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Eric Carson Wynn v. Heather Johnson

Citation: Not availableDocket: 06-06-00013-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; August 24, 2006; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

Narrative Opinion Summary

In this appellate case, the petitioner, previously convicted of sexually assaulting the child's mother, sought to establish a parent-child relationship through the courts. He challenged the trial court's dismissal of his action, asserting a denial of due process due to the lack of appointed counsel in accordance with constitutional standards. The Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal, clarifying that the genetic testing provisions in the Texas Family Code do not inherently provide a right to legal counsel. The petitioner further argued the applicability of Texas Government Code Section 24.016, which the court found permits but does not mandate the appointment of counsel in civil matters. Additionally, Texas Family Code Section 107.013, which mandates counsel in termination cases, was deemed irrelevant as no government action was taken to terminate parental rights. The appellate court concluded that the dismissal did not infringe upon the petitioner's due process rights, as the need for counsel in parental rights cases is not absolute. Consequently, the trial court’s decision was affirmed, leaving the dismissal intact and denying any entitlement to appointed counsel for the petitioner.

Legal Issues Addressed

Appointment of Counsel under Texas Government Code Section 24.016

Application: The court clarified that Section 24.016 allows for the discretionary appointment of counsel in civil cases but does not require it.

Reasoning: Wynn argued that Section 24.016 of the Texas Government Code mandated the appointment of counsel, but the court clarified that this section allows for appointment at the court's discretion in civil cases, not as a requirement.

Constitutional Necessity of Counsel in Parental Rights Cases

Application: The court found Wynn's argument overstated, indicating that while counsel may sometimes be required, it is not an absolute necessity in every case involving parental rights.

Reasoning: Wynn's constitutional argument, referencing the necessity of counsel when parental rights are at stake, was found to be overstated. The court highlighted that while counsel may sometimes be required, it is not an absolute rule.

Due Process under the U.S. Constitution

Application: The court determined that the dismissal of Wynn's action did not violate his due process rights, as the genetic testing provisions do not provide a statutory right to counsel.

Reasoning: The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, ruling that Wynn was not denied due process since the genetic testing provisions of the Texas Family Code do not grant a statutory right to counsel, unlike parental rights termination cases.

Right to Counsel in Parental Rights Termination Cases under Texas Family Code Section 107.013

Application: Although Section 107.013 mandates counsel for indigent parents in termination cases, it was not applicable here as no governmental entity initiated termination proceedings against Wynn.

Reasoning: Although Wynn correctly noted that Section 107.013 of the Texas Family Code requires counsel for indigent parents in termination cases, it was deemed inapplicable because no governmental entity sought to terminate his parental rights.