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City of Cleburne v. Central Appraisal District of Johnson County and Appraisal Review Board of Johnson County

Citation: Not availableDocket: 10-02-00154-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; July 7, 2004; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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The trial court dismissed the City of Cleburne's lawsuit against the Central Appraisal District of Johnson County, the Appraisal Review Board, and taxpayer One Cobblestone Village, Ltd., citing a lack of jurisdiction. The City contested a May 1, 2001, order that reduced the appraisal value of Cobblestone's property from $7,601,785 to $4,200,000, without notifying the City of the hearing. The City sought an injunction against the order, claiming it was void and demanding compliance with the Tax Code. Both the District and the Board, as well as Cobblestone, filed pleas to the jurisdiction. The court's dismissal was comprehensive, taxing costs against the City and denying all relief except what was explicitly granted.

The appellate court reviewed the jurisdictional plea de novo, confirming that subject-matter jurisdiction is a legal question. It noted that under Texas law, district courts possess general jurisdiction unless explicitly limited. The City asserted claims against the District for compliance with the Tax Code, against the Board to prevent enforcement of the alleged void order, and against Cobblestone due to affected rights. The court concluded that the district court had jurisdiction over these claims, reversed the dismissal, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Johnson occasionally stayed at the victim's home, where the seven-year-old victim testified about an incident during which Johnson assaulted her while they were both sleeping on couches. She recounted that he engaged in several forms of sexual contact, including putting his penis in her mouth, rubbing her private areas, and penetrating her anus. 

In assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, the court must view it favorably to the verdict, determining if any rational juror could find the essential crime elements proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The court emphasized that the prosecution was not required to demonstrate penetration under Texas Penal Code § 22.021; mere contact between the victim's sexual organ and Johnson's was sufficient for conviction. 

The victim's uncorroborated testimony alone could support a conviction for aggravated sexual assault. She drew a picture indicating contact between Johnson's penis and her private area and testified about the pain associated with the assault. Medical evidence suggested suspicious findings regarding her hymen, although it was not conclusive of sexual assault.

Regarding the allegations of anal penetration, the court reiterated that the law does not necessitate proof of penetration for a conviction under the same statute, and the victim's statements and drawings indicated that such contact occurred. The jury found the evidence sufficient both legally and factually to support the charges against Johnson concerning the victim's sexual organ and anus.

Johnson was acquitted of the charge of penetrating the victim's anus with his finger, which led the court to conclude that this issue need not be further considered. Johnson's challenges regarding the sufficiency of the evidence and the victim's testimony were overruled by the court.

Johnson contends that the pretrial hearing should be treated as a "taint hearing," referencing the New Jersey Supreme Court's ruling in State v. Michaels, which addresses the reliability of child witness statements affected by suggestive interrogation techniques. The Michaels decision highlights that such techniques can distort a child's memory, raising due process concerns. The initial burden to initiate a taint hearing lies with the defendant, who must provide "some evidence" of suggestive interviewing. If the defendant meets this burden, the state must then prove the reliability of the statements by clear and convincing evidence.

During the hearing, an expert witness testified that the interviewer improperly included Johnson's name, conducted a lengthy interview with leading and closed questions, and offered improper incentives, leading to uncertainty about the child's statements. Although the trial court recognized the identification procedure as "unduly suggestive," it ultimately deemed the victim's testimony reliable. Johnson argued that he met the burden of showing unreliability, while the state failed to prove the statements' reliability.

However, Texas has not adopted the Michaels framework, and the trial court has discretion over the admissibility of testimony. Johnson did not provide sufficient alternative arguments against the trial court's discretion. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment, noting that the primary issue in the hearing was whether to permit identification testimony from a witness subjected to suggestive procedures. The court referenced guidelines for conducting child interviews to mitigate the risks of improper interrogation.