J. Cleo Thompson and James Cleo Thompson, Jr. L.P., Wes-Tex Drilling Company, L.P., and Approach Resources I, L. P. v. Cheryl Elizabeth Clayton

Citation: Not availableDocket: 08-07-00152-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; June 10, 2009; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Mr. James Cleo Thompson, Jr. offered $3,000 on January 2, 1975, for the right to cross Joe Clayton's land to access property owned by Ann Cole Lauffer, which Clayton accepted with the condition that the road would be repaired by Thompson and his associates whenever damaged. Thompson, who holds a managerial position in J. Cleo Thompson Petroleum Management, LLC, negotiated this agreement and relied on Clayton's representation of the right to use the roadway. From 1975 until Clayton's death, there were no objections to the road's usage. Cheryl Clayton, successor to a portion of the ranch, noted increased road traffic and violations of the agreement, including deviations from the roadway, leaving gates unlocked, and unauthorized installations. James Dalby, a district superintendent for Thompson's companies, affirmed ongoing maintenance and improvements to the road since 1975 without costs to the Claytons. Cheryl Clayton initiated a declaratory judgment suit to clarify the terms of roadway use. The trial court concluded the agreement ended with Joe Clayton's death, granting Cheryl Clayton's motion for partial summary judgment, denying the defendants' motions, prohibiting access to the Lauffer Ranch via Clayton's former property, and awarding attorney’s fees to the plaintiff.

Appellants present four issues on appeal: 1) The trial court incorrectly granted Plaintiff Clayton's motion for partial summary judgment, concluding the Road Agreement had terminated as a matter of law, while denying Defendants' motion. 2) The court erred in restricting access from Clayton's property to the Lauffer property under the oil and gas lease. 3) The court made an error in granting partial summary judgment post-trial. 4) Given that Appellants had authorization to use the road, the issue of attorney’s fees should be reconsidered by the trial court. The judgment is reversed, rendered, and remanded. 

A traditional motion for summary judgment requires the movant to demonstrate no genuine issues of material fact exist and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, per TEX.R.CIV.P. 166a(c). A defendant must disprove at least one element of the plaintiff’s case or prove an affirmative defense. If successful, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to raise a factual issue. Summary judgment is reviewed favorably toward the non-movant, with all reasonable inferences made in their favor. If the trial court does not specify grounds for its ruling, the judgment is upheld if any theory presented is valid. The review of summary judgment motions is conducted de novo, and if errors are found in the trial court's ruling, the appellate court will reverse and render the appropriate judgment.

Legal issues, such as contract interpretation, are also reviewed de novo, focusing on the parties' intent. Contract language that clearly indicates an intention to grant an easement is sufficient, and no specific wording is necessary. An easement conveys an interest in land, while a license grants a privilege without transferring any interest. The creation of easements can occur through express grants, implications, estoppel, prescription, or by reference to a map or plat. Since easements represent an interest in land, their creation and transfer must comply with the statute of frauds unless imposed by law.

An easement cannot be revoked at will, as established in Marcus Cable Assocs. L.P. v. Krohn. A determinable easement is one that ends upon a specific event or contingency. In contrast, a license allows a person to perform certain acts on another’s land without granting an interest in the land itself, and is generally revocable at will. Notably, a license terminates upon the death of the licensor, although there are exceptions, such as when the licensee has significantly invested in reliance on the license.

The document outlines an agreement between Mr. Clayton and J. Cleo Thompson, et al., regarding permission to traverse specified lands for drilling purposes. Key points of the agreement include:

1. Payment of $3,000 by Thompson, which Clayton accepts upon signing the agreement.
2. Thompson and his associates are granted access to Mrs. Ann Cole Lauffer's lands for drilling activities but cannot extend access beyond these lands without further permission.
3. Rights granted can be assigned only to third parties in relation to the Lauffer lease, and no other rights beyond this are intended.
4. Drilling activities are restricted during deer hunting season.
5. Thompson must install a cattle guard and gate at the property’s boundary, ensuring the gate is locked except during operational activities, and he is responsible for maintaining the fence.
6. Access is limited to Thompson and his personnel, who cannot open the roads to the public. Thompson is also required to restore the road condition after any damage caused by their operations, as it is the landowner's sole access route.

Rights granted under the agreement will terminate when Thompson, et al, or their successors plug and abandon the Lauffer lands. Mr. Clayton grants permission to Thompson, et al, to access the lands of Mrs. Ann Cole Lauffer for drilling and exploration related to the mineral estate held by Thompson, et al. The agreement establishes an appurtenant easement, allowing free passage to and from the estate at Thompson, et al's discretion. The appellee contends that the agreement lacks specific grant language and does not meet the requirements of the Statute of Frauds and the Statute of Conveyances due to insufficient easement description, unacknowledged signatures, and lack of recording. However, the agreement is valid as it is in writing and signed by Mr. Clayton. Even though the easement description may not be exact, it is sufficiently identifiable. Additionally, an unrecorded easement remains binding on successors with notice, as evidenced by Ms. Clayton’s knowledge of the agreement. The court concludes that the agreement grants an express determinable easement, which expires upon the specified conditions. The trial court's judgment is reversed, affirming the transfer of the easement, and the case is remanded for reconsideration of attorney’s fees.