Kareem Abdul Jabbar White v. State of Texas

Citation: Not availableDocket: 07-00-00473-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; July 24, 2002; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Kareem Abdul Jabbar White was convicted of delivering cocaine and sentenced to 60 years in prison and a $5,000 fine by the 64th District Court of Swisher County, following a jury trial. White appealed, raising eight issues primarily challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. He argued that the primary witness, Agent Tom Coleman, provided testimony that contradicted the indictment and claimed his own whereabouts during the offense placed him outside the crime scene.

The appellate court affirmed the conviction, stating that to assess the legal sufficiency of the evidence, it reviewed whether any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the evidence viewed favorably for the prosecution. The court emphasized that a conviction requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt for each element of the offense and stated it could not act as an additional juror in reassessing the jury's verdict. 

The court also noted that after establishing legal sufficiency, it would conduct a factual sufficiency review, considering whether the evidence was so weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination or if the evidence against the conviction was significantly stronger than that supporting it. Ultimately, the court found the evidence sufficient to uphold the conviction.

Reversal of a fact finder's determination occurs only if manifest injustice is demonstrated. The court may disagree with a jury's verdict, even if supported by evidence, but will not substitute its judgment. In assessing legal sufficiency for a conviction, the state must prove essential elements. The appellant was indicted for knowingly delivering cocaine (1 to 4 grams) to Tom Coleman. Actual transfer entails relinquishing possession and control of a controlled substance. Evidence showed Kelly introduced Coleman to the appellant, who sold Coleman cocaine for $220 on September 28, 1998, with a chemist confirming the substance weighed 2.98 grams. This established the necessary criteria for delivery by actual transfer. The court then evaluated the factual sufficiency of the evidence, emphasizing that determining witness credibility is the fact finder’s role. The defense sought to discredit Coleman by questioning the validity of his testimony regarding the timing of drug purchases, specifically noting that Coleman reported buying cocaine from the appellant at 10:35 a.m. after allegedly purchasing from another dealer earlier that morning, which the defense argued was logistically impossible due to travel time. The trial court allowed the defense to question Coleman about the earlier transaction, aiming to undermine his credibility and the timeline presented in his report.

The State contends that while Coleman stated his routine was to return to Amarillo after drug purchases, there is no evidence he did so following his transaction with Willie B. Hall. Citing *Franklin v. State*, the State argues that discrepancies in Coleman's testimony affect his credibility, which should be assessed by the fact finder and not an appellate court. Elijah Kelly, who entered a plea bargain to testify against the appellant, stated he observed the appellant hand "something" to Coleman but did not see a drug exchange. The State sought to undermine Kelly's credibility using his prior testimony from a related case. After a thorough review of the evidence, it was determined that the evidence was factually sufficient to support the verdict, and issues one through four were overruled.

In issues five through eight, the appellant challenges the sufficiency of evidence regarding the enhancement of his punishment, specifically questioning the proof that the crime occurred within 1,000 feet of a playground. The indictment states the offense occurred near Conner Park in Tulia, Texas. The appellant argues that the State did not prove Conner Park qualifies as a playground, as defined in Texas law, which requires a facility with three or more recreational apparatus for children. Testimony from Officer Jim Mull included a resolution approving a drug-free zone map that indicated the location of Conner Park. Mull measured the distance from the transaction site to the park as approximately 192 feet and testified to the presence of at least three recreational apparatus at the park, including a basketball court, sandbox, and pavilion. The court interpreted the term "apparatus" broadly, rejecting the appellant's argument to limit it to only specified items in the statute. Thus, it concluded that the evidence sufficiently supported the enhancement allegation that the appellant delivered a controlled substance within 1,000 feet of a playground, overruling issues five through eight. The sufficiency of the evidence was assessed based on the elements of the crime as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge.

A jury's finding lacks legal sufficiency if: (a) there is no evidence supporting it; (b) the court cannot consider the evidence due to legal or evidentiary rules; (c) the evidence is merely a scintilla; or (d) the evidence compels a different conclusion. When a party has the burden of proof and the jury does not find in their favor, two inquiries arise: first, whether evidence exists to support the jury's decision, and second, if not, whether the record establishes a different conclusion as a matter of law. Legal sufficiency reviews focus only on evidence favoring the jury's findings, ignoring contrary evidence. The factfinder—jury or judge—determines the credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony, resolving any inconsistencies. Damage assessments in personal injury cases are typically at the jury's discretion, with no binding effect from expert witness opinions on treatment necessity or causation. 

In the case of Sandoval and Ponce, Ponce argued that the trial court erred in disregarding the jury's findings on medical expenses. She contended that the jury's findings were supported by evidence and that the jury had the discretion to evaluate the credibility of claims regarding her hypertension and related expenses. Ponce's opposition included written and oral arguments, asserting that the jury's decisions were valid. Following the trial court's judgment contrary to the jury's findings, Ponce filed a Motion to Reconsider, claiming the judgment was improper and referencing relevant legal authorities to support her position.

Ponce requested the trial court to re-enter the original judgment based on jury findings, but both of her motions were overruled. She properly preserved error regarding the first and third issues by timely notifying the court of her complaints and seeking specific relief. The appeal focuses on the trial court's error in granting judgment notwithstanding the jury's verdict and disregarding the jury's findings on past and future medical expenses. The trial court determined that the jury's findings on these expenses were supported by legally insufficient evidence, which it could not do without such evidence being present. The court could not enter a judgment exceeding the jury's determinations based solely on perceived injustice in the jury's findings. 

The trial court and Sandoval failed to understand the rationale behind the jury's determination of $1,600 for past medical expenses, despite evidence supporting at least this amount. Both parties acknowledged the incident where Sandoval was struck by Ponce's vehicle led to necessary emergency treatment, and while Sandoval's hypertension was uncontested, its causal relationship to the incident was disputed. Dr. Philips testified that multiple factors contribute to hypertension and stated that the jury could find Sandoval's past medical expenses exceeded $1,600 based on the evidence presented. The jury was correctly tasked with evaluating evidence related to preexisting conditions and the adequacy of Sandoval’s post-accident care. Dr. Philips's expert opinion did not conclusively determine the causal relationships for all of Sandoval's medical conditions or expenses.

Opinions regarding the relationship and amounts of medical expenses were deemed evidentiary, allowing the jury discretion to weigh all evidence and assess witness credibility, including Dr. Philips. The jury's determination of $1,600 for past medical expenses is supported by legally sufficient evidence, as is their decision not to find future medical expenses for Sandoval, which lacked conclusive evidence. The trial court's judgment disregarding the jury's findings of past and future medical expenses was erroneous, leading to the conclusion that Ponce's first and third issues are sustained.

Regarding Sandoval's cross-points, challenges to the legal sufficiency of the evidence for past and future medical expenses were overruled, as evidence supported the jury’s findings. Additionally, Sandoval's assertion of zero damages for future wage earning capacity was found insufficient because she did not establish a specific amount as a matter of law. The court emphasized that it cannot create original findings of fact and thus could not imply damages.

In terms of factual sufficiency, Sandoval's claims for a new trial based on the weight of the evidence for medical expenses and wage loss were rejected. The court stated that a finding can only be reversed if it is manifestly erroneous or unjust when considering all evidence, supporting the jury's decisions as valid.

Determinations regarding factual sufficiency do not involve reweighing evidence or setting aside verdicts simply due to perceived reasonableness of alternative outcomes. The credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony are exclusively within the purview of the factfinder. Medical records presented in Sandoval's case indicated that her initial complaints post-incident were related to her foot and leg, later shifting to blood pressure issues and symptoms of hypertension, along with findings of EKG changes and chronic anxiety. The records also revealed preexisting arthritis in her knees and bone growths on her heel, as well as instances of noncompliance with hypertension care instructions. While Dr. Philips disputed the records regarding noncompliance, he had not conferred with Sandoval or her medical providers. Jurors were tasked with assessing witness credibility and resolving evidentiary inconsistencies. The evidence confirmed physical trauma to Sandoval's lower extremity from the incident, necessitating the jury's evaluation of the trauma's extent and duration. Despite potential differences in jury determinations compared to those of trial or appellate courts, the review found no manifest error or injustice in the findings. Ponce's challenges to the judgment were sustained, and Sandoval's cross-points were overruled. The trial court's judgment was reversed, awarding Sandoval $1,275 from Ponce, subject to applicable credits and offsets, plus interest and court costs. The case was remanded for the trial court to finalize judgment details and assess appeal costs against Sandoval.