Elizabeth Reynolds v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 13-05-00643-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; August 2, 2007; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Elizabeth Reynolds appeals her conviction for criminal solicitation of capital murder, resulting in a life sentence following a jury verdict. She raises four issues: claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, denial of a motion for mistrial, and factual insufficiency of evidence supporting her conviction. 

The incident occurred on August 9, 2003, when her boyfriend, Albert Benitez, encountered an armed intruder, Franciso Perez, who shot him multiple times. During the ordeal, Benitez held the door against Perez until he was shot from behind. After being shot several times, Benitez managed to escape and call 911, providing police with a description of Perez and indicating that Reynolds had been kidnapped.

Reynolds later approached police at the station, claiming she was abducted by Perez and forced to drive him. However, Officer Greif noted inconsistencies in her emotional state, and she failed to mention her prior 911 call. Additionally, Texas Ranger Oscar Rivera testified that Reynolds attempted to call 911 after the shooting but did not provide a coherent description of the shooter due to his ski mask. The court ultimately affirmed Reynolds' conviction.

Ranger Rivera testified that there was no record of Reynolds calling 911, noting that a call record would exist even if she hung up. His investigation revealed bullet holes in the door, indicating the shooter was positioned in the kitchen. After the incident, Reynolds could not identify Perez in a lineup but later indicated he resembled the shooter when shown photographs. Rivera detailed forensic evidence, including a shirt identified by Reynolds as belonging to the shooter, found half a mile from the highway where the shooter allegedly exited the vehicle, and noted it was undamaged. He also reviewed Reynolds's phone records, which showed over one hundred calls to Sara Perez's number from July to September 2003, and found a $2,000 transfer to Sara Perez on the shooting day, alongside a $2,000 check to Francisco Perez dated the day after.

Sara Perez testified that Reynolds called her seeking Francisco Perez and instructed her to lie to authorities about her employment if questioned. The jury convicted Reynolds of criminal solicitation of capital murder, sentencing her to life imprisonment. A motion for a new trial was denied, leading to this appeal.

Reynolds claims ineffective assistance of counsel, asserting that her appellate counsel miscalculated the deadline for a new trial hearing and that trial counsel did not properly defend her. The legal standard for evaluating these claims is based on the Strickland test, which requires showing that counsel's performance was unreasonably deficient and that such deficiencies affected the trial's outcome.

Before evaluating Reynolds's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the prerequisites for filing a motion for new trial are outlined. A motion must be substantiated by an affidavit that clearly demonstrates the truth of the claims made. Reynolds's motion asserted that her trial counsel was ineffective for several reasons: failing to investigate the case thoroughly, not calling willing witnesses, not informing Reynolds of plea offers, and not challenging a juror with a personal connection to a State witness. It also claimed that counsel made false assurances about winning the case and frequently fell asleep during the trial. However, the supporting facts were not included in the record, and Reynolds did not file any affidavits, which is necessary when the claims are not evident in the record. The absence of affidavits meant that Reynolds's motion was improper.

Reynolds's first issue examined whether her counsel was ineffective for not including supporting affidavits. The court noted that the failure to file affidavits could be seen as a strategic decision, and the undeveloped record was insufficient to meet the Strickland standard for proving ineffective assistance. Reynolds failed to demonstrate how she could have obtained the affidavits, leading the court to conclude that she did not satisfy the first prong of Strickland, resulting in the overruling of her first issue.

In her second issue, Reynolds claimed she was denied effective counsel as her attorney did not present a defense. The court reiterated that a silent record, absent an explanation for counsel’s actions, does not overcome the presumption that those actions were reasonable. Counsel typically should be given a chance to justify their decisions before being labeled ineffective. Thus, without further evidence or explanation, the court found insufficient grounds to declare trial counsel ineffective.

A motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel was submitted by Reynolds, citing six specific instances of her trial counsel's alleged ineffective conduct. However, on appeal, she shifts her argument to claim that trial counsel failed to present a defense, criticizing his opening statements, cross-examination of Ranger Rivera, and witness selection. The court notes that a trial record typically lacks sufficient information to assess such claims and emphasizes that ineffective assistance of counsel allegations must be firmly supported by the record. The court presumes that counsel acted with a reasonable trial strategy due to the absence of evidence indicating that the conduct was so deficient that no competent attorney would engage in it.

Reynolds also contends that the trial court erred in not granting a mistrial after Ranger Rivera violated a motion in limine by referencing Francisco Perez's conviction related to the shooting. Despite the objection and a prompt jury instruction to disregard the statement, the court found that the testimony did not significantly inflame the jury's perceptions. The court reviews mistrial motions for abuse of discretion, noting that a mistrial is warranted only for highly prejudicial errors. The court concludes that, even if an error occurred, it was harmless due to substantial evidence of Reynolds's guilt, including over 100 phone calls to the convicted suspect's mother.

Ms. Perez testified that Reynolds made multiple calls to her son, Francisco, and presented evidence of a $2,000 check from Reynolds to Francisco dated the day after the shooting. The trial established that Perez shot Benitez, who identified him as the gunman in a lineup. Reynolds’s defense focused on the absence of direct evidence linking her to soliciting the shooting, rather than disputing Perez’s role as the shooter. Given the substantial evidence against Reynolds and the indication that Perez was likely the gunman, the mention of Perez's conviction did not adversely affect Reynolds’s case. Under Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a), an appellate court must reverse a conviction for constitutional error unless it determines that the error did not contribute to the conviction. The court overruled Reynolds’s challenge.

In assessing the factual sufficiency of the evidence for criminal solicitation, the court reviewed the evidence neutrally to determine if the jury could rationally find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The offense of criminal solicitation involves requesting or attempting to induce another to commit capital murder. The evidence included testimony from Benitez about being shot multiple times by Perez, bank and phone records indicating significant financial transactions between Reynolds and Perez around the time of the shooting, and Reynolds's behavior following the incident. Notably, she claimed to have called 911, but no record existed of such a call. The jury could infer that Reynolds facilitated Perez's entry into the house. Despite Reynolds’s claims that the calls were to her cleaning lady and disputing the handwriting on the check, the jury, as the sole judge of credibility, could reasonably convict Reynolds based on the circumstantial evidence presented, including testimony from Sara Perez indicating that Reynolds instructed her to lie if questioned.

Circumstantial evidence can independently support a jury's verdict, often possessing equal or greater probative value than direct evidence, as established in Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). When evaluating the evidence neutrally, it is not sufficiently weak to render the conviction clearly wrong or manifestly unjust, aligning with the standards set in Watson, 204 S.W.3d 416-17. Consequently, Reynolds's fourth issue is overruled, and the trial court's judgment is affirmed. The memorandum opinion was filed on August 2, 2007. Additionally, if the trial record lacks sufficient detail for direct appeal review, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be addressed in a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus, referencing Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) and Moore v. State, 700 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).