Texas Tech University v. Stephen Finley

Citation: Not availableDocket: 07-06-00111-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; August 15, 2006; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Texas Tech University appealed the trial court's order denying its plea to the jurisdiction and granting injunctive relief to Stephen Finley. The university argued that Finley's discrimination complaint was untimely, as he did not file it within the required 180 days after his termination on November 7, 2003. Texas Tech contended that the formal charge was dated July 26, 2004, exceeding the deadline of May 5, 2004, according to Texas Labor Code § 21.202(a). Finley, however, claimed he mailed his complaint on March 10, 2004, and supplemented it in April 2004, presenting evidence that the EEOC and TWC-CRD acknowledged the timeliness of his complaint.

The trial court, after a hearing, denied Texas Tech's plea and prohibited them from contacting the EEOC and TWC-CRD regarding Finley's claims. The appellate court reviewed the trial court's order de novo, emphasizing that a plea to the jurisdiction is a legal challenge to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction, which requires examining the pleadings and any relevant evidence. The appellate court ultimately affirmed the denial of the plea but reverted part of the order concerning the injunction against Texas Tech contacting the agencies.

Under Texas law, individuals alleging employment discrimination must exhaust administrative remedies before filing a civil suit. This requires filing a complaint with the EEOC or TWC-CRD within 180 days of the alleged discrimination. The deadline is strict and jurisdictional, meaning late filings result in loss of subject-matter jurisdiction for Texas trial courts. Finley asserts that his complaint was timely filed, citing a letter to the EEOC dated March 10, 2004, which was received on April 5, 2004, thereby meeting the filing requirement. The TWC-CRD confirmed that this complaint was considered timely as it was automatically dual-filed with them. Texas Tech argues that a July 26, 2004, charge of discrimination is the formal complaint that initiated the process and that the EEOC did not view Finley's initial complaint as timely until the July charge was filed. However, analysis of the EEOC's July 15, 2004, letter reveals that the July 26 charge was a perfected version based on Finley’s initial complaint. The sequence of events shows that Finley submitted his initial complaint on April 5, completed a charge questionnaire on April 23, and returned the perfected charge by July 26. The Labor Code distinguishes between original and perfected complaints, and the process requires a questionnaire from the aggrieved party, which aligns with established procedures in Texas law.

The Commission prepares a formal charge, which is reviewed and signed under oath by the complainant. Evidence shows that the EEOC followed this process with Finley’s charge, contradicting Texas Tech’s argument that the administrative process only began with the July 26 charge. Texas Tech claims that prior documents filed by Finley with the EEOC are invalid due to a lack of retention in the TWC-CRD file. However, the TWC-CRD has clarified that the timeliness of a complaint is determined by the date received by the EEOC. Finley’s complaint was timely filed, as a relevant letter was received on April 5, 2004, ahead of the statutory deadline, confirming the trial court's jurisdiction.

In Texas Tech’s second issue regarding injunctive relief, the court finds that the trial court erred by prohibiting Texas Tech from contacting the EEOC or TWC-CRD. The trial court’s order functions as a temporary injunction but is void because it did not set a bond or a trial date, violating procedural rules. Thus, the portion of the order restricting Texas Tech's contact with these agencies is reversed, while all other aspects of the order are affirmed.