Ernest Slade Wilson v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 06-03-00206-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; October 22, 2003; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Ernest S. Wilson appeals the revocation of his felony community supervision stemming from a forgery conviction on February 14, 2002. Initially sentenced to two years' imprisonment, his sentence was probated for five years as part of a negotiated plea agreement. The State moved to revoke his supervision, citing multiple violations, including failure to report, substance abuse, lack of educational proof, non-payment of fees, and non-compliance with treatment requirements. Wilson admitted to violating the terms on July 8, 2003. The trial court revoked his supervision and imposed an eighteen-month confinement as per the plea agreement.

Wilson filed a pro se notice of appeal following amendments to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure effective January 1, 2003. Under the amended Rule 25.2(a), a defendant in a plea bargain case may only appeal certain matters unless granted permission by the trial court. The trial court certified that this was a plea-bargain case and stated that Wilson had no right to appeal. The appellate court, citing jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction, concluded that since Wilson pled true and was sentenced within the terms of his plea agreement, he could only appeal issues raised by pre-trial written motions or with the trial court's permission, neither of which applied in this case. Thus, the court dismissed the appeal. 

Date submitted: October 21, 2003; Date decided: October 22, 2003.

Hunter did not object to the trial court's decision to discharge a juror during the habeas hearing, nor did anyone raise concerns during the proceedings that could have allowed the juror to continue serving. Consequently, no error regarding the juror's dismissal was preserved. The key issue revolves around whether the unpreserved error of dismissing the juror justified the declaration of a mistrial. In the case of Fierro, a juror related to the accused was dismissed without objection from Fierro, who stated he had no issue with the juror serving. The trial court erroneously deemed the dismissal necessary due to the juror's alleged familial relationship, which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals later found to be incorrect, as cousins do not fall under the statutory definition of relationships warranting a dismissal for cause. The court concluded that because the dismissal was erroneous and unpreserved, it could not support a finding of manifest necessity for a mistrial. The key precedent set by Fierro indicates that an erroneous juror dismissal leading to a mistrial, particularly when there is no objection, does not establish manifest necessity. This ruling applies similarly to the current case, where both the dismissal and the lack of objection were present, underscoring that the distinction in circumstances does not alter the outcome regarding the necessity of the mistrial.

The dismissal was deemed erroneous, necessitating reversal to prevent double jeopardy for Hunter. The trial court failed to consider the less drastic alternative of retaining the problematic juror and continuing with the existing jury, which means manifest necessity did not justify a mistrial. Relevant case law includes *Thompson v. United States*, where the Supreme Court recognized the authority of courts to discharge a jury for manifest necessity, but distinguished it due to a juror's disqualification under Arkansas law, contrasting with Texas law where the questioned juror could only be challenged and was not challenged in this case. Additionally, in *Simmons v. United States*, the Court upheld a mistrial when a juror's undisclosed relationship with the accused was revealed, emphasizing the necessity of impartiality for a fair trial. The ruling affirmed the importance of ensuring juror impartiality and that the necessity for a mistrial must be clearly established to avoid double jeopardy claims.

Mr. Justice Curtis emphasized the distinction between the court's discretionary authority to safeguard the integrity of the tribunal and a party's right to challenge jurors. In this case, the bias of the problematic juror was only presumed, unlike in Simmons, where it was clearly established. The trial court mistakenly believed it had no option but to declare a mistrial after dismissing the juror, despite the absence of manifest necessity to support this action. Consequently, double jeopardy precludes retrial, leading to the reversal of the denial of Hunter's habeas corpus application and remanding the case for the application to be granted.

The dissenting opinion notes that the trial judge incorrectly dismissed a juror in an attempt to protect Hunter from a potentially biased juror, leading to a mistrial declaration. Hunter claimed that a retrial would violate his double jeopardy rights under both the U.S. and Texas constitutions. This situation bears similarities to Ex parte Fierro, where a juror was also dismissed without statutory grounds after trial commencement. However, differences include the potential prejudice to Hunter compared to the State in Fierro and the lack of objection from Hunter regarding the juror's dismissal. Unlike in Fierro, where no alternatives were considered, the trial court sought Hunter's consent to proceed with only eleven jurors, which he refused. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has established that judges must consider less drastic alternatives before declaring a mistrial, emphasizing the importance of completing trials before the same tribunal whenever possible.

A trial judge is not required to explicitly state the reasons for a ruling if the record sufficiently discloses the basis. Granting a mistrial without considering less drastic alternatives constitutes an abuse of discretion. In this case, while the trial court's dismissal of a juror was erroneous, it had proposed a less drastic solution that required the consent of both parties. Hunter's objection to this alternative left the trial court with no viable options. Consequently, extraordinary circumstances justified declaring a mistrial due to manifest necessity. Although the juror's dismissal was flawed, it was not inherently fatal, as it led to the mistrial declaration. The court acted in good faith to protect Hunter's right to an impartial jury, and proceeding with a potentially tainted juror could have undermined the fairness of the trial. The court had appropriately considered alternatives, and Hunter's refusal to proceed with fewer than twelve jurors eliminated options other than a mistrial. The case is distinguished from precedent due to the trial court's effort to ensure a fair trial for Hunter. Ultimately, the actions taken did not result in injustice, warranting a denial of Hunter's plea.

Trial commenced the week of February 11, 2008, with jury selection addressing whether any jurors had served on the grand jury that indicted Hunter, which none had. A jury was selected, and trial proceedings began on Wednesday. The initial indictment involving a problematic juror was dismissed and replaced by a second indictment from a different grand jury, maintaining the same charges against Hunter related to an alleged assault. The notion that the trial court had the option to use an alternate juror upon discovering the problematic juror's prior service is incorrect, as no alternate had been selected. While hindsight suggests that appointing an alternate juror could prevent issues like this, Hunter's claim did not propose a viable alternative at the time of the issue's discovery. The document notes that Hunter did not differentiate between federal and Texas protections, leading to the presumption that state rights are no greater than federal ones. In double jeopardy cases, the level of judicial scrutiny varies based on blameworthiness; strict scrutiny applies when the State is at fault, while a deferential review is appropriate when neither party is to blame, such as in hung jury situations. Here, the trial court's decision to declare a mistrial was justified, as the problem juror’s presence was not due to any fault of Hunter or his counsel, and the trial court aimed to protect Hunter’s interests. Nonetheless, Hunter's counsel could have chosen to retain the problematic juror when the issue arose.

The trial court's decision to declare a mistrial is scrutinized, particularly regarding the problematic juror who had not been formally dismissed before the mistrial was declared. The court had options, including retaining the juror, which was suggested prior to the dismissal. The document references several cases (Webb v. State, Mitchell v. State, Self v. State) to support the premise that a juror who served on a grand jury returning a related indictment could be presumed to harbor bias against the accused, making them challengeable for cause. 

The trial judge was aware of alternatives to a mistrial: compelling the unavailable witness Beasley to testify out of order or allowing Valadez to testify in Beasley's place. Yet, the judge did not pursue these options. It is argued that the trial court should have considered keeping the juror, even without a party's suggestion, to uphold constitutional rights. Hunter's assertion, made for the first time on appeal, that he might have accepted continuing with the disqualified juror is deemed implausible, given the nature of grand jury proceedings. The record lacks clarity on the juror's presence at the time of the mistrial declaration, although it notes the court recognized the juror's prior involvement in the grand jury that indicted Hunter.