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Dillards, Inc., Jennifer Watson and Shane Watson v. Shirley Newman and Jill Watkins
Citation: Not availableDocket: 07-08-00203-CV
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; November 20, 2008; Texas; State Appellate Court
The case involves an interlocutory appeal by Shane Watson, a Potter County Deputy Sheriff working off-duty as a security guard at Dillard’s Department Store, against an order denying his motion for summary judgment based on a claim of official immunity. The appellees, Shirley Newman and Jill Watkins, allege that Watson committed intentional torts against them during an incident at the store on November 26, 2004. The situation escalated when Newman and Watkins attempted to return jeans, and a Dillard’s sales clerk, Jennifer Watson, refused the return due to a lack of proof of purchase. Following a heated exchange, Jennifer called for security, prompting Shane Watson to confront Newman and Watkins. He grabbed Newman’s arm and commanded her to follow him, leading to further allegations of harassment. Despite their denials of making threats, Watson detained them, which resulted in their arrest for failure to identify and evading detention. The court ultimately affirmed the trial court's denial of Watson's summary judgment motion, concluding that the evidence did not conclusively establish his entitlement to official immunity while acting as a private security guard. On December 6, 2004, Watkins faced charges for interference with public duties, a Class B misdemeanor, related to obstructing Watson during an investigative detention. Neither Watkins nor Newman were charged with making threats. On June 6, 2005, Newman was acquitted of evading detention after a jury trial. The charge against Watkins was dismissed on June 9, 2005. Newman was also found not guilty of failing to identify on June 15, 2005. Subsequently, both filed an Original Petition against Dillard’s and the Watsons, alleging intentional torts including false imprisonment, lack of consent, assault, and abuse of process. Watson's motion for summary judgment citing official immunity was denied, leading to an accelerated appeal. Watson's appellate brief was filed on June 30, 2008, while the appellees failed to file their brief by the July 21, 2008 deadline, nor did they request an extension. The appellate court noted the lack of guidance for handling an appellee's failure to file a brief, stating they would independently analyze the merits of Watson's claims based on his arguments alone. The court emphasized the importance of determining jurisdiction, stating that generally a judgment must be final to be appealable, but statutory exceptions exist for interlocutory appeals, such as in cases of denied summary judgment based on claims of immunity, allowing the court to hear this appeal. The trial court's granting of a summary judgment is reviewed de novo, as established in Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett. The same de novo standard applies to the denial of a summary judgment motion asserting official immunity, as noted in Norville v. Phelan and Welch v. Milton. Official immunity protects governmental employees from personal liability when they act within the scope of their authority, perform discretionary duties, and do so in good faith. To succeed in a motion for summary judgment based on official immunity, the employee must conclusively establish these elements, as indicated in University of Houston v. Clark. In specific factual scenarios, official immunity can extend to off-duty governmental employees, as demonstrated in cases involving deputy constables and campus police officers working off-duty. The determination of whether an off-duty peace officer acted within the scope of authority involves assessing their conduct and distinguishing between private and public actions, which is a factual question for the trier of fact. In this case, Watson, a certified peace officer working as a private security guard, did not conclusively establish that his actions had transitioned from a private capacity to that of a public officer. As a result, the evidence did not resolve the matter as a question of law. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Watson’s motion for summary judgment, and the judgment is affirmed.