Luke Teixeira v. John Hall, M.D.

Citation: Not availableDocket: 06-03-00123-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; April 22, 2004; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Luke Teixeira, representing himself, appealed a summary judgment in favor of Dr. John Hall. Teixeira's initial brief was due on February 6, 2004, but he requested an extension, which was granted until March 8, 2004. On March 19, 2004, the court informed Teixeira that he needed to file his brief by April 5, 2004, along with a cover letter explaining his prior failure to comply. Teixeira did not submit his brief or contact the court thereafter. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution. 

In a separate case, Todd Stephens and his business entities appealed against the City of Reno, which had obtained a permanent injunction against them for violating Ordinance 1852, which restricted the use of certain property to agricultural and residential purposes. Stephens argued that his dirt mining operation was protected under a grandfather clause in the ordinance, disputed the City's classification as a type A municipality, and contended that the injunction violated Rule 683 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. The court upheld the trial court's injunction, finding sufficient evidence that Stephens' operation began after the ordinance was enacted, that he did not effectively challenge the municipality's classification, and that Rule 683 did not apply to permanent injunctions. The City of Reno's enforcement action stemmed from Ordinance 1852, enacted on October 9, 2006, which prohibited commercial dirt mining activities on the property.

Stephens' dirt mining business is recognized as violating zoning and usage restrictions set forth in Ordinance 1852 and its predecessor, Ordinance 1850. He contends that his business is protected under the grandfather clause of Ordinance 1852, which allows for the continuation of preexisting nonconforming businesses. The City argues that Stephens' operations are not compliant with the ordinance and also do not qualify for the grandfather clause. Following a bench trial, the trial court sided with the City and issued a permanent injunction against Stephens, prompting his appeal.

The appellate court found sufficient evidence indicating that Stephens' operations at the Sugarhill Road site commenced after the enactment of Ordinance 1852. In his appeal, Stephens alleges that the trial court incorrectly granted the injunction by ruling that his dirt mining operation qualifies as a nonconforming use under the grandfather clause. His appeal points focus on the legal sufficiency of the trial court's factual findings regarding the timeline of his operations and the applicability of the grandfathering provisions.

The appellate court treats the trial court's findings of fact with the same weight as jury findings, applying standards for legal and factual sufficiency. It will uphold the findings if reasonable judges could reach the same conclusions based on the evidence. The trial court has the exclusive authority to assess witness credibility and the weight of their testimonies.

Ordinance 1852 restricts the property to agricultural and residential use, while acknowledging that Stephens' mining is a nonconforming use. To utilize the grandfather clause as a defense, Stephens needed to demonstrate that his business existed before the ordinance's effective date of October 9, 2006. He references an affidavit from Jess Watson, the Reno Chief of Police, asserting that Stephens began excavation activities on October 17, 2006, indicating that his business did not predate the ordinance. The affidavit also notes that the topsoil removed from the property was sold or transported off-site.

Watson's absence as a trial witness is noted, as affidavits generally are not admissible as independent evidence in trials, except in specific circumstances such as summary judgments. Affidavits lack evidentiary value in contested cases. Even if considered, the affidavit in question does not support the claim that Stephens' business was operational on the property when Ordinance 1852 was enacted. The finding that Stephens was in business before the ordinance's effective date, derived from a summary judgment denial order, is deemed improper because such findings are not typically included when no evidence or testimony has been presented. The trial court must base summary judgments solely on the pleadings and affidavits, with no genuine issues of material fact. The contested nature of when Stephens' dirt mining business commenced renders the finding from the summary judgment order ineffective. Evidence from Stephens' discovery responses indicates that no dirt was excavated in 2006 and that the mining site became active only on November 23, 2006, supporting the conclusion that his business did not exist prior to the ordinance's passage. Consequently, the trial court correctly determined that the grandfather clause did not apply to Stephens' business, leading to the overruling of this point of error.

On the second point of error, Stephens failed to adequately challenge the City's claim of being a type A municipality. The City alleged its status in active pleadings, which Stephens denied without a verified response, failing to meet the requirements of Rule 93 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, this point of error is also overruled.

Lastly, Stephens contends the trial court's permanent injunction order is void due to noncompliance with Rule 683, arguing it lacks sufficient reasoning and specificity regarding the restrained acts.

Rule 683 mandates that any order granting an injunction must explicitly state the reasons for its issuance, provide specific terms, and detail the acts to be restrained without referring to other documents. Compliance with these requirements is essential; failure to do so renders the injunction void. However, Rule 683 applies only to temporary or ancillary injunctions and not to permanent injunctions. In this case, since a permanent injunction was granted, Rule 683 does not apply, leading to the affirmation of the trial court's order. 

Additionally, the excerpt discusses various findings of fact related to the dirt mining operations at 875 Sugarhill Road, including the impact of pumping untested stormwater into the drainage system and the illegal nonconforming use of the property under Ordinance 1852. The court finds these points irrelevant to its ruling and does not address them. The timing of the ordinance's passage is emphasized as more significant than its effective date, clarifying that Stephens was indeed operating a dirt mining business at the relevant time, contradicting his claim of entitlement under a grandfather clause. The trial court concluded that this clause did not apply to Stephens’ operations.