Harvey Leroy Sossamon, III v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 10-02-00231-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; November 16, 2004; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Harvey Leroy Sossamon, III, was convicted of murder for killing Donald Wayne Davis and sentenced to life in prison. Sossamon, representing himself, raised eleven issues on appeal, including the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, denial of a mistrial, alleged due process violations due to perjured testimony, and issues regarding his right to self-representation. The court prioritized reviewing the legal sufficiency of evidence, which must meet the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, and also addressed factual sufficiency, the denial of mistrial, and self-representation issues. The background details the incident where Sossamon returned to "The Bar" after being escorted out and shot Davis, leading to his eventual capture three months later. The court concluded by overruling all of Sossamon's issues and affirming the trial court's judgment. The excerpt emphasizes that the jury is responsible for reconciling evidence conflicts and that the appellate review ensures the conviction aligns with due process standards.

Sossamon was convicted of murder under Texas law, which defines murder as intentionally or knowingly causing the death of another individual or causing serious bodily injury through an inherently dangerous act. The jury charge included definitions and instructions regarding intent, knowledge, criminal responsibility, and self-defense. Sossamon admitted to shooting Davis but claimed that another individual, Steinhauer, caused Davis's death afterward. He also asserted that he acted in self-defense when confronted by an attacker with a cue stick.

The State argued that evidence supported Sossamon's intent to kill, citing his re-entry into the bar with a firearm and his statement about not allowing others to harm him. The prosecution contended that Sossamon failed to provide evidence to substantiate his self-defense claim. The jury's verdict implied a rejection of this defense, as specific intent to kill can be inferred from the use of a deadly weapon unless it is clear that the manner of use could not cause death or serious injury.

Eyewitness testimonies suggested that Sossamon initiated the confrontation after being escorted out of the bar, and none reported any threat from a cue stick. Sossamon shot Davis in the back while Davis was leaning over a pool table, further supporting the State's argument regarding his intent to kill. The burden was on the State to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, particularly in refuting Sossamon's self-defense claim, which they successfully demonstrated through the evidence presented at trial.

Sossamon's testimony regarding the events leading to the shooting of Davis included claims of a provoked fight outside "The Bar" and multiple attackers inside. He stated he shot at an individual wielding a cue stick, asserting he intended to hit the person threatening him, and expressed indifference to the potential outcome of that action. A law enforcement officer testified that Sossamon indicated he wanted to kill Steinhauer but did not succeed because she was hiding. The court found that a rational jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Sossamon intentionally killed Davis, rejecting his self-defense claim.

In assessing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, the court emphasized the jury's role in evaluating credibility and demeanor, stating that evidence may support a conviction even if it is not overwhelmingly strong. Sossamon challenged the sufficiency of evidence regarding his intent to kill Davis, arguing that factors such as witness credibility issues, contradictions in testimonies, and claims of self-defense undermined the prosecution's case. However, the court maintained that the jury's resolution of conflicting evidence in favor of the State does not constitute factual insufficiency. Sossamon's assertions about the evidence were ultimately found insufficient to overturn the guilty verdict.

The State maintains that sufficient evidence exists to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Sossamon intentionally or knowingly killed Davis, primarily supported by consistent eyewitness accounts of Sossamon's actions. The State asserts that Sossamon failed to provide evidence to substantiate a self-defense claim. The jury was tasked with evaluating witness credibility, and their determinations must be respected. Evidence indicating that Steinhauer was Sossamon’s intended target supports the argument for intent to kill rather than contradicting it, as criminal responsibility remains with Sossamon regardless of the intended victim, per Texas Penal Code § 6.04(b). Additionally, consistent eyewitness testimonies challenge Sossamon’s claim of self-defense, reinforcing the notion of intent to kill. The overall evidence does not appear too weak to uphold the verdict nor does it suggest that the reasonable doubt standard was not met.

Regarding the request for a mistrial, appellate review follows an abuse of discretion standard. Sossamon had invited Steinhauer to testify despite the State's concerns about her previous outbursts. The trial court preemptively indicated it would not grant a mistrial for any such outbursts, and Sossamon did not object at that time. During her testimony, Sossamon sought a mistrial based on hearsay objections, which was denied. The State contends this issue was not preserved for appeal, and the court acted within its discretion in rejecting the mistrial request. 

On the matter of due process related to perjury, a violation occurs if a prosecutor knowingly utilizes perjured testimony and the court cannot ascertain that such testimony was harmless. The prosecutor is obligated to correct perjury, even if not instigated by them. Sossamon claims that the State employed perjured testimony when Sally Glenn stated the victim was shot while kneeling, conflicting with expert testimony indicating an upward bullet trajectory, which he argues could have unduly influenced the jury's perception.

Sossamon did not provide evidence to support his claim that Glenn's testimony was perjured, as mere disagreements in testimony do not suffice to establish perjury, and credibility determinations are for the jury. Consequently, Sossamon's assertions regarding Glenn's testimony were overruled. Regarding the preservation of evidence, Sossamon bore the burden to demonstrate the State's bad faith in failing to preserve evidence that was material and favorable. Key considerations include whether the lost evidence was exculpatory, if Sossamon was prejudiced by its absence, and the level of government culpability. Sossamon's claims about the Bellmead Police Department's evidence handling were deemed insufficient to prove bad faith or exculpatory nature, leading to the overruling of his arguments on this issue as well.

On the topic of self-representation, both the Sixth Amendment and the Texas Constitution affirm a defendant's right to counsel, which can be waived if done knowingly and intelligently. However, such a waiver is not easily inferred, and courts generally presume against its validity. Importantly, a denial of the right to self-representation is considered a structural error that cannot be assessed for harmlessness. A defendant must clearly assert the right to self-representation, and prior to acceptance of such a request, the trial court must ensure the defendant understands the potential risks of self-representation. The court may also appoint standby counsel to assist a self-representing defendant.

A defendant's right to self-representation can be waived through conduct indicating uncertainty or abandonment of that request. Case law establishes that failure to object to standby counsel's participation can undermine the Faretta right, as seen in Sossamon v. State, where the defendant requested to represent himself but did not object to standby counsel's active involvement during pre-trial and trial. Despite initially seeking self-representation, Sossamon allowed standby counsel, Stanley Schweiger, to file motions, question witnesses, and perform other defense tasks without objection. This lack of insistence on self-representation, especially after the appointment of standby counsel and in front of a different judge, demonstrated an abandonment of his request. Consequently, Sossamon waived his right to self-representation and was not denied that right. The court overruled issues five, six, and seven related to this matter. 

Regarding the admissibility of evidence of prior extraneous offenses, the trial court's rulings are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. The Code of Criminal Procedure mandates that the State must notify the defendant of any extraneous offenses it intends to use at the punishment hearing upon timely request, in line with procedural rules.

A reasonable notice requirement is established to prevent unfair surprise and trial by ambush, as articulated in case law. If a crime or bad act has not led to a final conviction or a probated/suspended sentence, notice of intent to introduce evidence of such actions is deemed reasonable only if it specifies the date, county, and name of the alleged victim. The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure mandates these details. The reasonableness of the State's notice is case-specific, with a ten-day notice before trial presumed reasonable. In the case at hand, Sossamon claimed he did not receive notice regarding the introduction of evidence from a past aggravated robbery conviction from 1979. However, the State had provided timely notice that included all required elements, thus Sossamon was aware that evidence might be presented. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing testimony related to this conviction.

Regarding jury instructions, Sossamon argued against the inclusion of a reckless conduct instruction (manslaughter) in his self-defense claim, asserting no evidence of recklessness existed. The State countered that a conviction for the greater offense negates any potential harm from this instruction, a position supported by legal precedent. Since Sossamon was convicted of murder, the potential error was deemed non-reversible.

On provocation, it was highlighted that if a defendant provokes an attack, they forfeit their right to self-defense. A provocation instruction is warranted when evidence shows the defendant intentionally provoked the attack through actions or words meant to create a pretext for inflicting harm.

An appellate court evaluates evidence favorably towards the instruction, determining if a rational jury could find provocation beyond a reasonable doubt. Sossamon claims that Steinhauer initiated a verbal confrontation and that Davis told him to leave “The Bar.” He further contends that one of the men who escorted him outside provoked a physical altercation by striking him and spitting on him. In contrast, the State argues that Sossamon’s statements—such as challenging others to fight and asserting he was not bothering anyone—indicate he was seeking confrontation when he re-entered “The Bar” armed with a gun. Eyewitness testimony supports the State's position. The court concludes there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find provocation, thus affirming the appropriateness of the provocation instruction and overruling Sossamon’s arguments. The judgment is affirmed, with the opinion filed on November 17, 2004.