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Leslie Megan Lewis-Grant v. State
Citation: Not availableDocket: 14-09-00068-CR
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; August 31, 2010; Texas; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Leslie Megan Lewis-Grant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, alongside a ten-year sentence for tampering with or fabricating evidence. She appealed her murder conviction on several grounds: the evidence was claimed to be insufficient both legally and factually; there was inadequate connection to the offense and insufficient corroboration of accomplice testimony; the trial court improperly submitted a law-of-parties jury instruction; and it failed to provide an accomplice-witness instruction. Additionally, she challenged the tampering conviction on similar grounds regarding evidence sufficiency and the lack of an accomplice-witness instruction. The court affirmed both convictions. The case arose from a crime scene where the body of James Michael Grant was found wrapped in bedding near a deserted truck, showing multiple stab wounds. Investigators discovered signs of a violent struggle at Grant's home, suggesting he was murdered there and later moved. The prosecution argued that Lewis-Grant, who had a contentious divorce from Grant and was motivated by resentment over child custody, solicited her boyfriend to commit the murder. Witnesses testified to hearing Lewis-Grant express wishes for Grant's death frequently, indicating her deep-seated animosity. Further testimony revealed she had previously threatened Grant’s life, prompting him to record their conversations. Cherryl Tull, the complainant's girlfriend, along with several witnesses, testified about Lewis-Grant's alleged intent to harm the complainant. They reported that Lewis-Grant had access to insulin as a licensed vocational nurse and had purportedly switched the complainant’s insulin types, which could lead to severe health risks, including diabetic coma. Tull recalled the complainant claiming that Lewis-Grant had taken insulin from her workplace to fill his syringes incorrectly. White and Tadlock noted that Lewis-Grant had mentioned baking a cake with excessive sugar to elevate the complainant’s blood sugar dangerously. Additionally, Lewis-Grant shared a disturbing dream about her son killing the complainant, followed by comments about buying her son a knife and machete for Christmas. Ed Palmer, the complainant’s best friend, described a confrontation where Lewis-Grant retrieved a loaded gun during an argument, threatening to kill the complainant, but Palmer intervened. Leewood Broussard later moved in with Lewis-Grant, whose daughter was dating Jeremy Knutson. Knutson testified that Lewis-Grant offered him $5,000 multiple times to kill the complainant. In July 2007, Lewis-Grant began a relationship with John Hopkins, who testified that she expressed a desire for someone to kill the complainant, offering him rewards for doing so, including access to the complainant's social security benefits. The day before the complainant’s death, Tadlock noted Lewis-Grant was upset due to a family issue involving her mother. Hopkins, influenced by alcohol, decided to kill the complainant after witnessing an argument that upset Lewis-Grant. He stated that although Lewis-Grant was unaware of his immediate plan to kill the complainant, there was an understanding between them regarding this intention. Witnesses indicated that Lewis-Grant often expressed her animosity toward the complainant in front of her children. Hopkins stole a knife and a machete from Wal-Mart and consumed alcohol while waiting for Jamie to call. Telephone records showed Jamie called Hopkins six times in the early morning. After meeting Jamie, Hopkins entered the complainant's house, instructed Jamie to keep Kate in her bedroom, and proceeded to stab the complainant multiple times, with Jamie witnessing the act and later stomping on the body. Medical examiner Dr. Townsend-Parchman confirmed that the stab wounds contributed to the complainant's death, noting that specific wounds could have caused rapid death. After the attack, Hopkins and Jamie staged the scene to look like a burglary, taking a 9-mm handgun, two magazine clips, and $380 from the complainant’s wallet. They wrapped the body in bedding, placed it in the truck, and drove to Greenbriar Road to dispose of it in a ditch. At Lewis-Grant's home, Hopkins, covered in blood, instructed her to burn the clothes they wore during the incident. Although he did not witness the actual burning, he saw her "messing" with the pit. Later, while police were investigating, Hopkins told Jamie and Lewis-Grant to extinguish the fire and dispose of the burned clothes. He instructed Lewis-Grant to provide an alibi, claiming they were at her home all night. When authorities arrived at the complainant's residence, they found Jamie and Kate alone, despite phone records indicating multiple calls between Jamie and Lewis-Grant that morning. Lewis-Grant testified she learned of the murder through Jamie's call around 8:30 a.m., and she appeared shaky when questioned by police. Investigators noted smoke coming from a chiminea at Lewis-Grant's home, prompting them to search her property with her consent. Ranger Ramos testified that the chiminea was not lit on the day in question, while the barbeque pit contained remnants of charcoal and what appeared to be material from blue jeans, suggesting recent extinguishment. Lewis-Grant denied any involvement in burning clothes with Jamie and Hopkins. Tadlock stated Lewis-Grant claimed she was burning sick-call requests that morning, despite having been previously reprimanded for such actions. Lieutenant Helms noted Lewis-Grant appeared calm during interviews, and witnesses, including her stepmother, confirmed she showed no signs of distress after the complainant's death. Hopkins claimed Lewis-Grant expressed gratitude for the murder and had previously requested he kill the complainant, offering social security benefits in exchange. Following a 9-1-1 call regarding Hopkins' threats, he was arrested and confessed to the murder, implicating both Jamie and Lewis-Grant. Both later faced charges, with Jamie also pleading guilty to murder. Lewis-Grant argued she was abused by the complainant and denied asking anyone to kill him or assisting in evidence destruction. The jury convicted her of murder and tampering with evidence, sentencing her to life imprisonment for murder and ten years for tampering. Lewis-Grant appealed, arguing the trial court should have provided an accomplice-witness instruction for Jamie, claiming Jamie acted as Hopkins' accomplice in both the murder and evidence destruction, asserting that the jury should have been instructed on this due to the admission of Jamie’s statements during trial. The jury's use of Jamie’s statements to support Hopkins’ testimony is contested, as the defendant argues that the absence of an accomplice-witness instruction significantly prejudiced her case. The State counters that such an instruction is only necessary when the accomplice testifies under oath in court. Since Jamie did not testify, the State claims he is not considered an accomplice witness, and thus his out-of-court statements do not require an accomplice-witness instruction. Under Texas law, a conviction cannot solely rely on accomplice testimony unless it is corroborated by other evidence linking the defendant to the crime. An accomplice is defined as someone involved in the crime's commission, and there must be evidence of their participation. If a witness is legally deemed an accomplice, the court must instruct the jury accordingly, as accomplices may have motives to lie, such as receiving reduced sentences. However, the accomplice-witness rule in article 38.14 does not apply to out-of-court statements, as clarified by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which defined "testimony" as evidence presented under oath in front of a tribunal. Jamie’s statements, introduced through Ranger Ramos, do not constitute testimony as per this definition, and therefore, the trial court was correct in not including an accomplice-witness instruction for Jamie. The appellate court upheld this ruling, rejecting the defendant's claims regarding insufficient evidence for her convictions of murder and tampering with evidence, noting that non-accomplice testimony only needs to "tend to connect" her to the offenses. Ample evidence exists to connect Lewis-Grant to both crimes, leading the State to argue that Hopkins' testimony was adequately corroborated. Under Texas law, a conviction based solely on an accomplice's testimony requires corroboration from non-accomplice evidence, as outlined in Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art 38.14 and relevant case law. The accomplice-witness rule is statutory and distinct from constitutional standards, necessitating the exclusion of accomplice testimony when assessing the evidence connecting the accused to the crime. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals emphasizes that when evidence presents two interpretations—one linking the accused to the crime and the other not—appellate courts should defer to the fact-finder's perspective. Corroborative evidence must not independently establish guilt or directly connect the accused to the crime but should strengthen the overall incriminating weight of the testimony. The evidence must show that rational jurors could reasonably conclude a connection exists between the accused and the offense, with each case evaluated based on its specific circumstances. Suspicious circumstances, such as motive or presence at the crime scene, are insufficient alone for corroboration but may collectively support conviction when combined with other evidence. Factors like ill will toward the victim may also serve as corroboration. Moreover, circumstantial evidence, even if seemingly minor, can contribute to corroborating an accomplice's testimony. In this context, Hopkins testified that Lewis-Grant solicited him to kill the complainant for financial gain, which is relevant to the charge of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. Lewis-Grant had a prior understanding with Hopkins about killing the complainant, although he testified that he did not know the act would occur on that specific night. After the murder, Hopkins, covered in blood, and Jamie went to Lewis-Grant's house, where he instructed them to burn their clothes in a barbeque pit. While Hopkins did not see Lewis-Grant burn the clothes, Jamie claimed she did, and he observed Lewis-Grant tampering with the pit. Multiple witnesses testified to Lewis-Grant’s motive and intent to harm the complainant, citing her distress over losing custody of their children and her expressed hatred for him. There were also accounts of her previous attempts to harm him, including an altercation where she threatened him with a gun and offered money to have him killed. Lewis-Grant provided contradictory statements about her whereabouts on the night of the murder, initially claiming she was asleep but later stating she woke up and found Hopkins missing. Friends testified that she had been intoxicated that night. Additionally, she suggested the complainant's death was drug-related, despite evidence contradicting this theory. The evidence surrounding the crime, including the discovery of the complainant's body and remnants of burnt clothing in the barbeque pit, combined with the suspicious circumstances, provided substantial corroborative evidence for the prosecution. Deputy White observed smoke near the crime scene, and evidence technicians found lighter fluid and remnants of clothing in the pit, suggesting recent activity related to the disposal of evidence. Jamie’s confession supported the statements and confession of Hopkins, indicating that Lewis-Grant was involved in burning their clothes after the murder. Although Lewis-Grant denied any involvement, she mentioned burning sick-call requests that morning, suggesting she had the opportunity to destroy evidence related to the murder. Corroborating evidence does not need to independently establish guilt or directly link the accused to the crime but can show a connection sufficient for a rational jury to consider. Hopkins testified that Lewis-Grant expressed a desire to kill the complainant to gain exclusive custody of her children. He detailed the murder and acknowledged taking items from the complainant’s home at Lewis-Grant’s direction, using her car and credit card as compensation for the crime. After the murder, Hopkins claimed that Lewis-Grant expressed gratitude but also worried about being caught. He stated that Lewis-Grant attempted to mislead others about their involvement, including claiming someone was after her. Additional non-accomplice evidence indicated Lewis-Grant had a motive and opportunity to commit the murder, having communicated with Jamie multiple times before the complainant's death. Witnesses testified to Jamie's animosity toward the complainant, and Lewis-Grant reportedly acknowledged that Jamie had killed him. Post-murder, Lewis-Grant's behavior was noted as lacking genuine emotion, and she remarked about gaining custody of the children and receiving benefits following the complainant's death, suggesting financial motive. Suspicious circumstances surrounding Lewis-Grant’s motive and opportunity, alongside other evidence, provide adequate corroboration for her murder conviction. The court determined that rational jurors could connect her to the offense, thus overruling her challenges regarding corroboration and accomplice-witness testimony. In addressing her contention about the jury charge, Lewis-Grant argued that the inclusion of a law-of-parties instruction improperly expanded the State's theory of liability, causing her significant harm. The State countered that the indictment, which alleged capital murder, permitted the jury to consider a lesser-included offense of murder based on the case's facts. The law-of-parties instruction allowed the jury to find that Lewis-Grant solicited, encouraged, or aided another in committing the murder. Lewis-Grant did not object to this instruction, necessitating her to demonstrate egregious harm. The legal definitions outlined indicate that capital murder involves committing murder for remuneration or employing another to do so, while murder involves intentionally or knowingly causing death or serious bodily injury. Lewis-Grant acknowledged that murder is a lesser-included offense of capital murder and did not contest the need for the law-of-parties to be included in the indictment. Her primary concern was that the broader language of the law-of-parties instruction allowed for a conviction based on actions not explicitly alleged in the indictment, which she argued could lead to proving a lesser standard than what was originally charged. Lewis-Grant cites Judge Clinton's concurring opinion in *Walker v. State* to argue against the inclusion of "abstract portions" of the Texas Penal Code section 7.02 in jury instructions. She contends that *Johnson v. State* supports limiting the law-of-parties instruction to case specifics. However, *Walker* did not include a law-of-parties instruction, and *Johnson* lacked the relevant phrase in its jury charge, which the court deemed erroneous for not providing a clearer application of the law of parties. The court declines to allow for a fragmented inclusion of section 7.02 in jury instructions and notes that *Johnson* suggests the entirety of section 7.02 should be presented if the law of parties is invoked. Lewis-Grant did not cite applicable case law to support her argument, and she also failed to request a more explicit application of the law of parties, as noted in *Chatman v. State*. Consequently, her fourth issue is overruled. Lewis-Grant also challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting her murder conviction, asserting a lack of evidence for premeditation, assistance in the crime, or mutual understanding with her co-defendant, Hopkins. The State argues that evidence of Lewis-Grant's encouragement and direction to Hopkins, along with circumstantial evidence such as inconsistent statements and motives, supports the conviction under the law of parties. When evaluating legal sufficiency, evidence is viewed favorably toward the verdict, allowing a rational jury to find the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury holds the responsibility of resolving testimonial conflicts and assessing credibility, and the appellate court refrains from reweighing evidence or substituting its judgment for that of the jury. Appellate courts assess whether a jury's decision is rational, reviewing all evidence, both admissible and inadmissible, in a neutral light. They evaluate the factual sufficiency of evidence by determining if the supporting evidence is weak or against the great weight of all evidence, which could render the verdict manifestly unjust. Appellate courts do not replace the fact finder's judgment but must find an objective basis in the record that contradicts the jury's verdict before ordering a new trial. While the court can critically assess the jury's decision, a deferential standard is maintained, requiring significant justification for reversal. The standards for legal and factual sufficiency apply equally to both direct and circumstantial evidence, with the latter alone capable of supporting a verdict. The cumulative effect of circumstantial evidence may also lead to a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. Establishing an agreement among parties to commit a crime often relies on their actions, and such an agreement must occur before or simultaneously with the crime. Courts consider events surrounding the offense to assess participation, emphasizing that the totality of incriminating evidence can support a conviction, even if no single fact is independently conclusive. Motive, inconsistent statements, and implausible explanations are significant indicators of guilt. In the case at hand, while it is agreed that Hopkins committed the murder, Lewis-Grant contends that for her conviction to be legally sufficient, the State must demonstrate her intent or knowledge of Hopkins' plan and her assistance in executing it, referencing the need for more than mere knowledge of a crime for party liability. In Vodochodsky, two men were charged with ambushing police officers, with the State asserting the defendant was complicit in the attack, knowing his friend intended to kill. The defendant claimed to be merely present and not responsible for his friend's actions. The court found sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude that the defendant was present, participated, made inconsistent statements, was aware of his friend's intentions, and sought to assist his friend before a planned suicide. In contrast, Lewis-Grant's case involves direct testimony indicating a clear understanding between her and Hopkins about killing the complainant, with Lewis-Grant expressing hatred towards him and promising material rewards for the murder. Additional corroboration from Ranger Ramos supported Hopkins' confession implicating Lewis-Grant. Evidence indicated Lewis-Grant encouraged and aided in the murder, demonstrated motive, and made inconsistent statements to divert suspicion. The court emphasized the importance of deferring to the jury's role in resolving conflicts in testimony and weighing evidence. Ultimately, the court found sufficient circumstantial and direct evidence to uphold the jury's verdict against Lewis-Grant, rejecting her challenges regarding the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting her murder conviction. Lewis-Grant asserts a lack of clear understanding with Hopkins regarding the murder of the complainant, arguing that the evidence suggests that Hopkins acted unilaterally and that this should not support her murder conviction. Despite her claims, a review of the evidence indicates the jury had sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence to conclude otherwise. Key points include: Lewis-Grant had a motive to kill the complainant; prior attempts to either kill or hire someone to kill him; threats made against the complainant; actions demonstrating solicitation and encouragement of Hopkins in the murder; inconsistent recounts of the night before the murder; corroboration of Hopkins’ confession by a witness; statements expressing gratitude towards Hopkins for the murder; and her involvement in destroying evidence post-offense. After a comprehensive evaluation of the evidence, it was determined that the proof of guilt was not weak or contrary enough to undermine the jury's verdict. Consequently, the court upheld the trial judgment, affirming the sufficiency of evidence for her murder conviction and addressing her related convictions for tampering with evidence. The panel of Justices Yates, Seymore, and Brown participated in the decision.