in Re: Michael J. Frischenmeyer

Citation: Not availableDocket: 06-02-00069-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; May 21, 2002; Texas; State Appellate Court

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Michael J. Frischenmeyer filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel a district judge to order the district attorney to produce evidence for DNA testing, as allowed under Texas law (Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01, et seq.). Frischenmeyer, represented by court-appointed counsel, sought this testing based on Article 64.02(2). However, Texas law prohibits hybrid representation, meaning defendants cannot represent themselves alongside appointed counsel in criminal matters, as established in case law (Ex parte Taylor, 36 S.W.3d 883, 887; Turner v. State, 805 S.W.2d 423). Consequently, the court denied the petition for writ of mandamus.

In a separate case, Jermaine Matthews was convicted of the sexual assault of a child and sentenced to twenty years in prison. Matthews argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, asserting no direct or circumstantial evidence linked him to the crime. The victim, a fifteen-year-old girl, described an encounter with a black male who lured her to an apartment under the pretense of giving her a lizard. She was unable to identify her attacker during the investigation or in court. Following the assault, the victim informed her mother, leading to a police investigation. Officer Randy Gray learned from witnesses that the suspect lived in Apartment F36 and was possibly named Jerome. Officer Felicia White suspected Jermaine Matthews based on his familial connection to the apartment and ultimately obtained a positive identification of Matthews through a photographic lineup, leading to a blood draw for forensic analysis.

Robert Hilbig, a criminalist with the Texas Department of Public Safety, confirmed the presence of semen on a vaginal smear slide from the victim's rape examination. Lorna Beasley, the DNA section supervisor at the DPS crime lab, conducted a DNA comparison between the semen and a known blood sample from Matthews, concluding that Matthews could not be excluded as the contributor. The statistical likelihood of the DNA profile matching Matthews was about 1 in 30.14 quadrillion for Caucasians, 1 in 11.92 quadrillion for Blacks, and 1 in 88.73 quadrillion for Hispanics. Despite this, Matthews argues that he was not definitively identified in court as the perpetrator of the crime and contends that the State failed to link him directly to the DNA sample, claiming that many individuals could share his name.

In assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, the court applies the standard from Jackson v. Virginia, requiring that the evidence be viewed favorably to uphold the verdict. This involves evaluating all evidence—direct and circumstantial—regardless of admissibility. Conversely, a factual sufficiency review requires a neutral assessment of the evidence, where the verdict can only be overturned if it is overwhelmingly against the evidence presented. The prosecution bears the burden of proving the defendant's identity as the offender beyond a reasonable doubt, which can be established through direct or circumstantial evidence. While direct in-court identification is ideal, it is not mandatory if circumstances eliminate confusion. The overall sufficiency of evidence is determined cumulatively, without needing each individual fact to demonstrate guilt.

The sufficiency of in-court identification hinges on whether, considering the totality of circumstances, the jury was adequately informed that the witnesses referred to the defendant, Jermaine Matthews. The absence of direct in-court identification does not negate the evidence but serves as a factor for the jury to weigh the credibility of witness testimony. Testimony regarding DNA comparison and photographic identification provided sufficient evidence linking Matthews to the sexual assault, despite no witness formally identifying him during the trial. A search warrant for Matthews' blood was obtained, and it was confirmed that the blood sample matched the semen found on the victim. Courts have established that a lack of formal in-court identification does not render evidence insufficient if the totality of circumstances suggests no significant likelihood of misidentification. In this case, Matthews was named during jury selection and referenced as the defendant throughout the trial, with no evidence contradicting his identity as the individual from whom the DNA sample was taken. The ruling emphasizes that while in-court identification is preferred, its absence did not prejudice Matthews, particularly as the jury could clearly identify him through other means. Additionally, witness testimony confirmed the victim's interaction with a "black guy" in the apartment on the day of the assault, further linking Matthews to the incident.

Gray testified that Tennison entered Apartment F36 first and spoke with the resident, who expressed a desire to engage in sexual activity with the victim. Afterward, Tennison informed the victim that the man wanted to speak with her inside the apartment. Approximately twenty minutes later, the victim exited the apartment and reported to Tennison that she had been raped. Additionally, White testified that Tennison positively identified Matthews in a photographic lineup, which was presented to the jury. This allowed the jury to compare the photographic evidence with Matthews' physical appearance in court. The jury could reasonably conclude that Matthews was the assailant based on this identification. After reviewing the evidence favorably towards the verdict, it was determined that the State sufficiently proved Matthews' identity beyond a reasonable doubt. Even when considering the evidence neutrally, the verdict was not found to be against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Consequently, Matthews' arguments were rejected, and the judgment was upheld.