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David Mark Temple v. State
Citation: Not availableDocket: 14-08-00074-CR
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; December 20, 2010; Texas; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
David Mark Temple was convicted of murdering his wife, Belinda Temple, and sentenced to life in prison. He appealed the conviction on eighty issues, which were categorized as follows: 1. Legal and factual insufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. 2. Violations of due-process rights due to the State's alleged Brady violations. 3. Trial court errors related to the prosecutor's cross-examination of the appellant concerning the credibility of other witnesses. 4. Allowing the prosecutor to present unsupported and inflammatory facts during cross-examination. 5. Improper jury arguments by the prosecutor. 6. Overruling of numerous hearsay objections by the trial court. The court affirmed the conviction. Background details include that Temple was raised in Katy, Texas, where he was a star football player. He married Belinda in 1992, and they had a three-year-old son and were expecting a daughter at the time of her death on January 11, 1999. On that day, Belinda retrieved their son from daycare due to illness and returned home briefly before leaving again. Appellant claimed that after Belinda arrived home, he and E.T. went to a park, stopping at a grocery store where they were recorded on video. Appellant went to Home Depot with E.T. around 5:14 p.m. and was not recorded leaving. Upon returning home, he found the back door of his house open and a window broken. He took E.T. to the neighbors, Michael and Peggy Ruggiero, informing them of a burglary and requesting them to call 911. After returning home, appellant discovered Belinda's body in the master bathroom closet, having been shot in the back of the head. He called 911 at 5:38 p.m. but claimed he could not perform CPR due to her injuries. Law enforcement arrived as he exited the house, announcing Belinda's death, and placed Shaka in the garage. Appellant was later questioned by detectives, where inconsistencies in his account were noted, and he was identified as a suspect. He lived with his parents until remarrying in 2001 and was indicted for Belinda's murder in 2005. In 2007, a jury found him guilty, sentencing him to life imprisonment. The trial court denied his motion for a new trial. Appellant argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction; however, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals established a single standard for evaluating sufficiency, which is legal sufficiency, to be applied in this appeal. A person is guilty of murder under Texas law if they intentionally or knowingly cause another's death or intend to cause serious bodily injury through actions that pose a clear danger to human life (Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(b)(1), (2)). Intent is defined as having a conscious objective to engage in the conduct or cause the result (Id. § 6.03(a)), while knowledge involves being aware of the nature of one's conduct or the circumstances surrounding it (Id. § 6.03(b)). When evaluating the sufficiency of evidence, courts must interpret all evidence in a manner favorable to the verdict, ensuring that the jury had a rational basis for finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, without reassessing the weight or credibility of evidence (Brooks, 2010). Courts defer to the jury's resolution of conflicting evidence unless irrational. The evidence must support a conclusion that the defendant committed the crime, with circumstantial evidence being as valid as direct evidence for establishing guilt. The cumulative effect of incriminating facts may suffice for a conviction, even if not every individual fact points directly to the defendant's guilt (Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9). In the case under analysis, it is established that Belinda was shot in the back of the head with a shotgun after 3:30 p.m. on January 11, 1999, suggesting that someone intentionally and knowingly caused her death. The court must now assess whether the evidence supports the conclusion that the appellant was the shooter, viewed in favor of the verdict. Appellant contends that the prosecution's case relied primarily on evidence of his motive and opportunity rather than on concrete evidence proving the elements of murder, emphasizing that motive is not an element of any crime. He points to legal precedents affirming that while motive is not a required element, it is typically admissible as circumstantial evidence of guilt. A significant portion of the prosecution's case aimed to portray the appellant as a controlling and emotionally abusive husband engaged in an extramarital affair, suggesting he had a motive to kill Belinda. Witnesses, including fellow coach Quinton Harlan, testified about the appellant's behavior, describing him as controlling and volatile. Quinton noted that appellant frequently chided him for not attending social gatherings and claimed to have authority over his household, even instructing Quinton to exert control over his own marriage. Further testimony highlighted that appellant made derogatory statements regarding Belinda's appearance and parenting. Belinda's twin sister, Brenda, corroborated the perception of the appellant as controlling. In the Fall of 1998, appellant initiated a flirtatious relationship with Heather Scott, a colleague. He admitted to kissing her and engaging in sexual relations with her on two occasions. Heather’s roommate testified to appellant's affectionate behavior toward Heather, while Quinton noted that both he and appellant had expressed interest in Heather but ultimately did not pursue leaving their wives. This context of the appellant's relationships and behavior contributed to the prosecution's narrative regarding his potential motive for murder. In 1998, Heather invited the appellant to her New Year's Eve party, during which they spent two nights together. Heather claimed they had sexual relations on January 1, 1999, while the appellant did not recall this. He provided an alibi of hunting. Heather initially told police on January 5 that she wanted to end their relationship, but later indicated that the appellant expressed love for her. At trial, Heather claimed her second police statement was coerced, stating the police were abrasive and rephrased her words about the appellant's feelings. Despite this, Detective Tracy Shipley, who drafted the statement, maintained Heather ultimately signed it voluntarily. Evidence suggested the appellant was involved in a sexual relationship with Heather, was ambivalent about leaving his wife, Belinda, and expressed love for Heather shortly before Belinda's death. This context, alongside evidence of the appellant's treatment of Belinda, suggested he had a motive for her murder. However, the mere existence of an affair was deemed insufficient to directly link him to Belinda's death, according to Smith v. State. Further evidence indicated the appellant could have been present when Belinda was murdered. After returning home to care for their child, E.T., Belinda called home at 3:32 p.m. and left her parents’ house around 3:45 p.m. The appellant stated that Belinda arrived home at 3:45 p.m., but later adjusted this to 4:00 p.m. He claimed he took E.T. to Cimarron Park and subsequently to Brookshire Brothers, where they were recorded entering at 4:32 p.m. This timeline suggests there were unaccounted minutes between Belinda's arrival home and the appellant's documented activities, particularly if the jury doubted his account of going to Cimarron Park. The medical examiner and an expert for the appellant stated that the precise time of Belinda's death could not be determined, but it occurred after her school meeting ended between 3:20 and 3:30 p.m. Evidence presented indicated that a gunshot was fired in the appellant’s neighborhood at a time when he was recorded at Brookshire Brothers. The Roberts brothers, who lived adjacent to the appellant, returned home from school around 3:57 p.m. and heard what they thought was a gunshot at approximately 4:38 p.m., coinciding with the time the appellant was filmed leaving the store. Although their testimony supported the appellant's defense, the jury could reasonably disbelieve it due to the witnesses being children and the absence of additional corroborating witnesses. Further examination of the timeline indicated that after leaving Brookshire Brothers, the appellant claimed to have gone directly to Home Depot. However, despite his assertion of heavy traffic, multiple witnesses stated that the trip should take only ten to fifteen minutes. The appellant was recorded leaving Brookshire Brothers at 4:38 p.m. and entering Home Depot at 5:14 p.m., resulting in a thirty-six-minute interval. Additionally, a witness, Bernard Bindeman, saw the appellant driving south on Katy Hockley Cutoff between 4:50 and 5:00 p.m., suggesting he had misled police about his travel direction and purpose. Moreover, inconsistencies arose regarding the appellant’s claim of using a car seat for his child, E.T. A detective found no car seat in the appellant’s truck, and photographs corroborated this absence. When questioned about the car seat, the appellant claimed ignorance of its whereabouts, despite his previous statements that he always secured E.T. in a car seat. Testimonies from Quinton and Tammy further supported the notion that the appellant typically used a car seat. The lack of a car seat on the day of Belinda’s murder suggested he may have been in a hurry to leave his home, contributing to the circumstantial evidence of his guilt. Testimony and physical evidence indicated that appellant's home was staged to simulate a burglary. Upon returning from Home Depot, appellant found a broken window, a television on the ground, and open drawers, leading him to believe a burglary occurred while he was out. However, Sergeant Dean Holtke, an investigator with the Harris County Sheriff's Office, testified that the scene suggested staging rather than a genuine burglary. For instance, there were significantly more glass shards in the living room than in the foyer, with none on the couch, indicating the door was likely open when the glass broke. No damage was found on the hutch or dents on the back door, contradicting appellant's theory about the glass. Holtke noted that the television had been carefully placed on the ground and was still plugged in, while the contents of the open drawers were undisturbed, and jewelry belonging to Belinda was found in plain view in the master bedroom. Appellant acknowledged that nothing of his was taken and that the jewelry Belinda wore was also not missing. The timing and setting of the alleged burglary, occurring during typical return hours for residents in a corner home, raised further suspicions. Additionally, appellant's behavior post-murder contributed to the inference of guilt. Law enforcement observed his lack of emotional response; Deputy Virginia Kathleen Johnson noted he calmly reported his wife had been shot without displaying distress. Detective Charles Leithner found appellant to be shaking and evasive during questioning, and a friend’s inquiry about seeking the murderer elicited a dismissive response from appellant, suggesting indifference. Collectively, these factors painted a picture of possible staging and suspicious behavior, leading to the jury's potential conclusion that the burglary was fabricated and not the cause of Belinda's missing jewelry. Appellant resumed his relationship with Heather shortly after Belinda's murder. During a visitation hosted by appellant's parents on January 13, Quinton testified that appellant inquired about Heather's well-being and later apologized to Quinton for the situation involving Heather. Heather received flowers from appellant on Valentine's Day, a month post-murder, and he visited her multiple times that spring, including planting flowers together. A neighbor testified seeing appellant with a woman in September 1999, and family members expressed disapproval upon learning of the relationship, leading to a period of no communication with him. Appellant and Heather married in June 2001. Appellant confronted Quinton and Tammy regarding their grand jury testimony in April 1999. He asked Tammy directly about her statements, to which she responded they should not discuss it. Quinton told appellant he was telling the truth to the authorities, prompting appellant to instruct him to "keep your mouth shut." Appellant later followed Quinton and Tammy in separate instances, leading to Tammy feeling threatened enough to retrieve a gun. These actions contributed to perceptions of appellant's guilt. Appellant argued against the evidence suggesting he owned a 12-gauge shotgun or reloaded shells, with his family testifying they primarily owned 20-gauge shotguns. Kevin recounted an incident in the 1980s when appellant's 20-gauge shotgun was damaged and later discarded. Clint Stockdick, a family friend, testified that he did not see the Temples use 20-gauge shells and noted that they primarily used 12-gauge shotguns, although Kevin denied ownership of a Mossberg shotgun he was shown. Evidence suggested that the appellant and his family were concealing information about their shotguns, which could imply guilt. Although the evidence did not directly link the appellant to a specific murder weapon, it was sufficient to support a conviction based on circumstantial evidence. The appellant's behavior—lying about his actions on the day of the murder, his demeanor following the incident, and staging his home to resemble a burglary—combined with a demonstrated motive and opportunity to commit the murder, reinforced the evidence against him. Regarding the appellant's claims of a Brady violation, he argued that his due-process rights were infringed due to the State's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence about a neighbor until after the trial had begun. He also contended that the trial court erred by denying his request for a continuance to utilize this late-disclosed material. However, it was determined that the appellant did not raise his objection in a timely manner, failing to preserve his Brady complaint. Even if he had preserved the issue, he did not demonstrate that the undisclosed evidence was material or that its disclosure would have likely altered the trial's outcome. The burden remained on the appellant to prove that the lack of timely disclosure affected the trial's result, which he did not accomplish. In January 1999, R.J.S., a high school student living next to the Temples, was implicated in the murder of Belinda. Appellant argued for a continuance, citing the State's failure to timely disclose critical facts: R.J.S. lied about skipping school, gave three inconsistent statements to police, failed three polygraph tests, was in the appellant's neighborhood looking for marijuana, saw the appellant driving before 4:30 PM, and a shotgun belonging to R.J.S.'s father was found post-murder. Except for the polygraph failures, these facts were presented to the jury. During trial, appellant methodically questioned R.J.S. and emphasized his potential involvement in closing arguments, leading the court to find no reasonable probability that earlier disclosure would have changed the trial's outcome. Regarding evidentiary and jury-argument issues, appellant raised seventy-five complaints about trial court rulings and alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The court operates under an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing evidentiary rulings, allowing for rulings within reasonable disagreement. To preserve errors for appeal, objections must be timely, and if sustained, further action must be taken to preserve the right to claim error. The prosecutor's discretion in cross-examination is upheld unless there is a clear abuse. Once the defendant testifies, they are subject to broad questioning on relevant matters. Appellant argues that the trial court improperly permitted the prosecutor to question him about the credibility of other witnesses' testimonies in issues five, seven, nine, eleven, and thirteen. The key testimonies include statements from Tammy, who claimed to have heard appellant insult Belinda by calling her "fat" and criticizing her clothing and parenting. Quinton corroborated Tammy's account, stating he heard appellant say that Belinda used to be attractive but is now "fat." Brenda Lucas, who visited the Temples during the holiday season, testified that appellant mocked Belinda's appearance and noted that he did not provide her with a birthday gift. She also observed Belinda's habit of removing her shoes upon arriving home. In contrast, appellant denied making any derogatory remarks about Belinda, stating that any comments about her "butt" were made in jest. He claimed to have given her gifts for her birthday, Christmas, and their anniversary and denied that she took off her shoes when coming home. During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned the appellant about statements made by witnesses, specifically regarding allegations of ridiculing Belinda's weight. The trial court overruled objections from the defense regarding the form of these questions, allowing the appellant to respond affirmatively when asked if certain witnesses had lied. The prosecutor's inquiries included whether Brenda had misled the jury, and despite defense objections, the appellant confirmed that Brenda and other witnesses had lied. The prosecutor also brought up testimony from Quinton Harlan, which the appellant confirmed, but he resisted labeling other statements as lies, suggesting instead that there could be various reasons for incorrect testimony. The court ultimately ruled against the defense's objections, permitting the prosecutor to question the appellant about the truthfulness of other witnesses' testimonies. The appellant clarified that while he believed Quinton was truthful about a specific incident, he disagreed with the characterization of Brenda and Tammy's statements as lies. The excerpt concludes by noting that it is established law that an attorney cannot impeach one witness's testimony based on another's, indicating that the trial court's decision to allow such questioning was an error, which will be considered in the harm analysis. Appellant challenges the State's cross-examination tactics, claiming they included irrelevant and inflammatory questions aimed at undermining his credibility before the jury, thus infringing on his right to a fair trial. Specific questions from the prosecutor questioned the nature of appellant's relationship with Tammy Harlan and his treatment of Belinda, which the trial court sustained objections against but without a request from appellant for further instruction or a mistrial. As a result, the court found no error in its handling of these inquiries. In subsequent issues, appellant objects to questions regarding his feelings about his unborn daughter, specifically whether he had arguments with Belinda over not wanting a daughter. Although the trial court sustained objections to some questions, appellant did not consistently seek to instruct the jury to disregard the prosecutor's inquiries. It was noted that prior to appellant's testimony, there was no evidence indicating he did not want a daughter, raising concerns about the factual basis for the prosecutor's questions. During a hearing on a motion for a new trial, the prosecutor claimed her questions were based on information from the Temple family and friends, although it was unclear whether this included the individual mentioned in the questioned context. The record does not clarify the factual foundation for the prosecutor's line of questioning. The appellant's seventeenth and eighteenth issues were overruled after he testified on direct examination about his desire for his daughter. In issue twenty, the appellant objected to a question from the prosecutor regarding his feelings towards the Lucases, which the court overruled. Although the appellant did not answer the questioned, it was based on prior testimony where he disparaged Belinda's family. The court noted that the question’s argumentative nature could depend on the prosecutor’s demeanor. In issues twenty and twenty-one, the appellant claimed an exchange during cross-examination violated his right to a fair trial, prompting a request for a mistrial. The prosecutor questioned the appellant about statements he made regarding a burglar, leading to a contentious interaction between the prosecutor and defense counsel. The court intervened, instructing both lawyers on proper conduct and allowing the defense counsel to express objections to the prosecutor's conduct. Despite sustaining the objection, the court denied the mistrial motion, stating that the issue could be raised on appeal. The jury was subsequently instructed to completely disregard the prosecutor's last question. The prosecutor directly accused the appellant of lying, which was deemed prosecutorial misconduct, as such assertions should not be made outside the evidence presented to the jury. The trial court sustained the appellant’s objection but denied the request for a mistrial, a decision that will be evaluated in the harm analysis. During the trial, the appellant testified about a family meeting on January 13, 1999, where he admitted infidelity. The prosecutor questioned whether the meeting involved discussions about shotguns, despite no evidence supporting this claim. The appellant argued these questions lacked factual basis, but he failed to demonstrate bad faith or request a voir dire to challenge the prosecutor's basis for the inquiries. Consequently, the court overruled his concerns. In a separate issue, the appellant contended the trial court erred by not granting a mistrial after the prosecutor implied that his family stopped speaking to him following the murder. Although the court sustained an objection to a specific question about this, the prosecutor referenced testimony from family members, prompting judicial admonitions to refrain from introducing evidence not in the record. The trial court addressed a question posed by the prosecutor regarding the appellant's family, which the defense objected to as overly broad. The court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the question but denied the defense's request for a mistrial. The appellate review concluded that the prosecutor's question was not sufficiently inflammatory to warrant a mistrial, as the court's instruction was deemed effective and the jury was presumed to have followed it. Additionally, the appellant raised issues concerning hearsay objections related to testimony from Detective Leithner about statements made by Heather Scott. Despite the defense's objections claiming the testimony was hearsay by implication, the court overruled these objections. The appellate court found that even if there was an error in admitting this testimony, it did not significantly impact the jury's verdict, as other explanations for Heather's concerns were evident. As a result, the appellate court upheld the trial court's decisions and overruled the appellant's claims regarding hearsay. Appellant's seventy-third issue pertains to the testimony of Tammy Harlan, specifically regarding her conversations with Belinda about changes in Belinda's demeanor in the presence of the appellant. The defense objected to the questions on hearsay grounds, which the court overruled. Tammy confirmed discussions in which she advised Belinda to assert herself against the appellant's negative treatment. The court found that the questioning aimed to establish whether Tammy had brought up Belinda's behavioral changes rather than to prove the truth of any hearsay statements. Additionally, Tammy testified that the appellant belittled Belinda in various contexts, reinforcing her advice for Belinda to stand up for herself. The court concluded that any potential hearsay violation was harmless due to the corroborative evidence presented without objection. In issues seventy-five and seventy-seven, the appellant challenges Tammy's testimony regarding advice she gave Belinda about attending the appellant's class reunion. The prosecutor's inquiry about this conversation led to a similar objection of hearsay, which was also overruled. Tammy stated she encouraged Belinda to attend the reunion, a fact that had already been introduced without objection by another witness, thus rendering any error harmless. The court overruled both of these issues. Tammy Harlan testified about a conversation with Belinda after a high school reunion, describing Belinda as "incredible" and "beautiful." The defense objected on hearsay grounds, which the court sustained, but no further action was taken by the defense, leading to no error by the trial court. The court overruled appellant’s seventy-seventh issue. In the seventy-ninth issue, the appellant claimed the prosecutor introduced hearsay by asking Rebecca Temple about a 1998 discussion of divorce between appellant and Belinda. The defense objected, asserting it injected false statements, but the objection was overruled. Rebecca Temple denied remembering the conversation, thereby negating hearsay. Appellant later answered a similar question without objection. The prosecution did not reference divorce discussions during closing arguments, rendering the earlier question harmless. The appellant's twenty-fifth through sixty-seventh issues claimed the trial court erred in allowing the State's jury arguments, alleging prosecutorial misconduct through unsupported facts, lessening the burden of proof, commenting on witness credibility, and accusing the Temple family of perjury. The purpose of jury argument is to analyze evidence presented at trial, and permissible areas of argument include summarizing evidence, drawing reasonable deductions, responding to opposing counsel, and a plea for law enforcement. Prosecutors have latitude in drawing inferences from evidence, provided they are reasonable and in good faith, and may express opinions based on the evidence without constituting unsworn testimony. Jury arguments that exceed approved boundaries do not automatically lead to reversible error unless they are extreme, manifestly improper, violate a mandatory statute, or introduce harmful new facts against the accused. An appellate court must evaluate such arguments within the entire context rather than as isolated statements. Generally, improper argument is deemed non-constitutional error and is disregarded unless it affects the defendant's substantial rights. A defendant must object during trial and maintain the objection through adverse rulings to raise the issue on appeal, and failure to object each time waives the complaint. The appellant claimed the prosecutor improperly introduced facts outside the record to vilify him, specifically through references to inadmissible hearsay regarding his marriage. The trial court erred in overruling the objection to the prosecutor's implications about evidence not presented, which could mislead jurors by inviting speculation about extraneous facts. The prosecutor also suggested that the appellant did not take E.T. to the park on the day of the murder, but evidence indicated that E.T. was sick and had been retrieved from school, supporting the inference that the appellant did not take him to the park. This error by the trial court will be considered in the harm analysis. Bernard Bindeman's testimony contradicted the appellant's account of his whereabouts, indicating he was seen driving south from near his parents' house, while the appellant claimed to have gone directly to Home Depot after visiting Brookshire Brothers. Officer Leithner's inquiry about the parks visited by the appellant revealed inconsistencies in the appellant's identification of the parks. Detective Schmidt confirmed that officers, while searching the parks, did not recall seeing the appellant's truck on the relevant day. The court overruled the appellant's objections regarding the prosecutor's comments on the absence of blood or tissue on the shotguns recovered, which was supported by the testimony of their expert, Max Courtney. Courtney had examined numerous shells and found no connections to the murder weapon, reinforcing the prosecutor's assertion that none of the shotguns was related to the murder. In addressing the appellant’s claims regarding the prosecutor's argument about the Temple family's forgiveness, the prosecutor suggested that the family chose to overlook the appellant's alleged crime, framing it as a denial of justice for the victim. The defense objected, but the court overruled the objections, and the appellant did not raise further objections during the prosecutor's subsequent statements about the family's alleged conspiracy to lie on his behalf. This lack of objection resulted in a waiver of any potential error regarding those arguments. The court overruled the appellant's thirtieth through thirty-eighth issues concerning various objections to the prosecutor's arguments during the trial. For the thirty-second and thirty-third issues, the appellant claimed the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to suggest he hid the murder weapon. The court found the prosecutor's argument, which inferred the appellant disposed of the weapon based on the absence of a identified shotgun, was a reasonable deduction from the evidence. In the thirty-fourth and thirty-fifth issues, the appellant objected to the prosecutor's statement suggesting that the jury should not underestimate the appellant's capability of committing the murder. Although the court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the statement, it denied the appellant's motion for mistrial, concluding the prosecutor's remarks were not excessively prejudicial. For the thirty-sixth issue, the appellant contended the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by speculating about the victim's feelings towards spending holidays with his family. The court sustained the objection, and since the appellant did not seek a mistrial, the trial court was deemed to have acted correctly. In the thirty-seventh and thirty-eighth issues, the appellant objected to the prosecutor calling him the "stud" of Katy High School and SFA, asserting it was not supported by the record. The court overruled this objection, noting that multiple witnesses testified to the appellant's athletic prowess, making the characterization a reasonable deduction from the evidence presented. Overall, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's rulings on these issues. Appellant's thirty-seventh and thirty-eighth issues are overruled. Issues thirty-nine through forty-two involve appellant's objections to the prosecutor's statements regarding his treatment of Belinda, particularly in the absence of others. The prosecutor suggested that Belinda's poor self-esteem stemmed from appellant’s derogatory remarks about her and her family, inferring that such treatment likely intensified when they were alone. Defense counsel objected, asserting a lack of evidentiary basis for the claims, but the court overruled the objections, citing the reasonableness of the prosecutor's deductions based on witness testimonies. Appellant’s thirty-ninth through forty-second issues are also overruled. In issues forty-three and forty-four, appellant argues the trial court erred by permitting the prosecutor to assert that he was under significant pressure from various sources, including personal relationships and family dynamics. Defense counsel objected, claiming the statements were beyond the record, and the court sustained this objection, instructing the jury to disregard the prosecutor's remarks. Despite this, the court found that the argument regarding appellant's pressure had evidentiary support and was not so prejudicial as to warrant a mistrial. The trial court's decision to deny the mistrial motion is upheld, reflecting a lack of abuse of discretion. The court overruled appellant's forty-third and forty-fourth issues. The appellant claimed prosecutorial misconduct regarding statements about a dog, Shaka, barking and jumping at the fence, but this claim was supported by witness testimony. The court also overruled the forty-fifth issue. In issues forty-six through forty-nine, appellant argued that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to assert that he failed to let Shaka inside and closed the door when he suspected a burglar was present. The prosecutor questioned why the appellant closed the door if he thought a burglar was inside and highlighted that Shaka remained in the backyard. The defense objected, but the court overruled the objections, concluding the arguments were reasonable deductions from the evidence, including testimony from Mike Ruggiero. In the fiftieth issue, the appellant claimed prosecutorial misconduct regarding the explanation of burglary motivations. Since there was no objection raised on these grounds, the issue was not preserved, but the court stated it would be overruled even if it had been. The prosecutor's comments were deemed common-sense observations about burglaries. Lastly, in the fifty-second issue, the appellant contended the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to argue he removed jewelry and washed his hands after killing Belinda. The defense objected, stating there was no evidence for this assertion, but the court overruled the objection. Although evidence of jewelry found in a tray and damp towels in the bathroom was presented, it was insufficient to reasonably infer that the appellant washed away blood, rendering the prosecutor's argument speculative. The trial court made an error by overruling the appellant's objections, which will be factored into the harm analysis. Specifically, the appellant contested the prosecutor's assertion that E.T. was likely in the backyard or garage when Belinda arrived home before her murder. The prosecutor did not claim as fact that E.T. was in those locations but stated he was not in the house at that time. Evidence presented showed that E.T. did not witness the murder, supporting the argument that he must have been nearby, as there was no indication he was with anyone else between Belinda's return from school and the appellant's arrival home. Therefore, the prosecutor's argument was deemed reasonable and not extraneous to the record. In addressing issues fifty-five through fifty-seven, the appellant argued that the State’s comments invited the jury to convict on a standard lower than "beyond a reasonable doubt." The prosecutor's remarks about "cold cases" lacking overwhelming evidence were characterized as appeals to common sense rather than improper. Although the prosecutor’s suggestion that the burden of proof could involve emotional considerations may have been improper, any error was waived since similar arguments had been made previously without objection. Ultimately, no reversible error was found based on the arguments presented during the trial. Appellant's issues fifty-five through fifty-seventh are overruled. Regarding witness credibility, issues fifty-eight through sixty-three assert that the trial court wrongly permitted the State to vouch for its witnesses during jury argument. In issues fifty-eight and fifty-nine, appellant claims the prosecutor improperly supported Detective Holtke's credibility by stating he did not lie about the absence of a car seat in appellant's truck. However, this claim was waived due to a lack of objection, leading to the overruling of these issues. In issues sixty and sixty-first, appellant objects to the prosecutor's statements about law enforcement's long wait to present evidence in court. Although defense counsel objected on grounds of inflammatory argument and going outside the record, the court overruled these objections, and the appellate court found the statements were not inflammatory, ultimately overruling these issues as well. For issues sixty-two and sixty-three, appellant argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched for Clint Stockdick's credibility, claiming he had more honor than the Temple family. While the trial court overruled the defense's objection, the appellate court recognized that the argument was exaggerated and inconsistent with the principle that convictions should rely on evidence rather than emotion, noting this error would be considered in harm analysis. Finally, in issues sixty-four and sixty-five, appellant contends the prosecutor made inflammatory statements suggesting the entire Temple family committed aggravated perjury, emphasizing the deceptive nature of their testimony. The trial court erred by overruling the appellant's objection to the prosecutor's inflammatory remarks, which suggested that the Temple family witnesses committed "more aggravated perjury in this trial than this building has heard in a decade." This statement was deemed theatrical and intended to provoke the jury, undermining the principle that a conviction should rest solely on the evidence presented without prejudice. The court highlighted the importance of evaluating the cumulative effect of multiple errors while conducting a harm analysis as per rule 44.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Non-constitutional errors that do not significantly affect a defendant's substantial rights are disregarded unless they have a substantial and injurious impact on the jury's verdict. If there exists "grave doubt" regarding the harmlessness of the error, it must be treated accordingly. In assessing potential adverse effects on the jury's decision, all aspects of the record are considered, including evidence, trial conduct, and the nature of the errors. Additionally, the trial court's decision to overrule the objections may implicitly endorse the prosecutor's improper conduct, increasing the likelihood of harm to the appellant. The trial court made errors by permitting the prosecutor to pose improper questions and make inappropriate jury arguments. However, these errors, stemming from an overzealous prosecution, did not significantly influence the jury's verdict when considering the overall record. The evidence presented lacked direct links to the appellant's involvement in Belinda's murder, with no eyewitness, DNA, or physical evidence. Nonetheless, substantial circumstantial evidence included the appellant's extramarital affair, abandonment of his family during the holidays, and resumption of the affair shortly after Belinda's death. Testimony indicated the appellant criticized Belinda and had a possible motive for murder, while evidence suggested a staged burglary and family conspiracy to protect him. Witness accounts contradicted appellant's travel timeline and behavior after the incident, which further implicated him. The prosecutor's speculative claims and exaggerated questions did not materially affect the jury's assessment of credibility between the testimony of appellant's family and that of witnesses Quinton and Tammy. The appellant's argument that the prosecution improperly introduced harmful evidence regarding Belinda's girlfriends is distinguished from the precedent set in Fant-Caughman v. State, where the credibility of a minor victim was critical, highlighting the distinct context of this case regarding marital dynamics. Appellant's extramarital affair during Belinda's pregnancy indicated significant marital issues. Testimonies from witnesses, including Tammy and Quinton, described appellant as controlling and disrespectful towards Belinda, casting doubt on claims of a happy marriage, particularly since many supportive witnesses were less familiar with the couple. The prosecutor's mention of information potentially known by Belinda's girlfriends did not materially impact the jury's perception of the couple's marital problems. Evidence suggested R.J.S. might be involved in Belinda's murder, notably a shotgun owned by R.J.S.'s father was found with a spent shell, but R.J.S. claimed he had used the shotgun for target practice prior to the murder, which could lead the jury to dismiss it as the murder weapon. The motive for implicating R.J.S. was weaker compared to that against appellant. Both appellant and R.J.S. testified, allowing the jury to evaluate their credibility directly. The jury could reasonably conclude R.J.S. was not the murderer, despite testimonies from the Roberts brothers about hearing a shotgun blast near the time of the murder, which could create reasonable doubt about appellant's guilt. Numerous prosecutorial errors regarding witness credibility, including calling appellant a liar and suggesting he was part of a perjury scheme, did not significantly influence the jury's decision or warrant a mistrial, despite appellant’s claims of due process violations based on precedent from the Ninth Circuit. Improper veracity questions by the prosecution in Texas cases are typically deemed harmless as they highlight existing contradictions between the defendant's and State’s witnesses’ testimonies. In cases like *Streff v. State* and *Creech v. State*, the courts have ruled that such errors do not lead to reversible error when they do not harm the defendant's reputation with the jury. The prosecutor's questioning is seen as emphasizing discrepancies rather than introducing harmful new information. In this instance, the prosecutor's assertions regarding the Temple family’s alleged perjury did not significantly impact the jury's decision. The testimony of the Temple family included contradictions related to the appellant's infidelity, which suggested a possible conspiracy to misrepresent facts. The prosecutor's comments, while inflammatory, were based on evidence and did not constitute a request for the jury to act on emotion rather than facts. Additionally, the prosecutor's statements were made after previously arguing without objection, further mitigating the potential impact of any impropriety. The prosecutor presented arguments alleging that the Temple family portrayed a misleading image of a loving relationship and a perfect marriage, despite the reality of a serious crime—the execution of a pregnant woman. The prosecutor claimed that the family's narrative and denial of the accused's ownership of a shotgun constituted a deliberate and conspiratorial lie. This assertion was supported by evidence from Clint Stockdick, which challenged the family's credibility. Regarding the trial court’s decision to deny the appellant's motion for mistrial after the prosecutor made a potentially prejudicial comment, the court maintained that the comment did not warrant such a drastic measure. The trial court instructed the jury to disregard the comment, and the standard for reviewing the denial of a mistrial focuses on whether the trial court abused its discretion. The reviewing court considers the severity of the misconduct, the effectiveness of the trial court's remedial measures, and the strength of the evidence against the defendant. While a prosecutor's claim that a witness is lying can be considered serious error, the specific circumstances of this case suggested that the trial court's decision fell within a reasonable range of disagreement, indicating that the prosecutor's remarks were unlikely to have significantly influenced the jury's decision. The prosecutor's comment calling the defendant a “damn liar” during testimony about a conversation regarding the victim's gun led to a reversal, despite instructions to disregard and an apology. This comment was based on the prosecutor's personal knowledge, making it particularly damaging. However, in a contrasting case (Seaton v. State), a prosecutor's remark was deemed curable by an instruction to disregard since the witness's credibility was not material. In the current case, the jury's understanding of the need to disregard the comment was reinforced by the defense counsel's immediate objection and the trial court's instruction. The improper comment was serious, as it directly related to a critical issue: the location of Shaka during the murder, which, if believed by the jury, would support the State's theory of a staged burglary. Detective Leithner's testimony suggested the defendant was evasive about Shaka's location, further complicating the issue. The case is distinguished from Roberts, where the prosecutor's knowledge of the truthfulness of the defendant's statement exacerbated the error. The discussion references precedents indicating that jury instructions can mitigate improper comments, but acknowledges the unique severity of the prosecutor's assertion in this case. The prosecutor's opening statement suggested skepticism about the appellant's claims regarding the location of his dog, Shaka, during the murder, though he did not assert that the appellant lied about it. The appellant contended that Shaka was in the garage. During jury arguments, the prosecutor claimed the appellant had recently fabricated this assertion and emphasized that Shaka’s barking would have indicated a burglar's presence, framing it as a fact that could not be altered by the appellant or his family. This dispute over Shaka's location was a central issue throughout the trial, and the jury was aware of the state's disagreement with the appellant's narrative. The trial court's instruction to disregard the prosecutor's outburst was deemed sufficient and within reasonable bounds, leading to the conclusion that denying the motion for mistrial was not an abuse of discretion. The court found that any errors did not significantly affect the jury's verdict. Although the appellant cited multiple cases of prosecutorial misconduct that led to reversals, the court did not find similar persistent misconduct in this case. Despite some inappropriate questioning and arguments by the prosecution, these did not rise to the level of prejudicing the appellant's rights or depriving him of a fair trial. The record did not indicate a deliberate effort by the prosecution to undermine the appellant's trial rights. The court affirms the trial court’s judgment and overrules the appellant’s remaining issues. Key findings include: 1. A grand jury in April 1999 did not indict the appellant. 2. Witness Michael Ruggiero stated the back door closed after the appellant entered his home but did not recall hearing any glass breaking. 3. The State aimed to prove that the appellant's dog, Shaka, was in the backyard during the murder to argue the burglary was staged, as Shaka was known to be aggressive. The appellant claimed he placed Shaka in the garage before leaving. 4. While some witnesses did not see Shaka in the garage, police photographs showed a dog blanket and bowls there, suggesting Shaka's presence. Testimony indicated no barking was heard, compatible with either scenario. 5. Angela Vielma, the only witness to see the appellant enter the garage, testified she did not see Shaka but also noted she could not see around a potential car in the garage, where Shaka’s items were located. 6. Detective Leithner's testimony regarding the appellant's irritation about the dog did not alone support the conclusion that Shaka was outside during the crime. 7. The court asserts that sufficient evidence supports the appellant’s conviction without needing to establish Shaka's location definitively. 8. The appellant’s due-process claims concerning witness questioning were waived due to failure to object at trial, as required by Texas appellate rules. The court emphasizes the importance of timely objections to preserve issues for appeal, suggesting defense counsel consider voir dire to clarify the basis for prosecution questions. The trial court held a hearing outside the jury's presence following a prosecutor's question that was alleged to be in bad faith. Challenges to the basis of a question should occur before or at the time the question is posed. In the case of Cavender, the prosecutor acknowledged that her questions were based on hearsay, which the Court of Criminal Appeals deemed too weak to justify. In the current instance, the prosecutor's explanation suggested that the question had some factual basis related to a conversation about divorce, though it was still based on hearsay. The appellant argued that the prosecutor's question violated his right to a fair trial and due-process rights. However, he did not raise an objection on these grounds during the trial, leading the court to overrule this issue. Several other issues raised by the appellant, regarding hearsay statements purportedly violating due-process rights, were similarly overruled due to lack of proper objections during the trial. The prosecutor admitted during the motion-for-new-trial hearing that her question originated from hearsay, but this did not eliminate the factual basis for the question. The appellant also claimed prosecutorial misconduct regarding the arguments made; however, he failed to object during the trial, which precluded him from preserving these issues for review. The court reiterated that objections must be made for issues of prosecutorial misconduct to be preserved. Additionally, the court noted that accusations made by the prosecutor regarding the family conspiring to commit perjury were not objected to by the appellant, resulting in a waiver of any potential error. To constitute reversible error, the argument must be deemed manifestly improper or introduce harmful new facts. Furthermore, neither the trial judge nor the prosecutor is permitted to comment on the accused's failure to testify. A comment made during the trial infringes upon the privilege against self-incrimination and the right against compelled testimony as protected by the Fifth Amendment and Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution. Case law, including Davis v. State, establishes that arguments attacking a defendant indirectly through defense counsel are considered improper. Such prosecutor conduct is seen as detrimental, potentially biasing the jury against the defendant. The appellant argues that this misconduct violated his right to a fair trial, suggesting it warrants a harmless-error analysis under Rule 44.2(a) due to its severity. However, the trial court's decision to sustain the objection and deny the mistrial motion means this issue does not require a harm analysis but will be reviewed for abuse of discretion, as clarified in Archie v. State.