Rhett Webster Pease and Janell Pease v. Principal Residential Mortgage, Inc. Diana Estala Stevens Barbara Bembry Travis County Constable's Office And Bob Vann

Citation: Not availableDocket: 03-02-00491-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; May 13, 2004; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Rhett Webster Pease and Jannell Pease sued Principal Residential Mortgage, Inc. and several associated parties for tortious interference with a contract due to a foreclosure sale and subsequent eviction. The appellees filed for summary judgment and sought to have the Peases declared vexatious litigants. The trial court granted the summary judgment and labeled Rhett Pease as vexatious, prompting the Peases to appeal.

The background reveals that in 1997, the Peases fell behind on a $63,808 promissory note secured by their property. Principal, the note's holder, informed Pease of a pending foreclosure after months of delinquency. Following a bankruptcy filing by the Peases in June 1997, they contested Principal's ownership of the note, claiming that errors in the assignment documentation from Capital Standard Mortgage to First Bankers Mortgage Corp. voided subsequent assignments. Despite ongoing disputes and insufficient payments made by Pease, Principal conducted a foreclosure sale on January 5, 1999, and obtained a summary judgment in July 1999 declaring ownership of the property. The Peases later filed additional lawsuits against Principal's attorneys and the trustee involved in the foreclosure.

The court affirmed the trial court's decisions, including the finding of vexatious litigant status for Rhett Pease.

In August 1999, Principal initiated a forcible detainer action in the Travis County Justice Court to reclaim possession of a property, resulting in a ruling by Justice of the Peace Barbara Bembry in favor of Principal. The appellants were evicted in September 1999. Following this, the appellants attempted to challenge Principal's ownership, claiming the substitute trustee’s deed obtained through foreclosure was void. Principal countered with a request for an anti-suit injunction against Rhett Webster Pease to prevent further legal actions regarding the property. On January 31, 2000, the court granted summary judgment for Principal, dismissing the appellants' claims and enjoining Pease from pursuing any lawsuits related to the property. In March 2000, Pease filed a federal lawsuit against Principal and others, alleging due process violations during the eviction; this was dismissed by the federal court as 'wholly frivolous.' A permanent anti-suit injunction was issued by the Travis County District Clerk's Office in September 2001, which was served to Pease. In response, Pease filed a new action for tortious interference with a contract. The appellants contest the summary judgment on grounds of alleged fraud regarding the assignment of the note and deed of trust, claiming no supporting evidence was provided for the summary judgment. The standards for reviewing summary judgment require the movant to demonstrate the absence of genuine material fact issues while favoring the nonmovant's evidence. The trial court's summary judgment may be upheld on any meritorious grounds presented, even if not specified in the ruling. Anti-suit injunctions are permissible to avert vexatious litigation, and Pease was specifically barred from related legal actions concerning the property.

An injunction challenged as overbroad was not appealed by Pease, rendering the judgment final and binding. The appellants' tortious interference suit, filed shortly after the injunction, is prohibited by the anti-suit injunction as it pertains to the deed of trust for the property at 12600 Limerick Avenue. Summary judgment was deemed appropriate because the lawsuit is directly related to the property. 

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of claims that have been finally adjudicated, as well as related claims that could have been raised. It requires proof of (1) a prior final judgment on the merits by a competent court, (2) identity of parties or privity, and (3) a second action based on the same claims. The analysis of privity considers the shared interests of the parties. In this case, the appellants’ claims are barred by res judicata because there was a final judgment in a prior suit from November 1997, the parties involved either share interests in defending the property ownership or are governmental actors, and the claims relate to the same subject matter as the earlier suit.

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the relitigation of specific issues resolved in a prior suit. For this to apply, the issues must have been (1) fully and fairly litigated, (2) essential to the prior judgment, and (3) adjudicated with the parties as adversaries. The validity of the assignment of the note and deed of trust was fully litigated in the 1997 lawsuit, meeting these criteria, thus supporting summary judgment on collateral estoppel grounds.

The trial court's summary judgment in favor of Justice of the Peace Bembry and Constable Vann is affirmed based on judicial and official immunity, which protects judges from liability for judicial acts unless performed without jurisdiction, regardless of the act's correctness or motive.

Justices of the peace, like district judges, possess immunity from tort liability while performing judicial duties. Judge Bembry had jurisdiction over the forcible detainer suit, granting her immunity for her actions in the case. Constable Vann, who executed a writ of possession based on a valid order from Judge Bembry, is not liable for damages if he acted in good faith and with reasonable diligence. The law protects officers executing facially valid writs, even if aware of legal disputes. Consequently, Constable Vann is entitled to official immunity.

Appellants challenged the trial court's designation of Rhett Webster Pease as a vexatious litigant. Under Section 11.054 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, a court can declare a plaintiff vexatious if there’s no reasonable likelihood of success and if they have initiated at least five unsuccessful litigations in the past seven years. The appellants have repeatedly relitigated against Principal since their initial claims were denied in 1997, including a 1999 lawsuit disputing Principal's ownership of a property, which also underlies the current tortious interference claim. Given that Rhett Webster Butler also meets the vexatious litigant criteria by filing five adverse lawsuits within the same timeframe, the trial court’s determination was upheld. All of the appellants' issues were overruled, and the trial court's judgment was affirmed.