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Salvador Rodriguez v. State

Citations: 398 S.W.3d 246; 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 4838; 2009 WL 1801264Docket: 13-07-00539-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; June 25, 2009; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Salvador Rodriguez was indicted for murder but convicted of voluntary manslaughter, receiving a twenty-year sentence and a $10,000 fine. Rodriguez contended that the trial court erred in three ways: by denying him credit for time served in a Mexican prison, not providing a "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction during sentencing, and admitting prejudicial photographs at the punishment phase. The incident leading to the charges occurred on August 4, 1991, when Rodriguez shot Jose Jorge Cardenas after witnessing him with Rodriguez's girlfriend. After fleeing to Mexico, Rodriguez was apprehended in 2004 and subsequently extradited to the U.S. 

During the trial, the prosecution presented testimony from Rodriguez's former girlfriend and autopsy photographs of Cardenas. Rodriguez objected to the relevance and prejudicial nature of the testimony and photographs, arguing they violated motions in limine and were cumulative. The trial court, however, permitted the evidence and ultimately sentenced Rodriguez to confinement, granting him 270 days of credit for time served. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decisions and the conviction.

On July 31, 2008, Rodriguez filed a motion for a judgment nunc pro tunc, seeking credit for time served in jail, specifically: 1)  August 18, 2004, to March 2, 2006, in a Mexican jail; 2) March 2, 2006, to March 9, 2006, in a Harris County jail; and 3) March 9, 2006, to December 1, 2006, in a Hidalgo County jail, totaling 833 days. The trial court did not rule on this motion but certified Rodriguez’s right to appeal on May 29, 2007. During the trial, Rodriguez also requested to disregard a statement made by Pallasser and sought a mistrial, both of which were denied.

In the appeal, Rodriguez argued that the trial court erred in not granting him credit for the Mexican jail time, while the State contended that the issue should have been raised via a petition for writ of mandamus, citing insufficient information to determine the correct amount of credit. Under Article 42.03, section 2(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, a defendant is entitled to credit for all time served prior to sentencing. The court noted that the trial court has a mandatory duty to grant such credit and can correct the judgment through a nunc pro tunc order. Since the trial court did not rule on the nunc pro tunc motion, Rodriguez's appeal regarding the credit calculation was deemed improper.

Regarding Rodriguez's second issue, he alleged reversible error for the trial court's failure to provide a "beyond a reasonable doubt" instruction during the punishment phase concerning extraneous-offense evidence, specifically a claim that he had previously threatened Pallasser. The State argued that no relevant evidence requiring this instruction was introduced at the punishment phase. The admissibility of extraneous-offense evidence at this stage is governed by Article 37.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which mandates that such evidence must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be relevant.

The trial court did not include an article 37.07, section 3(a)(1) instruction in the punishment charge, and Rodriguez did not object to this omission during the trial. Rodriguez contended that the instruction was necessary due to the admission of all guilt-innocence phase evidence, including testimony on an extraneous offense. However, since no extraneous-offense evidence was introduced at the punishment phase, the court determined that the instruction was not required, overruling Rodriguez's second issue.

Regarding the admission of autopsy photographs of the victim during the punishment phase, Rodriguez argued these were introduced solely to inflame the jury, asserting their prejudicial nature given that he had already admitted to shooting the victim. The admissibility of photographs is at the discretion of the trial judge, and the court applied a Rule 403 balancing test to evaluate the probative value against the danger of unfair prejudice.

Rodriguez objected to two specific photographs, claiming they were cumulative and highly prejudicial. The court found that while the photographs were gruesome, they were relevant and probative in demonstrating the nature of the crime, including the use of a deadly weapon and the severity of the victim's injuries. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs.

Ultimately, all of Rodriguez’s issues on appeal were overruled, and the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.