Jorge Humberto Franco v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 14-09-00083-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; February 17, 2010; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Jorge Humberto Franco pleaded guilty to sexual assault and two counts of indecency with a child, receiving concurrent ten-year sentences for each offense. On appeal, he argued ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming that this led to his guilty plea and sentence. The trial court had previously conducted a hearing in which both the complainant and her mother testified, while Franco presented five witnesses in favor of probation. He also testified about his concerns regarding the impact of imprisonment on his family. The court considered a psychological evaluation before sentencing him. Following sentencing, Franco moved for a new trial based on ineffective assistance, but the trial court denied this motion after an evidentiary hearing.

The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision, applying the Strickland v. Washington standard for evaluating claims of ineffective assistance. This requires proving both deficient performance by counsel and that this deficiency resulted in a loss of a fair trial. The court emphasized a highly deferential review of counsel’s performance, noting that Franco also alleged a conflict of interest regarding his representation, which would necessitate a different analysis for ineffective assistance claims.

The defendant must demonstrate (1) that his counsel had an actual conflict of interest and (2) that this conflict adversely affected specific aspects of counsel's performance, as established in Cuyler v. Sullivan. An actual conflict arises when counsel must choose between advocating for the client’s fair trial or advancing other interests detrimental to the client. A mere potential for conflict is insufficient for reversal. In this case, the defendant raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during a motion for new trial. The trial court's denial of this motion is assessed under an abuse-of-discretion standard, which requires a review of whether the decision was clearly wrong, arbitrary, or unreasonable. The trial court retains the authority to judge witness credibility and the weight of their testimony. The defendant argued that his counsel's law firm also represented his employer, Buy Our Homes, asserting that this created a conflict due to the employer's incentive to see him incarcerated to avoid commission payments. However, there was no evidence of concurrent representation during the relevant period or that the interests of the defendant and his employer conflicted. Testimony indicated the employer supported the defendant's request for probation, with no evidence presented that any compensation owed to the defendant was unpaid.

Appellant fails to provide legal or factual support for the claim that his employer could evade payment due to his incarceration or deportation. There is no evidence of a conflict of interest between appellant and his attorneys regarding representation. Since no actual conflict was demonstrated, specific attorney conduct linked to the alleged conflict does not need to be examined. 

Appellant raises four claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, but two arguments have been waived and the remaining errors were not prejudicial. He asserts that his attorneys did not develop a sound trial strategy, but this claim lacks detail and supporting authority, resulting in waiver. He also contends that trial counsel failed to object to the presentence investigation report without specifying any legal objection, leading to waiver of this argument as well. 

While appellant and his attorney initially signed incorrect certifications regarding the nature of the case, he does not show how this impacted his defense, admitting these errors caused no prejudice. Furthermore, appellant claims counsel misadvised him about the possibility of "shock probation" after sentencing. However, he is statutorily ineligible for this option due to the nature of his conviction, and the conversation occurred post-sentencing, thus having no bearing on the outcome of his trial. 

The court overruled the appeal issue and affirmed the trial court's judgment, concluding that the arguments presented lacked merit and did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel.