Adusumilli, Indira v. City of Chicago

Citation: Not availableDocket: 98-1019

Court: Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; October 28, 1999; Federal Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Indira Adusumilli, a former Administrative Assistant for the City of Chicago's Department of Police, was terminated from her position and subsequently filed a lawsuit alleging discrimination, harassment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the City after striking parts of Adusumilli's affidavit. On appeal, Adusumilli contended that the stricken statements were improperly excluded and that summary judgment was unwarranted regarding her claims of sexual harassment and retaliation.

The appellate court accepted the facts as alleged by Adusumilli due to the summary judgment standard. Adusumilli was hired on January 16, 1992, and fired on September 6, 1994. She reported multiple instances of sexual harassment occurring between December 1993 and September 1994, all of which were within the filing period for her Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaint. Specific incidents included inappropriate comments from her supervisor and police officers, unwanted physical contact, and suggestive remarks. Notably, one officer allegedly poked her buttocks, which she reported to her supervisor, leading to an Internal Affairs Department investigation that ultimately did not sustain her claims. After the investigation, Adusumilli ceased reporting further incidents, even as the alleged harasser was assigned to work close to her desk. The appellate court affirmed the district court's decision.

The City assigned Gray to a specific role due to his computer skills and familiarity with arrest procedures, utilizing a vital computer at the Twenty-Fourth District. Adusumilli reported inappropriate behavior from Gray, alleging he stared at her inappropriately. Concurrently, the City documented multiple errors made by Adusumilli during her employment. Notable issues included incorrect processing of traffic reports, typographical errors on official notifications, and mishandling of important documents. Despite receiving positive performance evaluations between January 1992 and December 1993, Adusumilli expressed dissatisfaction with her ratings, believing she deserved an "excellent" rating. By June 1994, her performance evaluation dropped to "unsatisfactory," citing carelessness, difficulty collaborating with coworkers, and challenges with routine tasks. She was placed in the Behavior Alert program for performance issues and recommended for a transfer to a less responsible role. Ultimately, Adusumilli was notified of her termination effective September 6, 1994. While she acknowledged making mistakes, Adusumilli contended that she met her employer's legitimate expectations and performed comparably to her colleagues.

Adusumilli claims she had no performance issues warranting her placement in the Behavioral Alert Program or her subsequent discharge, which she contends were retaliatory actions following her complaints. She filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) on September 7, 1994, receiving a right to sue letter on September 29, 1995. Subsequently, on December 28, 1995, she sued the City for discrimination and harassment based on race, color, national origin, and gender, as well as for retaliation. 

On December 5, 1997, the district court struck several statements from her affidavit and granted the City summary judgment on all claims. Adusumilli appealed, challenging the court's decision to strike three statements from her affidavit and arguing against the summary judgment regarding her claims of sexual harassment and retaliation. The court’s review of the affidavit stricken portions was based on the abuse of discretion standard, determining that statements must be based on personal knowledge and admissible evidence. The district court deemed that certain statements lacked foundation, were speculative, or contradicted her prior sworn testimony. Adusumilli disputes the court's findings, particularly regarding her interpretation of harassment motivations and her superiors' awareness of her discomfort related to a colleague's presence.

Adusumilli references her Local Rule 12(N) Statement of Additional Facts, specifically paragraphs 19 and 20, to support her argument. Paragraph 19 is deemed irrelevant, while paragraph 20 asserts that Gray’s presence in her work area hindered her performance and that she complained to her supervisor, Zeliasz, with no remedial action taken. However, the cross-referenced deposition pages clarify that her complaint was about Gray using the computer, not about feeling uncomfortable due to his presence. Consequently, the district judge's decision is upheld. 

Adusumilli also contests the judge's ruling that her affidavit conflicts with her deposition. She cannot succeed in summary judgment with an affidavit containing contradictory allegations to her earlier sworn testimony. The judge struck a statement from her affidavit claiming near-daily harassment, finding it inconsistent with her deposition where she described her first year as uneventful and denied feeling discriminated against based on sex. Adusumilli argues that her deposition referred to specific incidents while her affidavit addressed the general workplace atmosphere, but this distinction does not resolve the contradiction of her claims. 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is warranted when there are no genuine issues of material fact, a standard applied rigorously in employment discrimination cases. An adverse party must provide specific facts to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial, rather than relying on mere allegations. The district judge concluded there were no genuine issues of material fact, allowing the City to obtain judgment on all of Adusumilli’s claims. On appeal, Adusumilli argues that summary judgment was inappropriate regarding her sexual harassment and retaliation claims, with the review conducted de novo.

Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment under Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, including creating a hostile work environment due to sexual harassment. For a claim to be actionable, harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive, and the plaintiff must demonstrate that the work environment is both subjectively and objectively hostile. Employers are vicariously liable for harassment by supervisors, but must show negligence for co-worker harassment.

In the case of Adusumilli, the court found no genuine issue of material fact regarding the objective hostility or negligence necessary for employer liability. The court considered the frequency and severity of the alleged harassment, which included teasing, ambiguous comments, and isolated incidents of unwanted touching, none of which were deemed severe enough to constitute a hostile environment. The court noted that some comments were not even directed at Adusumilli, and the most serious incident was a single, mild poke. The Circuit recognizes a "safe harbor" for employers when alleged harassment is too mild to suggest discrimination based on sex. Adusumilli's claims fell within this safe harbor.

Regarding retaliation under Title VII, it is unlawful for employers to discriminate against employees for engaging in protected activities. Using the McDonnell Douglas framework, Adusumilli must establish a prima facie case of retaliation by demonstrating her engagement in protected expression, suffering an adverse action, and showing a causal connection between the two.

Adusumilli must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation, after which the City must provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse action. If the City meets this burden, Adusumilli must then demonstrate that the City’s stated reasons are pretextual and that the real motive was discriminatory. The district court found that Adusumilli met the initial elements by showing her complaint about Gray’s conduct was protected and that her placement in the Behavior Alert program and termination were adverse actions. However, the court determined she failed to establish a genuine causal link between her complaint and the adverse actions, as well as a genuine issue regarding the City’s reasons being pretextual.

Adusumilli's timeline—complaining in January, being placed in the Behavior Alert program in March, and terminated in September—could suggest a causal connection, but the court concluded that her termination was due to poor job performance rather than retaliation. The City argued it would have fired her regardless of her complaint, citing her poor performance. Although Adusumilli acknowledged making mistakes, she claimed her performance met her employer's legitimate expectations. However, the court noted that self-serving statements do not effectively counter an employer's negative performance assessment. 

Adusumilli attempted to support her case with her earlier evaluations, which were rated "good," and contended that her last unfavorable evaluation was suspicious as it followed her complaint about Gray. Nonetheless, the court found her reliance on positive evaluations misplaced due to extensive documentation of her poor performance, which had been noted well before her complaint. The court characterized prior evaluations as "makeweight evidence" in light of the significant discrepancy between them and her documented performance issues. The City had thoroughly documented Adusumilli's persistent performance problems dating back to 1992, reinforcing the legitimacy of its reasons for her termination.

No jury could reasonably conclude that the City fired Adusumilli solely due to her complaint against Gray. The case referenced, Dey, highlighted that the decision to terminate Dey involved input from her harasser, which could influence the assessment of her job performance. In contrast, Adusumilli did not complain about Muzupappa or Zeliasz, the individuals consulted before her termination, eliminating the presumption of retaliation. Even if a causal connection between her complaint and the firing existed, Adusumilli failed to demonstrate that the City’s stated rationale—poor performance—was pretextual. Pretext can be shown by proving a discriminatory motive or discrediting the employer's explanation, neither of which Adusumilli achieved. Consequently, the district court acted correctly in striking portions of Adusumilli’s affidavit and granting summary judgment on her hostile work environment and retaliation claims. The court's ruling is affirmed. Additionally, Adusumilli did not contest the untimeliness of her EEOC filing regarding events prior to November 12, 1993.