in the Interest of T.R.F., a Child

Citation: Not availableDocket: 10-07-00086-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; August 15, 2007; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The Tenth Court of Appeals reviewed the case regarding the termination of parental rights of T.F. (mother) and H.R.F. (father) concerning their child, T.R.F. A jury had determined on January 18, 2007, that the parent-child relationship should be terminated, leading to a final order on February 28, 2007. Following the verdict, the trial court appointed new appellate counsel for both parents, who filed separate notices of appeal. The court affirmed the judgment concerning T.F. and severed her appeal.

In H.R.F.’s appeal, issues one and two were dismissed because they were not specifically presented in a timely filed statement of points, as mandated by the Texas Family Code, which requires appellants to file such statements within 15 days of a final order. H.R.F.’s third issue was divided into two parts: the first part, claiming the trial court erred in not dismissing the case after one year for lack of a final order, was also dismissed for the same reason. The second part contended that the trial court abused its discretion by extending the dismissal date without evidence of extraordinary circumstances. Although H.R.F. argued that the court should have provided more clarification on these circumstances, the court found no legal requirement for such specificity. Consequently, this portion of H.R.F.’s appeal was overruled, and the trial court’s judgment was affirmed overall.

Sefa Koseoglu filed a breach of contract lawsuit against the Texas A&M University System, the Texas Engineering Experiment Station, and his supervisor Mark McLellan, alleging a breach of a settlement agreement related to an employment dispute. Texas A&M and McLellan asserted sovereign immunity through pleas to the jurisdiction. Koseoglu sought summary judgment, claiming his contract rights were violated and that sovereign immunity was waived due to a denial of due process concerning his employment. The trial court denied the pleas to the jurisdiction, leading to this interlocutory appeal.

Koseoglu argues that sovereign immunity is waived because Texas A&M accepted the settlement's benefits and that the settlement was intended to resolve a due process liability. Additionally, he requested the chance to amend his pleadings if the court considered dismissal. The court determined it lacked jurisdiction to review McLellan's appeal due to the lack of statutory authorization for such an interlocutory appeal. Consequently, the court dismissed his appeal. As for Texas A&M, the court concluded Koseoglu did not provide sufficient factual allegations to demonstrate a waiver of sovereign immunity, resulting in a reversal and remand regarding Texas A&M. The court emphasized that interlocutory appeals are strictly governed by statute, specifically section 51.014 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and clarified that only governmental units can appeal under this statute.

The Court in Tullous determined that the Sheriff of Brazos County, as a constitutionally derived office, qualifies as a "governmental unit" under Texas law, specifically section 101.001(3)(D) and section 51.014(a)(8). This classification aligns with similar rulings regarding other elected officials, such as governors and police chiefs, whose offices also stem from the Constitution. However, the Court disagreed with extending this status to government employees not created by the Constitution or statute, emphasizing the need for a strict interpretation of the law as mandated by the Supreme Court.

The excerpt critiques the notion that a narrow interpretation of section 51.014 would waste judicial resources, asserting that the statute allows for prompt review of immunity claims through section 51.014(a)(5), which enables government employees to appeal immediately if their immunity claims are denied in trial court. As for the appellant McLellan, the Court ruled that he does not qualify as a "governmental unit," leading to the dismissal of his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. It is established that plaintiffs suing a governmental unit must present sufficient facts to demonstrate a waiver of immunity, with the Court assessing pleadings and evidence in favor of the plaintiff to determine jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court has not recognized a waiver of sovereign immunity through the acceptance of contract benefits, and it has consistently declined to acknowledge a 'waiver-by-conduct' exception in subsequent cases. Intermediate appellate courts have followed this precedent, refusing to recognize such exceptions without further guidance from the Supreme Court. Koseoglu argues that his employment contract with Texas A&M was terminated without due process, claiming this constitutes a deprivation of property rights and that sovereign immunity has been waived for due process claims, citing Texas A&M Univ.-Kingsville v. Lawson. However, this interpretation is incorrect. Koseoglu also references the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Coates v. Pierre, but that case did not address sovereign immunity. The U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed that states and their agencies are immune from section 1983 lawsuits unless immunity is explicitly waived, a power reserved for the Legislature, which has not waived immunity in section 1983 cases. Consequently, Texas A&M maintains its sovereign immunity from Koseoglu’s claim, and the court sustains Texas A&M’s argument that Koseoglu has not sufficiently pleaded a waiver of immunity.

Koseoglu is granted an opportunity to amend his pleadings because they do not explicitly show an incurable jurisdictional defect. Texas A&M argues that Koseoglu has had ample time to amend due to the four-month pendency of its plea to the jurisdiction; however, Koseoglu maintains that he should only amend if the court finds his pleadings deficient. The court supports Koseoglu's position, citing precedent that establishes a plaintiff's right to amend pleadings to address jurisdictional deficiencies unless it is impossible to do so. Relevant case law indicates that courts must provide a reasonable opportunity to amend, as seen in Texas Department of Transportation v. Ramirez, where amendment was denied only because the facts indicated jurisdiction could not be established. The court also references other cases affirming the necessity of providing such opportunities, noting that dismissals should occur only after the plaintiff has been allowed to amend their pleadings if necessary.

In Harris County v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635 (Tex. 2004), the Texas Supreme Court established that if a plaintiff is given a reasonable chance to amend their complaint after a governmental entity files a plea to the jurisdiction and fails to allege facts that would waive immunity, the trial court must dismiss the case with prejudice. This ruling emphasizes that once jurisdiction is definitively determined, it cannot be relitigated. In Sykes, after being allowed to amend his petition, the trial court concluded that the Texas Tort Claims Act did not waive immunity for Sykes's claims against Harris County, preventing further litigation on this issue.

The excerpt also references Levatte v. City of Wichita Falls, 144 S.W.3d 218 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004), where the plaintiff was granted time to amend but chose not to, leading the court to deny any further opportunity to amend. Similarly, in O’Neal v. Tex. Bd. of Chiropractic Examrs., the appellate court denied a plaintiff's request for more time to amend after the plea to the jurisdiction had been pending for three months, noting he had ample notice of the deficiencies in his pleadings.

While O’Neal is procedurally different from Koseoglu's case, it reinforces the principle that a plaintiff may stand on their pleadings until a court finds a plea to the jurisdiction meritorious. The discussion highlights the balance between a plaintiff's right to amend and the necessity for finality once jurisdiction has been assessed.

A plaintiff must be given a reasonable opportunity to amend pleadings to address jurisdictional defects unless it is clear that no amendments could invoke jurisdiction. Some cases suggest that amending pleadings in response to a plea to jurisdiction may limit further amendments. The approach from Miranda, which restricts amendment opportunities, is seen as inconsistent with the established rule in County of Cameron, which mandates that plaintiffs be allowed to amend after a plea to jurisdiction is sustained. Dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate only after the plaintiff has had the chance to amend. In this case, the question of whether the Legislature waived Texas A&M's immunity concerning Koseoglu's claim hinges on the specifics of his underlying claim related to a settlement agreement. While it has been determined that the Legislature did not waive immunity for Koseoglu's due process claim, it remains uncertain if an actionable claim exists regarding the termination of the employer-employee relationship. Therefore, Koseoglu must be given the opportunity to amend his pleadings. The court dismissed part of the interlocutory appeal for lack of jurisdiction but reversed the judgment concerning Texas A&M University System and Texas Engineering Experiment Station, remanding the case for further proceedings.