately informing the jury on this matter without the need for the specific instruction sought by the defendants.
Jury instructions emphasized that defendants must have knowingly engaged in criminal conduct, assessing each defendant's participation individually. The court clarified that to "attempt" possession of marijuana, defendants must have taken a substantial step toward the offense with intent. The aiding and abetting instruction stressed that a person must knowingly associate with and participate in the criminal venture. "Knowingly" was defined as being aware of one's actions and the nature of the conduct, ruling out ignorance or accident. The court instructed that if a defendant acted without knowledge of a crime, those actions alone do not establish guilt. Each defendant's conduct was to be evaluated separately, ensuring that the acts of one could not be attributed to another. The jury was directed to consider each count independently and return separate verdicts, reinforcing that mere presence or unwitting participation was insufficient for guilt.
In terms of prosecutorial misconduct, defendants claimed that the Government's closing arguments suggested that convicting them required the jury to find law enforcement officers had committed perjury. The court typically uses a two-step inquiry to assess the impact of improper comments. This includes determining if the comments were improper and then analyzing if they deprived the defendant of a fair trial based on several factors, including the nature of misconduct, defense invitation, jury instructions, defense opportunities to counter, and evidence weight. Given that no objection was raised during the remarks, the plain error standard applies, requiring proof that the comments not only denied a fair trial but also affected the trial's outcome.
Defendants argue that the Government's case mirrors the problematic argument in *United States v. Vargas*, where the prosecutor improperly suggested that the jury must find the defendant guilty if they did not believe the agents were truthful. The court in Vargas ruled that jurors should not be forced to choose between believing the agents or acquitting the defendant, as it would misstate the reasonable doubt standard. In the current case, the prosecutor only implied that the defense accused the officers of perjury but did not explicitly state that a not-guilty verdict required the jury to conclude that the officers lied. This distinction aligns with recent rulings that clarified the distinction between permissible and impermissible prosecutorial arguments regarding witness credibility.
Additionally, defendants contend they were prejudiced by the Government's characterization of statements from Sumpter and Buchholz as "confessions." Despite their objections, the court permitted this characterization, allowing the defense to argue against it and providing jury instructions on evaluating the statements. The jury was tasked with determining whether the defendants made the statements and assessing their weight based on all evidence presented.
Defendants claim prosecutorial misconduct in the Government's characterization of certain statements as confessions, citing United States v. Morsley, 64 F.3d 907 (4th Cir. 1995). In Morsley, the Fourth Circuit deemed two comments by the prosecutor improper: one falsely asserting a guilty plea and another referring to statements as a "confession," despite no formal confession being made. However, the court found these errors did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial. Even if the prosecutor's characterization of the defendants' statements as confessions was considered a "tolerable trial error," it did not result in prejudice against the defendants. The jury received instructions clarifying how to evaluate the statements and were reminded that attorneys' comments are not evidence. The defense was also given a chance to counter this characterization. The evidence supporting conviction was substantial, leading to the conclusion that any error regarding the term "confession" did not warrant reversing the jury's verdict.
Regarding jury misconduct, the defendants alleged bias from Juror 99, claiming her curiosity indicated bias against them. The trial judge’s discretion in jury empanelment is respected unless abused, which was not found in this case. Juror 99 expressed her curiosity but affirmed her ability to remain fair and impartial. The district court, having the advantage of assessing the juror's credibility, determined she could fulfill her duties, and this decision was upheld. As a result, the district court's judgment is affirmed.
The district court determined that a witness's testimony was crucial to the Government's case and ruled a new trial was necessary due to an objectively false statement made by the prosecutor. However, the current case involves evidence from a Government agent regarding the witness's prior cooperation, making the precedent set in Cheska inapplicable. The commentary related to Pattern Instruction 5.11 indicates that its bracketed paragraph may serve as supplemental language in conspiracy-related cases, which does not apply here since no conspiracy charges were involved. The defendants cited conspiracy cases to support their position, but the lack of conspiracy in the present case weakens their argument. Additionally, the Committee Comment clarifies that sections (a) and (b) of Instruction 5.11 are meant to be alternatives rather than used together. The court found no prosecutorial misconduct, making it unnecessary to assess whether any resulting prejudice occurred. The definition of "confession" under 18 U.S.C. sec. 3501 includes self-incriminating statements, and prior rulings, such as Dickerson v. United States, affirm that Miranda rights govern the admissibility of statements during custodial interrogations. Moreover, in United States v. Goodlow, the court expressed skepticism regarding whether the prosecutor’s description of the defendant’s statements as a confession constituted misconduct.
