Gregory Charles Gorman v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 03-07-00416-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; July 17, 2008; Texas; State Appellate Court

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Gregory Charles Gorman was convicted of serving alcohol to a minor, specifically a seventeen-year-old employee named L.F., while managing the Brooklyn Pie Company in Georgetown, Texas. The jury sentenced him to 365 days of confinement, suspended for 24 months, and fined him $4,000, half of which was probated. Gorman appealed, claiming the trial court improperly admitted evidence of extraneous acts related to providing alcohol to minors. The court upheld the conviction, stating that the trial court did not err in admitting such evidence. The incident occurred on February 11, 2006, when L.F. stayed late to help Gorman clean the restaurant. She testified that Gorman offered her an alcoholic drink, which she consumed while cleaning. L.F.’s boyfriend, Todd Wagner, became concerned when he could not reach her and went to the restaurant, where he found Gorman denying L.F.'s presence inside. Wagner and friends, including Chris Sharp, eventually saw L.F. briefly appear at the door before Gorman continued to mislead them about her whereabouts. After they called the police, officers arrived to investigate the situation.

Robbins testified that Gorman told police no one else was in the building and consented to a search, during which Robbins found L.F. hidden behind a freezer. Robbins doubted L.F. could have gotten there on her own due to her intoxicated state and had to physically lift her out. L.F. was fully clothed, and Robbins believed she couldn't have dressed herself. Surko, L.F.’s mother, noted that upon her arrival, L.F. had become aggressive and was transported to the hospital, where her blood-alcohol level was recorded at .247. Gorman's account of the night differed significantly from L.F.’s; he claimed she left with friends and returned appearing “twitchy and nervous.” He stated he gave her a non-alcoholic drink and was consuming margaritas himself, denying any offer of alcohol to L.F. Witnesses, including police and restaurant employees, reported seeing cups with suspected alcoholic beverages at the scene, though details about the cups were disputed. Ultimately, Gorman was found guilty of negligently serving alcohol to a minor, receiving a sentence of one year’s confinement (suspended for 24 months) and a $4,000 fine (half probated). He appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of previous acts involving alcohol and minors, presented through testimony from a former employee who claimed Gorman frequently offered her alcohol during her employment. The admission of extraneous acts is reviewed for abuse of discretion, with trial courts granted broad discretion in evidentiary rulings.

C.J. testified that Gorman discreetly provided her with alcohol during work hours without detection, despite the presence of other employees. Gorman challenged this testimony as inadmissible propensity evidence under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b), arguing its prejudicial nature outweighed its probative value under Rule 403. The trial court permitted the evidence to demonstrate Gorman's knowledge and absence of mistake, but not as proof of a plan. The jury received a limiting instruction to consider C.J.'s testimony solely for establishing knowledge or absence of mistake. According to established legal principles, defendants can only be tried for the specific charges against them, not for general criminal behavior. Extraneous acts are generally inadmissible to show a defendant's character but can be relevant if they tend to make a material fact more likely or rebut a defense theory. Such evidence may demonstrate motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake. In this case, evidence of Gorman’s knowledge regarding underage employees' access to alcohol was pertinent due to defense claims that he had taken measures to restrict this access.

Extraneous-offense evidence is admissible to demonstrate intent when the appellant challenges intent during cross-examination. Testimony from Michael LaMonica, a Brooklyn Pie Company employee, indicated that Gorman stored alcohol securely to prevent access by underage employees. Contrarily, C.J. testified that Gorman frequently provided her alcohol during work hours, suggesting he was aware that underage employees could access alcohol. The trial court's decision to admit C.J.'s testimony was upheld, as the appellate court must defer to the trial court's discretion unless there is a clear abuse. Since the evidence was valid for showing knowledge, the appellate court did not need to evaluate its admissibility for demonstrating absence of mistake.

Furthermore, the court assessed Gorman's objections under Rule 403, which requires exclusion of evidence if its probative value is significantly outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice or confusion. The trial court must balance several factors, including the probative value of the evidence, its potential to unduly influence the jury, the time required to present the evidence, and the necessity of the evidence for proving a significant fact. In this case, the similarity between Gorman providing alcohol to C.J. and the charged offense of providing alcohol to another minor was deemed inherently probative, supporting the decision to admit the evidence.

Probativeness of evidence is influenced by the similarity between extraneous transactions and the charged offense, as well as the timing of these acts. C.J. worked for Gorman from November 2005 to February 2006, with the charged offense occurring on February 11, 2006. Although C.J. was not employed at the time of the offense, the hiring of L.F. as her replacement indicated a brief interval between the extraneous acts and the offense. The connection between Gorman and these acts bolstered the probativeness of C.J.'s testimony, which was the sole evidence presented, contrasting with Gorman’s denial. The court noted that similar conflicting evidence has been deemed sufficient in other cases.

The first factor of the Rule 403 balancing test supports the trial court’s ruling due to the similarity and timing of the acts. The second factor indicates that the extraneous act is not more objectionable than the charged offense, reducing the likelihood of irrational jury prejudice. The third factor favors the trial court because the time spent on C.J.'s testimony was minimal compared to the trial's total duration, with no excessive development of her evidence. The fourth factor also supports the ruling, as C.J.'s testimony was essential to demonstrate Gorman’s knowledge of underage alcohol access, countering the defense's claims.

In reviewing the trial court's decision, the standard requires a reversal only for a clear abuse of discretion. All factors of the Rule 403 test supported the trial court’s ruling, leading to the conclusion that the probative value of C.J.'s testimony was not substantially outweighed by any potential unfair prejudice. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision and Gorman's conviction.