The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's order granting Julia Ann McKinney Isaacs a money judgment against her ex-husband, Manuel R. Isaacs, for child-support arrearages exceeding $93,000, along with attorney’s fees and a judicial writ for wage withholding. Isaacs appealed the decision, arguing that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under Texas Family Code section 157.005 and that sections 31.006 and 34.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code barred his ex-wife from collecting the arrears. The court found Isaacs’s arguments unmeritorious.
The factual background reveals that Isaacs's obligation to pay child support ended in 1986, but in 2009, McKinney filed a notice of child-support lien and a request for a judicial writ of withholding due to alleged arrears of over $103,000. Isaacs did not file a motion to stay the issuance of the writ within the required timeframe. He later sought to set aside the notice, claiming he had paid all due support directly to McKinney, disputing the arrearage amount, and asserting that McKinney was precluded from recovering the arrears through judicial means.
During a hearing, the trial court determined it had jurisdiction and ruled in favor of McKinney, ordering the issuance of a child-support lien and a monthly wage withholding of $625 from Isaacs’s earnings. The appellate court upheld the trial court's judgment.
The trial court determined that section 157.005(b) does not strip it of jurisdiction. It found that Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 34.001, amended in 2009, does not apply to child support judgments under the Family Code. Isaacs appeals with five issues, primarily arguing that section 157.005 limits the court's jurisdiction regarding its judgment on child support arrearages, claiming conflicts between section 157.005 and sections 157.323 and 158.309. However, section 157.005(b) explicitly states that the court retains jurisdiction to confirm child support arrearages and issue a cumulative money judgment if an enforcement motion is filed within ten years of the child becoming an adult or the obligation terminating.
Research indicates no previous case interpreting the current version of section 157.005, which allows the court to confirm arrears and render cumulative judgments under section 157.263 if properly requested. Parton did not seek relief under section 157.263; instead, she aimed to enforce child-support liens and requested a judicial writ of withholding from Isaacs’s earnings, thus giving the trial court jurisdiction to render judgment for the owed amount and enforce liens. The court can also issue income withholding orders that account for arrearages. Isaacs' assertion of an irreconcilable conflict among these statutes is unfounded, as they provide multiple cumulative remedies for the enforcement of unpaid child support.
The trial court's jurisdiction to impose certain remedies, as outlined in Tex. Fam. Code Ann. 157.005(a), (b), is time-limited, while other remedies remain available until all child support and arrears are paid. The court found that section 157.005(b) does not restrict its jurisdiction regarding the relief granted in the judgment from which Isaacs appeals. Isaacs's arguments asserting such limitations lack merit, particularly as he did not claim this provision to be a statute of limitations or challenge its constitutionality. The relevant version of section 157.005(b) contains a time limit specific to relief under section 157.263, distinguishing it from the case of In re S.C.S., which involved a prior version of the statute.
In addressing Isaacs's second issue, he contends that section 34.001 prevents the trial court from rendering judgment for child-support arrearages, arguing that missed payments constituted separate final judgments that became dormant due to the absence of execution within ten years, per Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. 34.001(a). He claims that these dormant judgments could only be revived within two years, asserting that Parton failed to execute or timely revive them. However, the statutes clearly allow Parton to pursue relief until all child support obligations are satisfied. Additionally, a 2009 amendment to section 34.001 explicitly states that it does not apply to child support judgments under the Family Code, further supporting the trial court's authority in this matter.
The amendment to section 34.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code applies to all child support judgments under the Family Code, irrespective of when the judgment was issued. The Supreme Court of Texas and the lower court have not yet interpreted this statute. In a prior case, the court noted the amendment but did not apply the new subsection (c) to resolve the appeal. Under subsection (c), section 34.001 is determined not to apply to child support judgments, rendering Isaacs’s arguments under this section meritless. Isaacs claimed the 2009 amendment violated Texas Constitution article I, section 16 concerning retroactive laws; however, he waived this argument by failing to present it in the trial court, thus it was not considered on appeal. The court overruled Isaacs's related arguments in issues three and four regarding the ex-wife's entitlement to child-support liens and income withholding, as they were based on previously discussed points. Isaacs’s fifth issue regarding attorney’s fees was not addressed because it was contingent on the reversal of earlier judgments, which did not occur. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, confirming that section 157.005(b) did not affect the trial court’s jurisdiction over the case.
