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Richard D. Parker v. State
Citation: Not availableDocket: 03-00-00281-CV
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; December 6, 2000; Texas; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Richard D. Parker appeals a judgment from the District Court of Travis County, which awarded the State of Texas, the City of Houston, and the Transit Authority of Houston (collectively "the State") a total of $111,557.31 for past-due taxes owed by Century Architectural Hardware Corporation ("Century"). Parker, the sole owner and director of Century, was sued individually for delinquent taxes from December 1992, January through March 1993, and December 1993. Evidence presented indicated specific tax liabilities for those months. A certificate from the State Comptroller identified Parker as the taxpayer and stated he owed $84,341.08 as of August 18, 1999.
On appeal, Parker contends that the State did not sufficiently prove the amount of taxes he collected, arguing the comptroller's certificate does not demonstrate how much tax money was actually received, given Century's use of an accrual reporting method. The State claimed that the certificate served as prima facie evidence of Parker's liability. However, the court found that the State failed to provide adequate evidence to establish the actual tax amounts collected by Parker. Therefore, even if Parker were liable under section 111.016 of the Tax Code, the State had the burden to prove the specific amounts he collected, which it did not fulfill. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's judgment, rendering that the appellees take nothing from Parker.
The State claims that additional evidence supports Parker's liability concerning tax obligations related to Century's operations. Key evidence includes Century's tax returns indicating tax liability based on sales, and the assertion that approximately 86% of receivables were collected within 60 days. Parker testified that he was the sole owner and majority shareholder during the tax liability period, with a typical collection timeframe for receivables averaging around 60 days. He acknowledged that Century usually paid taxes from other funds before receiving payments from customers.
Despite $33,000 in Century's account at its closure, Parker was restricted from accessing these funds due to bankruptcy proceedings. The State noted that Parker attempted to pay sales taxes with checks that bounced due to insufficient funds. Additionally, evidence showed Century had $235,671 in outstanding accounts receivable during bankruptcy, which included uncollected sales taxes.
While the State attempted to demonstrate that some tax money was collected, it did not provide concrete evidence of the actual amounts collected. The inquiry into Century's tax collection practices revealed that the State had not investigated whether tax funds were ever collected. The court emphasized that the burden of proof lies with the State to demonstrate taxes actually collected, rather than shifting this obligation to Parker. Ultimately, the court found insufficient evidence to support a judgment against Parker under section 111.016(a) of the Tax Code, leading to the reversal of the district court's decision and a ruling that the appellees take nothing from their suit against Parker.