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Jovany Jampher Paredes v. State
Citation: Not availableDocket: 14-10-00266-CR
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; August 23, 2011; Texas; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Affirmed on August 23, 2011, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals upheld the capital murder conviction of Jovany Jampher Paredes, sentencing him to lifetime confinement without parole in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. Paredes, a member of the SPPL street gang, was implicated in the murders of Abelardo Sanchez and Rafael Sanchez Cantu, who were killed during a robbery attempt linked to a dispute over a bad batch of cocaine. Key participants included members from both SPPL and a rival gang, La Primera, with several SPPL members testifying against Paredes. Jessica Perez, a significant witness, described the events leading to the murders, including a party where Paredes intervened in a disagreement and where drug use occurred. The group later traveled to the victims' apartment, where the fatal incident took place. The court addressed the issue of accomplice witness testimony, highlighting that Rivera and Perez were legally considered accomplices, while the status of another witness, Cano, was left for jury determination. The sufficiency of evidence corroborating the accomplice testimony was a point of contention raised by Paredes. On September 2, the group arrived in Galveston at dawn and, after a serious conversation among appellant Barcenas, Aguilar, and Perez, appellant expressed dissatisfaction with the cocaine they had purchased, believing it was too weak. Appellant insisted on returning to the Kingsgate Apartments to demand a refund. The group complied, arriving around 10:00 a.m. Most members exited the cars, while Perez, Trevino, and Vanessa stayed behind. Appellant then called Cano to request an "AK." They drove to a Katy Wal-Mart parking lot, where Cano transferred an AK-47 to appellant's car. Appellant also obtained a handgun from another gang member. After regrouping at the gas station near the Kingsgate Apartments, they devised a plan to rob a drug dealer residing in apartment 95. They parked out of sight, and except for Perez and Baretto, everyone approached the dealer's apartment, armed with the AK-47, a revolver, and another firearm. Shortly after, Perez heard a gunshot, followed by Montalvo, Barcenas, Aguilar, and Pimental rushing back to the cars. Under Montalvo's direction, they returned to the apartment. Perez then heard more gunshots and saw Trevino returning with a black scoped rifle, which was not among the original weapons, and Rivera carrying cocaine. Appellant returned with the AK-47. After returning to Perez's apartment around noon, the group went to the bedroom. Trevino requested a rag to clean the guns, and appellant, whose shirt was bloodied, asked for a replacement shirt, which Perez failed to wash, instead storing it in her closet. Post-shower, Perez learned that appellant had hidden the AK-47 in her closet and heard him admit to shooting someone, describing the scene as having blood "gushing out like a river." Joe Rivera, a member of SPPL, testified about a party at Perez's apartment on September 1, 2007, where he arrived around 10:00 p.m. with Baretto and others, including Aguilar, Trevino, and Montalvo. Rivera noted that Cano was not present. The group engaged in drinking, marijuana use, and cocaine consumption, eventually running out of cocaine around 3:00 a.m. They decided to procure more cocaine from a dealer at Kingsgate Apartments, knowing the dealer through Trevino. After retrieving the cocaine, they traveled to Crystal Beach, where they used it for about an hour. Appellant expressed dissatisfaction with the cocaine's quality and proposed a robbery of the dealer, which initially met with resistance due to the group’s fatigue. Despite the initial reluctance, appellant persuaded the group to proceed with the robbery plan. They returned to the Kingsgate Apartments around 9:00 a.m., where Trevino warned appellant about the dealer’s firearm. The group, armed with only Rivera's revolver, approached the dealer's apartment under the guise of purchasing more cocaine. After their knocks went unanswered for five minutes, appellant called Cano to acquire an AK-47. They met Cano, who provided the weapon before departing. The group also obtained a .22-caliber revolver from another gang member, Spooky, and returned to the Kingsgate Apartments around 11:00 a.m., with appellant loading the AK-47 during the drive. Upon arrival, the gang members approached the back door, with appellant concealing the AK-47 in a Rockets jersey. After knocking and being invited inside, they confronted the occupants, with Trevino hitting a sleeping man with a gun and demanding to know the location of drugs and money. Appellant threatened two men with a gun, demanding money and drugs, while his accomplices, Trevino and Rivera, searched the apartment. Rivera searched the kitchen, while appellant pointed his weapon into a southwest bedroom, where he demanded valuables from the occupant, who claimed to have none. Appellant then fired approximately five shots into the bedroom, silencing the occupant. Afterward, he and Rivera searched a southeast bedroom, where Rivera discovered a significant amount of drugs. Appellant attempted to break into a locked bathroom but shot the doorknob, prompting a man to flee while brandishing a rifle. Appellant's weapon jammed during his attempt to shoot the man, leading Trevino to assist by firing at the man, who then fell on the bed. The intruders fled the apartment, taking a rifle and drugs, and returned to their vehicles. They later arrived at Perez’s apartment, where appellant changed his shirt before driving Rivera home. Police later discovered two bodies in the apartment, including the complainant, who had been shot in the chest. Investigators found significant evidence linking the crime to appellant, including a Rockets jersey, bullet casings from an AK-47, and a description of a getaway vehicle—a white Pontiac traced back to appellant. The next day, police arrested appellant and found an AK-47 in Perez’s apartment, which matched the casings from the crime scene. Further investigation revealed a bloodstained shirt belonging to appellant, with DNA evidence linking him to the scene, including a match to the victim's DNA. Cano claimed membership in the SPPL gang, though he was not actively involved at the time of the murders. He admitted to owning the AK-47 used in the crimes. On September 2, 2007, while at a Denny's in Katy with his girlfriend, Cano received a call from appellant asking to borrow the AK-47. Cano agreed but requested that appellant come to the Denny's to pick it up. Appellant later called to say he was outside, and Cano then handed over the AK-47, which appellant wrapped in a white material. Cano did not ask why appellant wanted the weapon and asserted he was not present during the murders. In the appeal, appellant contended that the trial court erred in two respects: (1) denying his motion for an instructed verdict due to insufficient corroboration of accomplice witnesses Jessica Perez and Joe Rivera, and (2) allowing a DNA analyst to present expert testimony in violation of the Confrontation Clause. Regarding the first issue, the court emphasized that the testimony of an accomplice cannot alone secure a conviction; it must be corroborated by other evidence linking the defendant to the crime, as mandated by Article 38.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The corroborating evidence does not need to directly connect the defendant to the offense but must tend to do so. The court noted that when assessing the sufficiency of corroborating evidence, it must be viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict and that appellate courts defer to the factfinder’s resolution of conflicting evidence. The analysis requires considering the cumulative impact of all non-accomplice evidence to determine if it sufficiently links the defendant to the offense. Cumulative suspicious circumstances can connect a defendant to a crime, even if each circumstance alone is insufficient. Evidence such as being near the crime scene at the time, along with other incriminating factors, can provide the necessary corroboration for a conviction. In this case, after excluding accomplice testimony, non-accomplice evidence linked the appellant to the murder of the complainant. A t-shirt found in Perez’s apartment contained a bloodstain with the DNA of Abelardo Sanchez, a murder victim from the same incident. Additionally, DNA scrapings from the shirt established the appellant as the only major contributor, reinforcing the connection to the crime. Further corroboration came from clothing items containing the victim's boyfriend's blood found in the appellant's vehicle and precedents where circumstantial evidence supported the defendant's implication in crimes. The appellant's argument against the DNA evidence's corroborative value due to multiple contributors was dismissed, as he was the only major contributor and the evidence should be viewed favorably for the verdict. Additionally, testimony from Cano indicated that the appellant borrowed an AK-47 shortly before the murders, and this weapon was later found in Perez's apartment, confirming its connection to the crime scene. Firearms expert testimony linked shell casings from the scene to the AK-47, indicating that the appellant had acquired the murder weapon just prior to the murders. This collective evidence strongly supports the appellant's involvement in the murders. Possession of the murder weapon by the appellant just before the crime is significant evidence linking him to the murders, as established in case law (Herron v. State; Cathey v. State; Ayers v. State). Such possession serves as corroborative evidence connecting the accused to the offense. The court concluded that a rational jury could find sufficient non-accomplice evidence to connect the appellant to the crime, leading to the overruling of the appellant’s first issue on appeal. The second issue pertains to the testimony of Robin Freeman, a forensic scientist and DNA analyst from the Harris County Institute of Forensic Sciences. Freeman testified about receiving the appellant's t-shirt and conducting DNA analysis that revealed a match to Abelardo Sanchez. Additional analysis of scrapings from the shirt collar indicated a DNA mixture from multiple contributors. Freeman detailed the batch process of DNA testing, where various analysts perform distinct steps, and confirmed her qualifications to oversee and interpret the results of these processes. The legal framework around the Confrontation Clause is addressed, highlighting that the Sixth Amendment right applies to both in-court and out-of-court testimonial statements. Citing Crawford v. Washington and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, the text underscores that testimonial hearsay cannot be admitted unless the declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a chance to cross-examine them. The Melendez-Diaz ruling emphasized that affidavits from lab technicians are considered testimonial statements that require confrontation. Appellant argues that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was violated when Freeman testified about DNA test results derived from analyses conducted by non-testifying analysts, citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. This argument has been previously examined by other courts. In Hamilton v. State, the San Antonio Court of Appeals ruled that an expert’s opinion based on lab work by others does not violate the Confrontation Clause, as the Supreme Court did not classify such data as testimonial. Similarly, in Settlemire v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld the admission of breath test results through a supervisor's testimony, clarifying that Melendez-Diaz did not invalidate the established rules for scientific evidence admission. The unpublished case of Oliver v. State also distinguished Melendez-Diaz, concluding that the Confrontation Clause was not violated when an expert used data from multiple analysts in a batch testing scenario. In this case, Freeman's opinion, based on data from her colleagues, was deemed admissible, affirming the trial court's decision. The appellate court overruled the appellant's claims and affirmed the lower court's judgment.