Jamie Ross v. Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services

Citation: Not availableDocket: 03-04-00569-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; February 16, 2005; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Jamie Adams Ross appeals the termination of her parental rights to her daughter, T.S.R., following a bench trial. The Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services also terminated the rights of T.S.R.’s biological father, Anthony Ross, who did not appeal. Ross contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. The court, however, upheld the trial court’s decision, citing evidence of Ross’s conduct that endangered T.S.R.’s physical and emotional well-being.

Key facts established during the trial include that Ross had an older child already under intervention and was on a Family Based Safety Service Plan when T.S.R. was born. Ross, who married Anthony Ross in February 2002, suffered an assault by him during her pregnancy. She admitted to using marijuana, including the night before T.S.R. was born, and failed to adhere to medical advice during her pregnancy. After T.S.R.’s birth, Ross and her daughter initially stayed in a family shelter but were removed due to noncompliance. Subsequently, they lived in a motel with Anthony, who reported that Ross was associating with drug-using friends, which led to disputes between them.

The Department of Family and Protective Services lost contact with Ross after she moved in with a friend, and she failed to appear for scheduled discussions about her case. On February 18, 2003, after Ross stated she was living at a motel with Anthony, a caseworker observed T.S.R. in poor conditions, including signs of neglect and inadequate feeding. T.S.R. was diagnosed with a severe yeast infection and was found to be irritable and underfed. Following these findings, the Department removed T.S.R. from her parents’ custody due to immediate concerns for her health and safety.

On February 19, 2003, the Department filed a petition for conservatorship and termination of parental rights for T.S.R. A hearing resulted in orders for the appellant and Anthony to pay child support, undergo psychological evaluations, and participate in various counseling and support programs. The appellant entered a family service plan on March 28, committing to attend parenting classes, counseling, drug assessments, maintain stable housing, and secure employment. Initially, she visited T.S.R. regularly, but her visits significantly declined by summer 2004, ceasing almost entirely except for one visit in August. Although she occasionally called to inquire about T.S.R., she did not complete counseling requirements and was reported to be under the influence during sessions. 

Despite being ordered to complete inpatient substance abuse treatment and failing to do so, she did finish the required parenting classes. The appellant struggled with maintaining stable housing, moving through various temporary living situations, and spent time in jail due to outstanding warrants. As it became evident she would not comply with the service plan, the Department shifted the focus to termination and adoption. By August 2004, T.S.R. was in foster care with Pete and Sandra Gonzales, who expressed interest in adopting her. 

The trial court found clear and convincing evidence for four grounds for terminating the parental relationship under Texas Family Code section 161.001(1): endangerment of the child's well-being, constructive abandonment, failure to comply with court orders for reunification, and substance abuse endangering the child. Additionally, the court determined that termination was in T.S.R.'s best interest. The appellant contended that the Department did not meet its burden of proof regarding the termination's justification.

The appellant contends that the Department did not successfully rebut the presumption that terminating the biological mother's parental rights would not serve the child's best interest. She did not request to be named permanent managing conservator or seek the child's return to her care, acknowledging her need for assistance. Instead, she seeks custody to obtain visitation rights deemed appropriate by the court. Texas law presumes that maintaining the parent-child relationship serves the child's best interest and requires clear and convincing evidence for parental rights termination due to its serious implications. The appellate court must apply a higher standard when evaluating the sufficiency of evidence for termination. Legal sufficiency review involves assessing evidence favorably to the trial court’s finding, while factual sufficiency review examines whether all evidence supports forming a firm belief in the allegations. The parent's natural rights are constitutionally recognized but are not absolute; the child's protection is prioritized. Under Texas Family Code Section 161.001, a court may terminate parental rights if two criteria are met: the parent has committed specified acts or omissions, and termination is in the child's best interest. The trial court identified four grounds for termination, which are supported by the record, and the appellant did not contest the evidence's sufficiency regarding these grounds. The focus now shifts to whether termination aligns with the child's best interest, where the presumption favors custody remaining with the natural parent.

Several factors are considered in determining a child's best interest, including the child's desires, emotional and physical needs, potential dangers, the parenting abilities of the custody seeker, available support programs, stability of the home, and any harmful actions by the parent. Evidence regarding these factors can lead to a conclusion about termination of parental rights, but insufficient evidence on all factors may not support that conclusion. Termination should not be used to merely place a child with more affluent parents. The focus remains on the child's best interest rather than the parent's circumstances. In this case, the biological mother acknowledged that physical custody would not be in her child's best interest and suggested limited visitation instead. Despite the mother's claims, evidence indicated that T.S.R. had formed a strong attachment to her foster parents, the Gonzaleses. The mother's visitation decreased significantly, and her drug use posed potential emotional and physical dangers to T.S.R. Ultimately, the evidence supported the decision to terminate parental rights, as the mother lacked stability and the ability to meet the child's needs.

Establishing a stable, permanent home for a child is a significant interest of the State. The evidence indicates that the child's needs and safety are at risk due to the appellant's behavior. In April 2002, social worker Lynda Backen evaluated the appellant, who was four months pregnant and not adhering to medical advice regarding bed rest. The appellant admitted to smoking marijuana during her pregnancy, including on the day of evaluation, and showed a lack of motivation to change her behavior.

Testimonies reveal extensive drug abuse history. As part of her family service plan aimed at reunification, the appellant agreed to undergo drug assessments and counseling but showed reluctance to comply fully. She tested positive for marijuana at the birth of her child and was advised to seek inpatient treatment, which she refused. Although she attended some counseling sessions, she ultimately ceased attending and demonstrated signs of significant chemical dependency.

The appellant claimed she no longer had a drug problem and maintained that her drug use did not endanger her child, indicating a willingness to engage in therapy only if her parental rights were not terminated. Despite completing parenting classes, she lacked a stable living situation, often moving from one friend's home to another, and was unemployed for most of the relevant period. 

At trial, the appellant acknowledged her inability to care for her children and suggested her mother or mother-in-law take custody instead. The Department of Protective Services presented evidence indicating that continued visitation could harm the child's emotional development and bonding with her foster family, emphasizing that long-term foster care does not equate to the permanency of adoption.

Shacklette expressed concerns about the appellant, Ms. Ross, regarding her substance abuse issues and erratic behavior, indicating that her instability could negatively impact visitation with the child, T.S.R. Evidence presented at trial showed that T.S.R. has been in the stable care of her foster parents, Mr. and Mrs. Gonzales, for 17 months and is thriving emotionally and physically. The Gonzaleses, who wish to adopt T.S.R., demonstrated their commitment and ability to provide a stable environment, with Mr. Gonzales caring for T.S.R. during the day and Mrs. Gonzales working outside the home. 

Paula Moore, an adoption specialist, testified against indefinite foster care, advocating for the termination of parental rights to allow for adoption, emphasizing that foster care creates emotional limbo for children. She noted that children in long-term foster care often struggle with a sense of belonging and authority, leading to behavioral issues. The district court was justified in concluding that Ms. Ross was unlikely to complete her family service plan, while the Gonzaleses exhibited the necessary stability and parenting abilities. The evidence supported the recommendation that termination of parental rights was in T.S.R.'s best interest, particularly in light of Ms. Ross's long-term drug use and unstable lifestyle, which undermined her ability to provide a safe and stable home.

The court evaluated the Holley factors and determined that the evidence supports the district court's conclusion that terminating the parent-child relationship is in T.S.R.’s best interest. Key points include the appellant's use of marijuana and cocaine during pregnancy and continued drug use in T.S.R.’s presence, even after involvement from the Department and during T.S.R.’s removal. The appellant failed to seek treatment for her addiction, did not comply with her court-ordered family service plan, and lacked stable employment and housing. Evidence suggested that T.S.R. did not receive adequate food or medical care. The court found that the appellant's actions indicated that the parent-child relationship was inappropriate, and she provided no justifications for her behavior. The evidence was deemed sufficient to uphold the district court's ruling on the termination of the relationship.