Reynaldo Reyes, Jr. v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 04-08-00699-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; November 17, 2009; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Reynaldo Reyes, Jr. was convicted of aggravated sexual assault and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by denying him the opportunity to question the victim, A.G., about her prior sexual activity and by allowing extraneous-offense evidence during the trial. A.G. testified that, at age thirteen, she was assaulted by Reyes while visiting his step-son, Thomas. After the assault, A.G. reported the incident to Thomas, who did not believe her, leading to her mother taking her to the hospital for an examination.

The trial included evidence of Reyes' saliva found on A.G.'s underwear. Reyes was convicted on two counts of aggravated sexual assault, while a count of indecency was dismissed. In his appeal, Reyes claimed the trial court's refusal to allow testimony about A.G.'s sexual history violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The court, however, upheld the trial court's ruling, citing Texas Rule of Evidence 412, which generally prohibits the admission of a victim’s past sexual behavior in aggravated sexual assault cases, with limited exceptions. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the right to confront witnesses in criminal prosecutions. Trial courts possess significant discretion in deciding the admissibility of evidence, and their rulings will not be overturned unless there is an abuse of discretion. For a trial court's evidentiary decision to be upheld, it must be reasonably supported by the record and legally sound under any relevant legal theory. In this case, Reyes sought to introduce A.G.'s prior sexual history to challenge her credibility and to counteract the State’s DNA evidence, which indicated that Reyes could not be excluded as a donor of saliva found on A.G.'s underwear. However, the court found that the proposed evidence was not admissible, as it did not meet the exceptions outlined in Rule 412 and did not provide necessary context to the scientific evidence presented. 

Additionally, Reyes argued that the trial court erred in admitting extraneous-offense evidence during the trial's guilt/innocence phase. The admissibility of such evidence is also subject to review for abuse of discretion, with courts typically allowing it only if it is relevant to a non-propensity issue and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by potential unfair prejudice. The principle that an accused should only be tried for the specific offense charged, rather than for a general criminal character, underpins the cautious approach to admitting extraneous offenses. In this case, the court upheld the trial court's refusal to admit A.G.'s prior sexual history and found no error in the admission of extraneous offense evidence.

Extraneous offense evidence under Rule 404(b) is admissible if it proves a material fact in the State's case without solely indicating the accused's propensity for criminal behavior. Carolyn Rice Wisenbaker testified that in 1987, she was assaulted by Reyes, who was later charged with aggravated sexual assault and pleaded no contest to injury to a child. The State argued that evidence of this past offense was relevant due to questioning by the defense that suggested Reyes could not commit such acts, thus potentially misleading jurors. The testimonies from his wife Wanda and Thomas implied that Reyes held strong negative views on molestation, which the State argued created a false narrative of his character. The trial court allowed the extraneous evidence after determining it was more probative than prejudicial and instructed the jury on its limited use. Reyes contested the admissibility of this evidence, arguing that the defense did not open the door for such testimony and that the evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial, potentially inflaming the jury. The State countered that the defense's questioning allowed for the admission of the evidence and that it was also applicable under the "doctrine of chances," suggesting that unusual offenses are unlikely to occur by coincidence.

The court found that while the defense argued against the admissibility of extraneous-offense evidence under the "doctrine of chances," they inadvertently allowed Ms. Wisenbaker’s testimony by suggesting to the jury that Reyes would never commit such acts. Citing Daggett v. State, the court noted that extrinsic evidence can counter a witness’s broad denial of misconduct when relevant to the charged offense. Although the evidence was prejudicial to Reyes, its probative value was not significantly outweighed by the risks of unfair prejudice or jury confusion. Ms. Wisenbaker’s testimony was brief, not duplicative, and potentially beneficial to the defense, as the defense contrasted her emotional demeanor with A.G.’s calmness to question the credibility of the allegations. The court upheld the trial court's decision to admit this evidence, determining it fell within reasonable discretion. Consequently, the trial court's judgment was affirmed.