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James Campbell, Jr. v. State
Citation: Not availableDocket: 06-07-00096-CR
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; December 18, 2007; Texas; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
James Campbell, Jr. appeals the revocation of his community supervision by the 336th Judicial District Court of Fannin County, Texas, based on allegations of his involvement in delivering a controlled substance to a confidential informant. Campbell argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the revocation. The Court of Appeals reviews such cases to determine if the trial court abused its discretion, requiring the State to prove violations by a preponderance of the evidence. The State presented testimony from a confidential informant, a police officer, and a friend of Campbell. The officer recounted arranging a drug buy at Campbell's home, while the informant testified that Campbell initially refused to sell drugs but later, through an associate named James Cuba, provided crack cocaine. Cuba corroborated the informant's account, stating he took her money to Campbell and retrieved the drugs. Campbell contends the evidence fails to show he directly delivered drugs and questions the informant's credibility and memory. However, the trial court, as the sole trier of fact, has the discretion to assess witness credibility. Despite the lack of direct evidence linking Campbell to the delivery, the court found sufficient evidence to establish his involvement as a party to the crime under Texas law. The informant’s testimony, albeit inconsistent, was bolstered by Cuba’s account, leading the court to conclude that the State met its burden of proof. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that there was no abuse of discretion in revoking Campbell's community supervision. C.C. testified that Barnett touched her genitals during an incident referred to as the "$50.00 incident," which occurred when she was 16 years old while living at her Aunt Bernay's house. She stated that Barnett placed an envelope with $50.00 and a letter on her bed asking for permission to touch her, after which she went to the garage where he made further requests and ultimately penetrated her. C.C. acknowledged that she was under the influence of drugs during the incident and has a history of mental illness, which Barnett's defense argued should discredit her testimony. Despite her admitted drug use and mental health issues, the jury found her testimony credible. The court affirmed that the evidence, viewed favorably to the verdict, was legally sufficient to support Barnett's conviction on count two, focusing on C.C.'s specific claim regarding her age at the time of the incident. Additionally, C.C. testified to multiple sexual assaults by Barnett, although she did not specify the age for each incident. Nonetheless, she indicated that she had sexual intercourse with him "three or four" times while she was 16, providing a basis for the convictions in counts one and three. The court concluded that the jury's decision to believe C.C. and the strength of the evidence did not warrant overturning the verdict. C.C. testified to three separate incidents of sexual intercourse: in Bernay's bedroom, at the pool, and on the day she moved out. During her videotaped forensic interview, she described additional instances, including one on a couch and a reference to other beds, but did not specify dates for these incidents. The State did not clarify whether the incidents from the videotape aligned with those C.C. mentioned at trial, as the tape was introduced after her testimony. None of the incidents were dated in a manner that confirmed they occurred before C.C. turned seventeen, except through inference from her global statement suggesting three or four incidents occurred prior to that birthday. This inference was deemed reasonable when viewed favorably towards the verdict. However, upon reviewing the evidence, the court found that C.C.'s global statement, combined with other evidence, was factually insufficient. Witnesses presented by Barnett indicated that the pool incident took place after C.C.'s seventeenth birthday, specifically around mid-September 2003. Additionally, Bernay's testimony confirmed that C.C. moved out in the second or third week of September 2003, after she was seventeen. C.C. acknowledged that she moved out post-birthday, although she mistakenly believed it was in 2004. A police report corroborated that this incident occurred in September 2003, after her seventeenth birthday. Thus, there was no evidence connecting the pool or moving out incidents to a date before she turned seventeen. The court concluded that the evidence supporting the incident in the bedroom, and the inference that it occurred when C.C. was sixteen, was too weak to uphold the verdict. Overall, the evidence was found to favor the conclusion that the pool and moving out incidents occurred after C.C. turned seventeen, leading to a determination that the inference regarding the bedroom incident did not suffice to support the verdict. The evidence related to the age element is primarily supported by a global statement, which is deemed insufficient to instill confidence in the jury's verdict. The court finds the evidence for counts one and three factually inadequate, leading to the conclusion that the verdict is clearly erroneous and unjust. Consequently, the trial court's judgment for count two is affirmed, while counts one and three are reversed and remanded for a new trial. Barnett received a seventy-five-year prison sentence for each of the three counts, with the terms to run concurrently. There were multiple incidents involving Barnett's inappropriate touching of the victim, C.C., but the court finds the evidence regarding a specific incident involving $50 sufficient to support the verdict for count two, making further examination of other incidents unnecessary. C.C.'s competency as a witness was not contested, despite her drug use, memory issues, and mental health concerns. The court noted significant discrepancies in C.C.'s testimony regarding timeframes, including confusion about her age and the duration of various living situations, which raises questions about her reliability as a witness.