Flanzo Lafont Townes v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 04-08-00392-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; April 22, 2009; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Flanzo Lafont Townes was indicted for possession of a machine gun. After his motion to suppress evidence was denied, he entered a plea bargain, pleading no contest, leading to a five-year probationary sentence. The trial court allowed him to appeal the suppression ruling. 

During the suppression hearing, probation officer Ronald M. Mora testified that he was informed by Detective Earwood of potential illegal drugs and weapons at Townes’s residence. Townes was on misdemeanor community supervision, which prohibited him from possessing contraband and allowed for warrantless searches by probation officers. Mora conducted a probation check at Townes’s home, where the owner, Wanda Bradley, consented to the search, although one bedroom was locked and accessible only by Townes.

When Townes was located and brought to the residence, he was not free to leave until the check was completed. Mora asked Townes if he had a key to the locked bedroom, and an officer provided it. Townes admitted the room was his and indicated that a weapon was present inside. During the search, Mora discovered a disassembled machine gun in a backpack and a revolver under a television stand. Townes accepted responsibility for the weapons. The trial court ultimately denied the motion to suppress without issuing findings of fact or conclusions of law. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

The standard of review for a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress is for abuse of discretion. A ruling will be upheld if supported by the record and correct under any applicable legal theory. Evidence is viewed favorably towards the trial court’s ruling, and if no findings of fact have been made, implied findings are accepted if supported by the record. Legal rulings are reviewed de novo unless the implied fact findings are decisive.

In the case at hand, Townes argues that the trial court wrongly denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained without a warrant, claiming the State did not prove a valid exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The State defends the search as either consensual—based on conditions of Townes's probation—or as reasonable due to reasonable suspicion. Townes counters that any consent was coerced, that there was no reasonable suspicion, and that the probation condition was not relevant to his underlying offense (driving with an invalid license), making the search invalid.

Townes cites Tamez v. State, where the court ruled that consent given under a similar probation condition was not voluntary and violated the Fourth Amendment. The State argues that Townes misapplies Tamez, referencing U.S. v. Knights, where the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search based on a probation condition without determining whether consent was given, deciding instead that the search was reasonable under the totality of circumstances and supported by reasonable suspicion. The appellate review is limited to the Fourth Amendment issue without considering the Texas Constitution in this context.

Reasonable suspicion supported the search in this case based on multiple factors. The State argues that information received by Detective Earwood, along with Townes's statement to Mora about possessing a machine gun, constituted sufficient reasonable suspicion. Townes disputes the reliability and source of this information, referencing Florida v. J.L., which holds that reasonable suspicion cannot rely on unknown informants. However, the court determined that Townes's own admission about having a machine gun provided adequate reasonable suspicion of illegal weapon possession.

Townes also contends that the search violated the Fourth Amendment due to his probation condition being overly broad and unrelated to his underlying offense. He argues this condition does not contribute to his rehabilitation. The court counters that protecting society is a primary goal of probation, alongside rehabilitation. Given that probationers are statistically more likely to violate laws and have greater incentives to conceal criminal activities, the conditions of probation, including warrantless searches, are justified to ensure compliance and community safety.

The court upheld the search condition that required Townes to consent to warrantless searches, affirming its reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. Townes’s claim that the search was improperly motivated by police objectives rather than probationary purposes was also dismissed, as the search served to confirm compliance with probation conditions prohibiting contraband possession. The court concluded that the search was lawful and affirmed the trial court's judgment.