Leonard Phillips appeals two summary judgments against him in a personal injury lawsuit filed against American Elastomer Products, L.L.C. (AEP) following a work-related back injury caused by an autoclave explosion at AEP’s Houston plant. Phillips, employed through Staffing United, claimed negligence, gross negligence, and intentional torts after the explosion during which he was injured while attempting to escape. AEP argued that Phillips's negligence claims were barred by the borrowed servant doctrine and the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act (TWCA), and that there was insufficient evidence for the intentional tort claims. The trial court granted AEP’s motions for summary judgment, leading to Phillips’s appeal. He contended that AEP failed to prove he was a borrowed servant and that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding his intentional tort claims. The appeal was affirmed. Background details reveal that the autoclave, taken out of service for a year without maintenance, exploded during safety tests, injuring several individuals and resulting in a fatality. Phillips sustained herniated discs and post-traumatic stress disorder, with his workers' compensation claim being accepted without dispute. Subsequent to his initial claims, Phillips amended his petition multiple times, ultimately removing his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and asserting intentional assault and battery. The trial court granted summary judgment on the negligence claims first, then on the intentional tort claims, while striking much of Phillips's summary judgment evidence due to timeliness and hearsay issues, which Phillips did not contest.
The trial court granted summary judgments to AEP on Phillips's intentional tort claims, prompting Phillips to appeal. He raises two main issues: first, he argues that his negligence claims should not be subject to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act (TWCA) exclusivity provision because he was not a borrowed servant; and second, he asserts that he provided sufficient evidence of intent regarding his intentional assault claims.
Regarding the standards of review for the summary judgments, AEP's motions were categorized as both traditional and no-evidence under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 166a(c) and 166a(i). However, AEP did not clearly specify which rule applied to the negligence claims, leading to the conclusion that this motion should be treated as traditional. For traditional motions, the defendant must show that the plaintiff lacks a cause of action as a matter of law. AEP's second motion on the intentional tort claims was clearly identified as both no-evidence and traditional. The review of summary judgments is done de novo, with the court considering all evidence favorably for the nonmovant and allowing reasonable inferences while resolving any doubts in their favor.
A no-evidence summary judgment is treated similarly to a directed verdict, with the same legal sufficiency standard applied. Such a judgment is warranted when there is (1) a complete absence of proof for a vital fact, (2) legal or evidentiary rules prevent weight from being given to the only evidence presented, (3) the evidence is merely a scintilla, or (4) the evidence conclusively contradicts a vital fact. Less than a scintilla occurs when evidence is insufficient to raise more than a suspicion, while more than a scintilla allows for reasonable disagreement among fair-minded individuals regarding the existence of a vital fact.
Regarding negligence claims, Phillips asserted three claims against AEP: (1) negligence and gross negligence relating to workplace safety, warning, and inspection; and (2) premises liability for failing to warn Phillips, an invitee, about hazardous conditions. AEP sought summary judgment, claiming immunity based on the Texas Workers' Compensation Act (TWCA) exclusivity provision and the borrowed servant doctrine. Under TWCA, employers who subscribe are shielded from common-law negligence claims, with employees’ remedies confined to the Act. When determining employer status under TWCA, Texas courts reference the borrowed servant doctrine, which protects employers who control an employee's work details. An injured worker is considered an employee of the employer who had the right of control at the time of injury; if control lies with another entity, the employer is not entitled to TWCA's exclusive remedy protections.
To establish its affirmative defense of subscriber status, AEP needed to demonstrate three elements: (1) that Phillips was a borrowed servant, (2) that he was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits, and (3) that AEP had relevant workers’ compensation insurance. Phillips only contested the first element, focusing on whether AEP had the right to control his work. In cases without a written agreement, the right of control is inferred from the facts surrounding the work, considering factors such as the nature of the work, duration of employment, machinery provided, actual control exercised, and the right to substitute operators.
Phillips presented evidence claiming Staffing, not AEP, controlled his work, citing his refusal to operate a forklift per Staffing’s instructions, Staffing’s issuance of payroll checks and workers’ compensation, and Staffing’s hiring and firing authority. However, the trial court struck the forklift evidence, which Phillips did not contest, resulting in a lack of evidence supporting his claims about refusing work. Additionally, Staffing's payroll and hiring practices do not conclusively indicate control over Phillips’s work at AEP. AEP provided undisputed evidence showing it controlled Phillips’s work environment, including setting work hours, training him, and supplying necessary tools and materials. Thus, the evidence presented by Phillips did not sufficiently support his assertion that Staffing had the right of control over his work at AEP’s facility.
Phillips attempts to contest AEP's evidence by claiming he used his personal tools—a socket set and screwdriver—to operate machinery due to the original tools sometimes going missing. He made this assertion in a stricken affidavit and twice in his deposition, with AEP successfully striking one statement but not objecting to the other. The surviving statement fails to prove AEP's lack of control over Phillips's work, as he acknowledged that AEP provided similar tools and the socket set and screwdriver were not necessary for changing molds or operating the machinery.
Phillips further disputes AEP's classification as a borrowed servant, arguing he was unaware of the employee-lending agreement between AEP and Staffing. Although he cites Guerrero v. Standard Alloys Mfg. Co., which suggests an employee must be aware of such an agreement to establish an employer-employee relationship, this precedent is not binding and contradicts recent Texas cases that apply the right-of-control test to determine borrowed servant status. The record shows that AEP adequately demonstrated Phillips's status as a borrowed servant and complied with the Texas Workers' Compensation Act (TWCA), thereby barring his common-law negligence claims.
While the TWCA's exclusivity provision prevents Phillips from pursuing negligence claims, it does not shield AEP from intentional tort claims. Phillips argues that the summary judgment regarding his assault claim was improperly granted, asserting he provided sufficient evidence of AEP's intent to injure, based on the notion that reckless conduct suffices for assault rather than specific intent.
Phillips argues that to establish assault under the Texas Workers' Compensation Act (TWCA), he only needs to demonstrate that AEP acted with recklessness, meaning AEP was aware of and consciously disregarded a significant risk of harm. Although he correctly cites the statutory definition of assault, the cases he references do not apply due to the intentional-tort exception in the TWCA, and he fails to provide authority supporting the application of this exception for reckless conduct.
Even assuming recklessness could overcome this exception, the evidence presented does not raise a factual issue regarding AEP's intent. Phillips attributes AEP's recklessness to its failure to maintain an autoclave and adhere to safety protocols. He cites depositions and an OSHA citation to support his claims; however, the OSHA citation and certain affidavits were struck from the record and not challenged on appeal, rendering them inadmissible as evidence.
The depositions from AEP's maintenance and plant managers do not substantiate Phillips's claims. Both managers stated that AEP did not intend for the autoclave to fail and had no knowledge that the explosion would occur during testing. Phillips's claims are characterized as mere negligence, lacking the requisite intent for an intentional tort. Additionally, a deposition statement from Patterson, AEP's plant manager, about safety procedures did not establish recklessness or intent to injure since it was not directly related to the specific case facts.
Ultimately, the court upheld the summary judgment against Phillips's assault claim, affirming that he did not demonstrate the necessary intent or recklessness to satisfy the standards for an intentional tort under the TWCA.
