Roger Thomas Scaggs v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 03-99-00081-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; May 31, 2000; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Roger Thomas Scaggs was convicted of murder in the Travis County District Court and sentenced to thirty-two years in prison and a $10,000 fine. On appeal, Scaggs argued that the trial court erred by not holding a hearing on his motion for a new trial, denying the motion, denying his motion to suppress evidence, admitting inadmissible evidence, and allowing the State to withhold discoverable evidence. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, stating that Scaggs did not contest the sufficiency of the evidence but maintained his innocence regarding the jury's verdict.

The murder of Scaggs' wife, Penny Scaggs, occurred on March 6, 1996, where she was beaten and stabbed. Scaggs claimed he had dinner with her before returning to work, discovering her body after 9:00 p.m. He consented to a search of his home and an interview with police. Testimonies indicated his lack of grief at the scene. A search of dumpsters near his workplace uncovered a pipe, knife, latex gloves, and jewelry belonging to the victim, with forensic evidence linking Scaggs to the crime. Additionally, evidence of an affair with an employee provided a potential motive.

In his appeal's first point, Scaggs claimed the trial court should have held a hearing on his new trial motion. The court clarified that a new trial can occur after a court sets aside a guilty verdict, and such motions can present new facts not in the record. The rules governing new trial motions allow the State to contest the grounds presented, and the trial court may accept evidence in various forms during the hearing.

Sworn motions and affidavits can serve as evidence for new trial allegations if admitted in court. Motions for new trial and their accompanying affidavits are only considered valid pleadings when presented as evidence. Courts may rule on new trial motions based solely on these sworn documents without requiring oral testimony. A trial judge must hold a hearing if a motion raises issues not resolvable from the record, provided the defendant presents reasonable grounds for relief. Conversely, the judge does not abuse discretion in denying a motion without a hearing unless the motion and supporting documents suggest facts warranting a new trial. 

In the case at hand, the appellant filed a motion for new trial claiming a 'disabled' juror served. The State countered with its own affidavits. The trial court reviewed the motions and affidavits, finding no need for an evidentiary hearing and denying the motion for new trial based on the absence of factual or legal grounds for relief. The court's order, dated January 21, 1999, presumes the motion was presented even though the record does not explicitly show this. Following the denial, the appellant objected and sought reconsideration of the new trial motion.

The appellant objected to the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial, arguing that a hearing was improperly not conducted. The records indicate that the trial court did not address the motion for reconsideration. The appellant claimed that a juror was 'disabled' due to childhood brain damage and exhibited delusions, including falsely asserting prior jury service in notable cases. This juror allegedly misrepresented her experience on a jury questionnaire, stating service in three criminal and one civil case. The appellant contended he would have challenged this juror for cause if aware of her mental state during voir dire, which he did not discover until after the trial. Supporting affidavits from an investigator, the juror’s physician, and a defense attorney were submitted. The investigator reported that the juror claimed to have met a victim and determined guilt in her sleep, while the physician, Dr. J. Douglas Hudson, expressed surprise at her selection due to her impaired mental faculties resulting from early encephalitis and ongoing seizures. He stated that her cognitive limitations precluded her from fulfilling juror responsibilities effectively. The defense attorney corroborated that the juror did not serve in the trial of Kenneth Allen McDuff. Under Texas law, all individuals are presumed competent to serve as jurors unless disqualified, and being of 'sound mind' is a required qualification.

A juror is disqualified from service if they are insane, under indictment for a felony, or have been convicted of a felony, as outlined in Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 35.19, 35.16(a)(2)(3)(4). Individuals with bodily or mental defects that affect their fitness for jury service may be challenged for cause during voir dire but are not absolutely disqualified. For a criminal conviction to be overturned on appeal due to a disqualified juror, significant harm must be proven, and the disqualification must not have been discovered until after the verdict (art. 44.46). In this case, the juror completed a detailed questionnaire and was not challenged during voir dire. The appellant does not assert that the juror was insane or absolutely disqualified but claims the juror was 'disabled' due to a mental defect. However, the appellant failed to demonstrate that the juror was absolutely or legally unqualified. Consequently, the motion for a new trial and supporting affidavits did not provide sufficient grounds for a hearing. Even if the trial court's denial of a hearing was erroneous, it would not necessitate a remand for a delayed hearing. The trial court indicated that all documents related to the new trial motion were considered and found no need for an evidentiary hearing. The appellant’s first point of error is overruled. Regarding the second point, the State's response to the new trial motion countered the appellant's claims, stating that eight jurors affirmed the questioned juror's conscientiousness and understanding of her duties. Additionally, it was noted that the appellant and defense counsel had access to the juror's questionnaire prior to the trial.

L A, a juror in the State of Texas vs. Roger Scaggs trial, initially voted not guilty but later changed her vote to guilty after providing a reasonable explanation. Other jurors noted her street smarts and ability to manage personal issues during the trial, contributing to their improved perception of her capability. While she was one of the quieter jurors, she demonstrated understanding and participated in discussions, helping the jury reach a consensus. Some jurors recognized her as different, with varying social skills and a tendency to be slower in processing information, yet they felt she was competent in making informed decisions. Concerns about her ability to follow proceedings diminished over time, and jurors acknowledged her unique lifestyle and experiences, which may have influenced her behavior. L A also disclosed a seizure disorder, prompting concern among jurors, but she communicated effectively about her needs. Overall, jurors expressed that L A was a valuable contributor to the jury's deliberative process.

An affidavit from juror L.A.J. in the Roger Scaggs case outlines their experience and health status during the trial. L.A.J. confirms awareness of a past encephalitis diagnosis but disputes claims of brain damage made by Dr. Hudson, their physician. They acknowledge having seizures, specifically one after the trial's verdict, but assert it did not impact their performance during the trial. Despite experiencing bronchitis, L.A.J. was able to focus and engage in discussions about the case.

The juror recalls key evidence from the trial, including details about calls made by Roger, his interactions with law enforcement, and physical evidence found. L.A.J. clarifies their understanding of the court's charge and the presumption of innocence. They also disclosed a previous miscommunication regarding serving on the McDuff jury, which they later retracted, apologizing for any confusion caused.

In terms of legal standards, the excerpt notes that a trial court's decision regarding a juror's qualifications is a factual determination, subject to appeal only for abuse of discretion, citing relevant Texas statutes and case law.

A stringent standard applied during voir dire should also govern motions for new trial. The trial court's denial of the appellant's motion indicated the court deemed the juror in question qualified. The appellate review of such decisions is under an abuse of discretion standard, as established in multiple Texas Court of Criminal Appeals cases, including Rent v. State and Jordan v. State. In Jordan, a similar case involving a juror's mental competency, the court upheld the trial court's discretion in denying the motion for new trial despite the defendant's substantial evidence claims. The current court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant's motion for new trial.

Regarding the motion to suppress, the appellant argued that the trial court wrongly denied his request to suppress evidence seized from his home without lawful authority. He claimed that police illegally seized a butcher block and a photograph of the victim. However, evidence showed that the appellant, who was neither arrested nor in custody, provided written consent for a complete search of his home shortly after his wife's body was found. The search was conducted over two days, and although he requested a receipt for the seized items, the officers verbally informed him of what was taken. The trial court found that the appellant's consent was both free and voluntary, that he did not withdraw this consent, and that subsequent searches were valid continuations of the original search, thus upholding the lawfulness of the evidence seizure.

The Court denied the Motion to Suppress evidence seized from Roger Skaggs' residence. The appellant argued that the absence of a receipt for the seized property rendered his consent involuntary and that the officers exceeded the scope of his consent during searches on March 7 and 8. Although the appellant acknowledged that his first argument was a novel issue in Texas law, the cases cited (May v. State, Barber v. State, and Gilmore v. State) were deemed unpersuasive for the Court's decision. Instead, the Court referenced precedents indicating that failure to provide a written inventory of seized property does not constitute reversible error if no injury is shown (Phenix v. State; Daltwas v. State). The Court concluded that the absence of a receipt did not invalidate the appellant's consent, which was not limited in scope or time and allowed for a "complete search." Regarding the claim of exceeding consent, the Court distinguished the present case from Sanchez v. State and State v. Brocho, emphasizing that the appellant was not in custody and had not revoked his consent, which remained valid for the duration of the search.

The Vermont Supreme Court in State v. Grega determined that the defendant's consent to search a condominium, where his wife's body was discovered, remained valid despite him becoming a suspect, as he had neither been arrested nor charged at the time of consent and did not revoke it before being detained. Consequently, the police's continuation of the search was deemed permissible. In contrast, the Maine Supreme Court's decision in State v. Ferdette involved a case where officers, having obtained consent from the homeowner to investigate a shooting, maintained control of her home without objections from her during their search, which included her re-entering the premises with an officer present. The court upheld the denial of evidence suppression due to ongoing consent. Similarly, in Phillips v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that initial consent to search extended to subsequent entries, affirming the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress evidence found. In the current case, the appellant was not in custody and maintained communication with the police, expressing cooperation without withdrawing consent to search his home. The trial court found that the search was within the scope of the appellant's consent, and thus, there was no abuse of discretion in denying the motion to suppress. Additionally, regarding the appellant's fourth point of error, the admission of evidence concerning efforts to locate a missing witness, Vanessa Ferguson, was contested. Both parties had sought subpoenas for her, but she had been missing for six months prior to the trial, resulting in unserved subpoenas.

The State secured a $200,000 bond attachment for a witness, Ferguson, who could not be located, leading to the attachment not being executed. Prior to trial, the appellant filed a motion in limine arguing that Ferguson's absence should not be referenced since she had not been served with a subpoena. The appellant claimed that implying Ferguson's unavailability would suggest his culpability. The court agreed to restrict the State's comments about Ferguson's absence unless permitted. During the trial, the State rejected the appellant's proposal to stipulate Ferguson's unavailability and was allowed to present evidence of its extensive efforts to locate her. This evidence included the appellant's own subpoena for Ferguson. After the trial, Ferguson surfaced and vacated the writ of attachment, later providing an affidavit stating she left voluntarily and that her testimony would have been favorable to the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant contended that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of Ferguson's unavailability, arguing it lacked relevance and was prejudicial. The rules of evidence permit relevant evidence unless its probative value is significantly overshadowed by potential unfair prejudice. The appellant maintained that the implication of his responsibility for Ferguson's absence would harm his defense. Conversely, the State argued it was required to explain Ferguson's absence as she was a key witness, and failing to do so would unfairly benefit the appellant. Given Ferguson’s affair with the appellant and the context of the murder investigation, her testimony was deemed material to the case. The trial court's classification of Ferguson as a material witness was supported by the record, leading to the conclusion that the court acted correctly in allowing the evidence regarding the efforts to locate her.

The admission of certain evidence was deemed a harmless error, as the appellant did not assert a constitutional violation but rather a breach of evidentiary rules. According to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b), errors not affecting substantial rights should be disregarded. A non-constitutional error warrants a conviction's affirmation if the appellate court can assure that the error did not substantially influence the jury's decision. The court found that the admission of evidence regarding efforts to obtain witness Ferguson's testimony was either not erroneous or, if it was, it was harmless.

In a separate point, the appellant argued that the trial court improperly admitted testimony from Sharon Fox, the victim's sister, and Pattie Adams, an employee of the appellant's company, without meeting the requirements of Texas Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403. Their testimonies included details about the appellant's neglect of his wife during a previous hospitalization. The appellant did not preserve error for appellate review by failing to object to this testimony when it was presented. He attempted to argue that an objection made during Mary Lowery's testimony was sufficient for Fox and Adams' later testimonies; however, the court indicated that continuous objections are necessary to preserve errors. The trial court previously held a hearing on the admissibility of Lowery's testimony, ruling it admissible under Article 38.36(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows for the introduction of evidence concerning the relationship between the accused and the deceased and the accused's mental state at the time of the offense. The appellant's objections were overruled, preserving the trial court's ruling for appeal.

The trial court admitted Lowery's testimony without determining its admissibility under Rules 404(b) and 403, despite the defense's objections. A subsequent ruling from the Court of Criminal Appeals clarified that evidence admissible under Article 38.36(a) could still be excluded under Rules 404(b) or 403 if timely objections were made. For evidence to be admitted under Article 38.36(a), the court must establish its relevance to a material issue and then assess whether its probative value is outweighed by Rule 403 factors. Although the admission of Lowery's testimony favored the State, the State did not present it to the jury after the objection. The appellant argued that the trial court’s comment regarding continuous objections negated the need to object to later witnesses, Fox and Adams. The Court has recognized exceptions to the contemporaneous objection rule, including the "running objection," where objections made outside the jury's presence apply when that evidence is presented later. However, the appellant did not formally request a running objection or invoke Rule 103(a)(1). Even if the trial court's comment were interpreted as a running objection, it would only apply to Lowery's testimony, not to subsequent witnesses. The court's precedent indicates that a running objection does not preserve error for later witness testimony on the same matter unless objections are renewed. Consequently, the defense's earlier objections did not carry over to the testimonies of Fox and Adams, leading to a waiver of any objections to those later testimonies.

In this case, the court distinguishes it from Ford v. State, where the appellant successfully preserved a claim regarding impact evidence through a running objection applicable to all witnesses. In contrast, the current appellant failed to extend his objection to the testimony of two specific witnesses, Fox and Adams, resulting in the forfeiture of that issue for appellate review. The appellant’s fifth point of error was thus overruled.

Regarding DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the trial court erred by allowing the State to withhold information about potential contamination of DNA samples. It was clarified that only certain analyzed samples were suspect, not all DNA material. The State had previously agreed to the appellant's discovery requests but withheld some details, including a list of rebuttal witnesses. During trial preparations, the State disclosed that DNA from both the appellant and victim was found, along with unidentified DNA under the victim's fingernails and elsewhere. The State made attempts to identify this unknown DNA, which did not match either party. Unknown contamination suspicions arose within the Department of Public Safety (DPS), prompting the State to send samples to LabCorp for further analysis. The prosecutor later informed the jury that the unidentified material was not human DNA but something similar.

Defense counsel initially intended to argue that unidentified DNA found at the crime scene belonged to an unknown burglar responsible for the murder of appellant's wife. They were caught off guard when the prosecutor claimed the unidentified DNA was not human. Relying on an agreement with the State and a pretrial discovery order, defense counsel filed a motion to compel the State to reveal the evidence supporting its assertion. During the hearing, the State assured the court that its theory was based on documents provided to defense counsel, which supposedly contained hints about its claim. The court ordered the State to disclose the basis for its claim in camera and subsequently received a note indicating that a memorandum from DPS Laboratory supervisor Irma Rios, which expressed concerns about potential DNA contamination, was among the documents shared. The trial court denied the motion to compel, believing the defense had already received the necessary materials.

However, during the trial, defense counsel discovered that they had not actually received Rios's memorandum or the LabCorp transmittal form that mentioned her contamination concerns. Although LabCorp found no contamination and detected only the DNA of the appellant and the victim, a LabCorp expert opined that contamination likely occurred during the DPS analysis. The record indicates that the discovery documents provided to the defense did not include Rios's memorandum or the LabCorp transmittal form, but it does not show that the State acted in bad faith by withholding this information. Appellant argues he was entitled to notice of the State's theory on both statutory and constitutional grounds.

Appellant claims that the failure to disclose information about DNA sample contamination constitutes a Brady violation and a breach of Due Process and the Sixth Amendment. He acknowledges that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 39.14 does not mandate disclosure of incriminating evidence and that such evidence countered favorable DNA evidence for him. Criminal defendants in Texas have limited discovery rights, and the trial court has discretion over what evidence is discoverable. The court finds no violation of Article 39.14.

In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court established that suppressing favorable evidence upon request violates due process if the evidence is material to guilt or punishment, regardless of the prosecution's intent. Materiality requires that the omitted evidence could have affected the trial's outcome; mere potential benefit to the defense does not establish materiality. The determination of materiality rests on whether there is a reasonable probability that disclosure would have changed the result of the trial.

For a successful Brady-Due Process claim, the prosecution must have suppressed evidence that was favorable and material to the accused's case. Evidence is deemed material if its disclosure could reasonably alter the trial's outcome. The court concludes that evidence of laboratory contamination alone is not favorable to the appellant, despite his disappointment in not using it as part of his defense strategy.

Samples of DNA analyzed by the Department of Public Safety (DPS) were found to be contaminated, but this contamination did not create a probability of a different outcome for the prosecution due to the strength of other incriminating evidence. The defense's inability to obtain Rios's memorandum or the LabCorp transmittal form prior to trial did not amount to a failure to disclose favorable evidence, nor did it violate the defendant's due process or Brady rights. The contamination evidence was deemed neutral, neither supporting nor undermining the prosecution's case. The appellant claimed that not being notified of the contamination infringed upon his Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel, arguing that he could have had independent experts review the DNA had he been informed in a timely manner. However, he had already employed a recognized DNA expert who testified on his behalf, and the trial court noted that he could have requested DNA samples for independent analysis before the trial. The court also stated that the State was not obligated to disclose its theory regarding the contamination. Ultimately, the appellant was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel, and the court found no error in the trial proceedings, affirming the trial court's judgment.