Darren Johnson v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 03-08-00638-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; June 5, 2009; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Darren Johnson was convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI), a third-degree felony, and sentenced to six years in prison. He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. The case details a traffic stop initiated by Officer Ricardo Medrano, who observed Johnson driving at 61 mph in a 40 mph zone. Upon contacting Johnson, Medrano noted signs of intoxication: difficulty finding his driver’s license, a strong smell of alcohol, bloodshot and glassy eyes, and slurred speech. Johnson claimed to have consumed only one beer shortly before the stop, which occurred at approximately 1:30 a.m., despite the timing suggesting a stronger odor of alcohol.

Medrano conducted several field sobriety tests, revealing significant indicators of intoxication: six clues on the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test, four clues on the walk-and-turn test, and three on the one-leg-stand test. The Romberg balance test also indicated impairment. A videotape of the stop was shown to the jury, where Medrano acknowledged that Johnson did not appear "staggering or falling down," nor did he appear "drop-dead drunk." However, he clarified that intoxication does not require these visible signs and noted that individuals have varying tolerances to alcohol. The court ultimately affirmed Johnson's conviction, finding sufficient evidence to support the jury's decision.

Medrano arrested Johnson for driving while intoxicated after field sobriety tests and requested a breath sample, which Johnson refused. Following his arrest, Medrano obtained a search warrant for a blood sample, which was drawn and analyzed by forensic scientist Debra Stevens. Four blood alcohol concentration (BAC) results were obtained—.1761, .1766, .1702, and .1698—each exceeding the legal limit of .08 grams per 100 milliliters. Stevens reported the lowest result of .16 grams per 100 milliliters and estimated that if Johnson had stopped drinking at 11:15 p.m., his BAC at the time of the traffic stop would have been approximately .20. If he stopped drinking at 1:15 a.m., it was possible that alcohol could still be entering his system, potentially lowering his BAC to .18.

Stevens clarified that while the exact amount Johnson drank could not be determined, the minimum amount could be estimated based on the BAC results. She affirmed that consuming one twelve-ounce beer would not suffice to reach the estimated BAC levels for Johnson's size. Regardless of the drinking cessation time, Stevens maintained that Johnson was intoxicated at the time of the stop, being about two-and-a-half times the legal limit. The defense presented only one witness, Jeff Marcum, who mentioned Johnson's prior back injury without further elaboration.

The jury found Johnson guilty of DWI, leading to a six-year prison sentence. On appeal, Johnson argued that the evidence was factually insufficient to support the conviction, primarily due to a lack of evidence regarding the chain of custody for the blood sample after it was drawn. He did not contest the legal sufficiency of the evidence. The court noted that factual sufficiency reviews are governed by state law, starting with the assumption that the evidence is legally sufficient as per Jackson v. Virginia.

In a factual sufficiency review, the court evaluates whether a rational jury could justifiably find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt after considering the evidence neutrally. Deference is given to the jury's previous fact determinations, and a verdict should only be overturned if the supporting evidence is so weak that it renders the verdict clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. A judgment will not be reversed unless there is objective evidence in the record indicating that the preponderance of the evidence contradicts the verdict. 

In this case, the jury was instructed to find Johnson guilty of felony driving while intoxicated if it determined beyond a reasonable doubt that he operated a vehicle while intoxicated and had two prior DWI convictions, which he acknowledged. The legal definition of "intoxicated" includes either a lack of normal mental or physical faculties due to alcohol or an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher. 

Evidence supporting the jury's finding of Johnson's intoxication included observations by Officer Medrano: Johnson had bloodshot, glassy eyes, slurred speech, and a strong odor of alcohol. Johnson exhibited significant difficulties during sobriety tests, including swaying and failing to follow instructions. Specifically, he displayed six clues of intoxication on the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test, four clues on the walk-and-turn test, and three clues on the one-leg-stand test. He also swayed noticeably during the Romberg balance test and refused to provide a breath sample.

Conversely, Johnson argued that video evidence showed him performing the tests adequately. However, the jury, as fact-finder, had the discretion to interpret the video, and could reasonably infer from it that he appeared intoxicated. Officer Medrano noted that intoxication does not always manifest in obvious physical symptoms. The jury could choose to credit Medrano's testimony over Johnson's claims regarding the video evidence, especially given Medrano's experience.

Medrano, a certified peace officer with 16 years of experience and five years in the DWI Enforcement Unit of the Austin Police Department, testified regarding Johnson's performance on standardized field sobriety tests. The jury could accept Medrano's observations despite any discrepancies noted between his testimony and video evidence. Key factors supporting the jury's finding of intoxication included Johnson's high speed, difficulty locating his driver’s license, bloodshot and glassy eyes, slurred speech, strong alcohol odor, six clues from the HGN test, and his refusal to provide a breath sample. Legal precedents indicate that a person’s refusal to submit to a breath or blood test can be introduced as evidence, and various signs of intoxication, such as slurred speech and unsteady balance, are relevant. The jury's conclusion that Johnson lacked the normal use of mental or physical faculties due to alcohol consumption is supported by the evidence, which also includes a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) analysis revealing a level of .16 grams per 100 milliliters—double the legal limit. This BAC was determined by Stevens, who indicated that Johnson's actual BAC at the time of the stop could have been between .18 and .20. Johnson did not present evidence contradicting the blood test results but challenged the integrity of the evidence regarding chain of custody.

Johnson argues that there is no evidence establishing the chain of custody for the blood vial taken from him on November 22, 2008, until it was tested on November 29, 2008. For blood test results to be admissible, a proper chain of custody must be established, as supported by Texas case law. While gaps in the chain affect the weight of the evidence, they do not affect admissibility unless evidence of tampering exists. The State presented testimony from Officer Medrano, nurse Susan Williams, and technician Ms. Stevens to establish the chain of custody. Medrano described procedures for handling the blood sample, including breaking the seal of the blood tube in front of Johnson and signing it. Williams confirmed drawing Johnson's blood and sealing it in the tube, asserting no tampering occurred. Stevens, who tested the blood, verified that the tube was sealed and identified the chain of custody. Johnson contended that unidentified individuals could have tampered with the evidence; however, he did not provide evidence to support this claim and conceded that the State demonstrated the chain's beginning and end. Medrano reiterated the policy to ensure the blood tube's integrity during the process.

Williams, a registered nurse, testified that she adhered to proper procedures when drawing Johnson's blood, placing it in a sealed vial. She confirmed that there was no reason to suspect the vial had been tampered with. Stevens noted her initials on the tube and presented it in court, confirming it was sealed. The primary issue was the weight of the blood test results, to be determined by the jury. Objections based on theoretical breaches of the evidence chain, lacking concrete proof of tampering, affect the evidence's weight rather than its admissibility. The court found no substantial evidence contradicting the jury's finding of Johnson's blood alcohol concentration at .08 or higher. Consequently, the evidence was deemed sufficient to uphold Johnson's conviction for driving while intoxicated. The judgment of the district court was affirmed.