Buford R. Sheffield, Trustee v. John James Ellison, Trustee and John Casey Ellison

Citation: Not availableDocket: 03-97-00050-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; June 19, 1997; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Buford R. Sheffield, Trustee, appeals a partial summary judgment from the District Court of McCulloch County, which affirmed that a warranty deed executed by William F. Bennett and Adelaide Bennett created an irrevocable trust. The deed, dated October 5, 1992, conveyed twenty-five acres to John James Ellison, trustee, for the benefit of John Casey Ellison, with a termination date of December 24, 1999. It stipulated that if the beneficiary died before the trust's termination, the property would vest in his heirs. The Bennetts attempted to amend the trust in 1994, replacing the trustee and beneficiary, which prompted the Ellisons to seek a declaratory judgment asserting the irrevocability of the original trust. Sheffield counterclaimed for a judgment affirming his status as trustee under the amendment. The trial court ruled in favor of the Ellisons, concluding that the original warranty deed established an irrevocable trust and that the 1994 amendment did not alter this. Sheffield's appeal challenges the trial court's determination regarding the trust's revocability. The court's review standards for summary judgment emphasize that the movant must demonstrate no genuine factual disputes and that evidence must be viewed in favor of the nonmovant.

In Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., the court addresses the interpretation of legal documents, establishing that if an instrument's language is clear, it is unambiguous and can be construed as a matter of law. The court's primary duty in interpreting a deed is to determine the parties' intent from the document itself, harmonizing all parts to ensure each clause has effect. For a trust to be irrevocable, its terms must explicitly indicate this; otherwise, it is deemed revocable. The intent to create an irrevocable trust does not require specific legal terminology but must be clearly reflected in the trust document. 

Case law reveals limited precedents on whether a trust can be irrevocable without explicit language. In Butler v. Shelton, the court found that a deed did not create an irrevocable trust because it lacked the necessary permanence language regarding heirs and assigns. Conversely, in Austin Lake Estates Recreation Club, Inc. v. Gilliam, the deed included clear language indicating the trust was irrevocable, demonstrating the trustor's intent. The deed in the present case suggests that the grantors intended to establish an irrevocable trust.

The habendum clause, in conjunction with the granting clause, conveys property "forever" to the grantee and their heirs. The warranty clause obligates the grantor and their heirs to defend the grantee's title against all lawful claims. Title is held by the trustee/grantee for over seven years until the trust ends, at which point it transfers to the beneficiary or their heirs. Multiple clauses in this case suggest an irrevocable conveyance, contrasting with the Butler case, where only one clause implied irrevocability and many trustees had reconveyed their interests back to the grantor by trial. Here, the deed restricts the trustee's ability to convey the property, and the warranty clause implies the grantor must defend the title, even against themselves, similar to the quitclaim deed scenario in Austin Lake. The trial court's interpretation aligns better with the granting and habendum clauses than the appellant's argument. The court upheld the trial court's ruling on the irrevocability of the trust, overruling the appellant's point of error and affirming the judgment.