Jesse Joe Rodriguez v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 13-02-00322-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; November 9, 2004; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Jesse Joe Rodriguez was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life imprisonment by the 36th District Court of Aransas County, Texas. Rodriguez appealed, raising seven points of error, including claims that the trial court improperly denied his request for an instructed verdict, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, and that the jury charge lacked an instruction on the need for independent corroboration of his confessions. 

Factual findings revealed that on May 9, 2001, two fishermen discovered a car and a body in the water near the Degussa Carbon Black Plant. Subsequent investigations identified two crime scenes: one on the shoreline, where items such as a torn bra and clothing were recovered, and another 125 yards away with additional evidence including a life insurance policy stained with blood. The medical examiner determined that the victim drowned, and DNA analysis indicated that Rodriguez could not be excluded as a contributor to the semen found in vaginal and anal swabs from the victim. Witness Tamala Dale Weeks testified that the victim had visited her home shortly before the incident and that Rodriguez had expressed a desire for the victim to give him a ride home, which she subsequently did. During the ride, Rodriguez allegedly took control of the vehicle, leading to the victim's distress. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision.

Appellant forced the victim into the back seat of a car, commanded her to undress, and then tore off her bra before sexually assaulting her both vaginally and anally. Despite the victim's pleas for help and threats to report the assault, appellant persisted and later attempted to kill her to prevent her from doing so. He tried to asphyxiate her by pressing her face against the back seat and applying significant pressure. When this failed, he sought to drown her by attempting to sink the car in water, which did not work. Eventually, he pulled the victim from the car and sexually assaulted her again in the water. After verifying she was not breathing, appellant left the scene, discarding some clothing items, and returned to his motel. 

In terms of legal sufficiency, capital murder is defined as committing murder during the commission or attempted commission of kidnapping or retaliation, as per Texas Penal Code. The appellant did not contest the murder charge but challenged the sufficiency of evidence regarding kidnapping and retaliation. The standard review for sufficiency involves assessing the evidence in favor of the verdict, determining if rational jurors could find the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Credibility and weight of witness testimony are determined by the trier of fact, and conflicts in evidence do not render the evidence insufficient. The reviewing court assumes that the fact finder resolved conflicts in favor of the verdict and applies common sense to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence.

In a factual sufficiency review, the standard is to evaluate whether the evidence, when viewed neutrally, shows that the proof of guilt is either weak enough to undermine confidence in the jury's verdict or that the evidence, while adequate alone, is significantly outweighed by opposing evidence. Evidence is deemed factually insufficient if it is so weak as to be clearly wrong or manifestly unjust, or if the adverse finding contradicts the great weight of available evidence. Deference is given to the fact-finder's determinations, especially regarding evidence's weight and credibility. 

The sufficiency of evidence is measured against the statutory elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge tied to the indictment, which must not alter the State's burden of proof or theories of liability. 

In the case of retaliation, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying an instructed verdict and claims the evidence fails to prove he caused the victim's death while committing retaliation. Retaliation involves intentionally harming someone due to their reporting or intent to report a crime. The indictment alleged the appellant drowned the victim while retaliating against her for threatening to report a rape. 

For legal sufficiency, the court concluded that a rational juror could find the appellant's confession and the evidence of the victim's drowned body supported the charge of retaliation beyond a reasonable doubt. For factual sufficiency, the appellant contended that his confession was the sole evidence of retaliation, arguing that the physical evidence did not suffice as corroboration. He referenced a prior case, Hartfield v. State, which indicated that corroboration must involve criminal charges or public threats. Despite this, the court found the evidence adequate to support the jury's conclusion regarding the retaliation charge.

Appellant contends that independent corroboration for retaliation requires evidence such as criminal charges or public death threats, similar to the case of Hartfield. However, neither the court in Hartfield nor relevant statutes mandate such evidence. In this case, the appellant admitted to sexually assaulting the victim, who threatened to report him, after which he drowned her to prevent her from doing so. The trial did not include evidence supporting the offense of retaliation. The evidence confirmed the victim was sexually assaulted and drowned, leading to the conclusion that the verdict was not against the great weight of the evidence, thus supporting the jury’s finding that the appellant caused the victim's death while committing or attempting retaliation. The appellant's first and second points of error are overruled.

Regarding the kidnapping charges, the appellant argued that evidence was insufficient to show he abducted the victim with intent to prevent her liberation. The indictment stated the appellant drowned the victim while attempting kidnapping. Under Texas law, kidnapping involves the intentional abduction of another person. The evidence demonstrated that the appellant restricted the victim's movements without consent, forcefully holding her in a car and threatening to crash if she resisted. The victim had intended to leave for a mail route early the next morning, but the appellant moved her from one location to another, specifically from Tamala Weeks’ residence to Degussa Dock, where she was later found dead. The State established that the appellant held the victim in a location where she was not likely to be found. Therefore, any rational jury could conclude that the appellant committed kidnapping, validating the legal sufficiency of the evidence. The appellant's claims regarding the factual sufficiency of the evidence, specifically that Degussa Dock is not secluded, were also addressed.

Evidence presented by the State established that the Degussa Dock is 500 yards from Highway 35 and not visible from it. The court found the evidence sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that the appellant caused the victim’s death during the commission of kidnapping, thus overruling the appellant's fifth and sixth points of error regarding the evidence's sufficiency related to the deadly weapon. The indictment did not include a charge for using a deadly weapon in connection with the kidnapping, and the trial court’s judgment did not indicate such use.

Regarding the jury instruction on corroboration, the appellant argued that the trial court erred by not including a requirement for independent evidence to support his confessions. Texas law prohibits convictions based solely on extrajudicial confessions unless corroborated by independent evidence that tends to prove the corpus delicti, which consists of two elements: identification of the victim's body and proof that the victim's death resulted from criminal acts. The court noted that the State provided sufficient evidence, including witness testimonies and the circumstances surrounding the victim's death, to establish the corpus delicti. Therefore, the trial court's refusal to provide a jury instruction on corroboration was deemed appropriate, leading to the overruling of the appellant's seventh point of error. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed.