Margaret Josephine Devlin-Weinheimer v. Edmund A. Weinheimer, Jr.

Citation: Not availableDocket: 13-08-00546-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; December 2, 2009; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Margaret Josephine Devlin-Weinheimer appeals a trial court decree declaring her marriage to Edmund A. Weinheimer Jr. void. She raises four issues regarding insufficient evidence to support the court's order, erroneous jury instructions, and the denial of her motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. The court affirms the trial court’s decision.

Edmund filed for divorce on October 13, 2005, with Margaret asserting an affirmative defense of reimbursement. After various discovery disputes, a temporary order was issued on March 5, 2007, striking Margaret’s pleadings due to discovery abuse. Subsequent to judicial changes, Judge Caldwell upheld this order on July 3, 2007.

On May 5, 2008, Edmund amended his petition, claiming that Margaret had an ongoing common law marriage with Edward Richter, which commenced on April 14, 1983, and had not been dissolved. A jury trial was held on June 11, 2008, to assess the validity of Margaret and Edmund's marriage.

Richter testified via videotape, recounting their relationship and cohabitation since 1983, where they acted as a married couple, filed joint tax returns, and acquired property together. He stated that Margaret described their relationship as a common law marriage. Richter mentioned a separation agreement presented by Margaret in 1985, which indicated her intention to divorce him. Although Richter initiated divorce proceedings in 1992, they were dismissed in 1994. During testimony, Richter was confronted with an affidavit from Margaret, claiming she had no personal association with him, which he contested, asserting that he only knew her mother during family visits.

Richter is characterized in an affidavit as a “conman” who abandoned his children and committed identity theft, with specific allegations that he seduced Margaret’s minor daughter, which Richter denies. Edmund, who began dating Margaret in 1996 and lived with her from late 1997, testified about his ignorance of Margaret's children until meeting her adult daughter Jacquelynne. He learned of Margaret's previous marriages to William Standley, Robert Devlin, Lewis Milberger, and Edward Richter and signed an informal marriage declaration with Margaret in 2002. Edmund filed for divorce in 2005 after discovering a pending divorce petition between Margaret and Richter, but could not find a divorce decree, believing their marriage was never dissolved.

Lewis Millard Smyth testified about his long relationship with Margaret, stating they cohabited from 1981 until the mid-1990s, and that he had provided her with financial support recently. Margaret testified that she never intended to marry Richter, had not represented herself as married to him, and had not communicated with him since 1985. The jury ultimately deemed Margaret and Edmund's marriage void, which the trial court confirmed, denying Margaret's subsequent motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial, leading to her appeal.

The case involves a dispute over applicable Texas Family Code provisions regarding informal marriages. Margaret argues for the one-year statute of limitations from a 1989 amendment, while Edmund cites a two-year rebuttable presumption from the current code. The original law allowed for an informal marriage to be inferred if the couple lived together and presented themselves as married, a standard that existed when Margaret and Richter's relationship allegedly ended in 1985.

In 1989, former section 1.91(b) of the Texas Family Code was amended to establish a one-year statute of limitations for proving the existence of an informal marriage, requiring that proceedings be initiated within one year after the relationship ended or by September 1, 1989, whichever was later. This amendment was subsequently repealed in 1997. The 1995 amendment abolished the statute of limitations and introduced a rebuttable presumption against the existence of an informal marriage if no action was taken within two years after separation. It clarified that actions barred before the amendment's effective date could not be revived. The current law indicates that if proceedings are not initiated within two years of separation, it is presumed that no agreement to be married existed.

Margaret contends that under the former provision, an informal marriage cannot be recognized without timely proof, while Edmund argues that the former section is no longer applicable. Courts are divided on the application of the one-year statute of limitations for cases initiated after September 1, 1995. Notable cases illustrate these conflicting interpretations. Ultimately, the necessity to determine the applicability of the former statute may be unnecessary as it is concluded that Margaret has waived her right to invoke it.

Margaret contends that Edmund's argument regarding waiver is misplaced, asserting that he bears the burden of proving their marriage is void. She claims that he failed to provide evidence of any proceedings initiated before September 1, 1990, to establish an informal marriage between herself and Richter, thereby not meeting his burden of proof. Although she does not argue that Edmund was required to act within one year of a 1989 amendment, she employs a statute of limitations defense to counter his claims. The court determines that Margaret waived her right to assert the former section 1.91(b) limitations defense because she did not plead it affirmatively and was barred from presenting any defenses at trial due to court-imposed sanctions. Since she raised this defense too late during the new trial motion hearing, the court concludes she is unable to rely on it.

Margaret's appeal issues, particularly her arguments regarding the trial court's decree declaring her marriage to Edmund void, are based on the applicability of former section 1.91(b). The court finds her claims of insufficient evidence to support the decree also depend solely on this section, leading to their overruling. Additionally, regarding her first issue on jury charge, the court reviews under an abuse of discretion standard, stating that failure to submit a proposed jury instruction must follow the correct procedural guidelines to preserve error.

The standard of "substantially correct" does not require absolute correctness or merely sufficient information for the court's attention, but rather that the core substance is accurate. In the case at hand, a jury was tasked with determining if the marriage between Edmund A. Weinheimer and Margaret Devlin-Weinheimer was void under Section 6.202(a) of the Texas Family Code, which states that a marriage is void if either party is still legally married to someone else. Margaret contends that Edmund’s burden of proof is divided into two categories: the existence of an informal marriage with Richter and whether this marriage was proven within a year after their relationship ended. However, since Margaret waived her limitations defense, the statute of limitations under former section 1.91(b) was not relevant, and thus the trial court did not err in excluding questions regarding the second category.

Margaret proposed specific jury questions regarding her cohabitation and the perception of her relationship with Richter as a marriage but omitted the necessary element of agreement required for establishing an informal marriage under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 2.401(a)(2). This omission rendered her proposed jury instruction incomplete and incorrect, failing to meet the standard of "substantially correct" as required by case law. Consequently, her failure to provide a complete instruction preserved no error for appeal. All of Margaret's issues were overruled, and the trial court's judgment was affirmed.