Donald Lynn Raesz, Dba AAA Tile Company v. PHCG Investments and Topaz Construction Company, Inc.

Citation: Not availableDocket: 03-94-00224-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; March 7, 1995; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Donald Lynn Raesz, operating as AAA Tile Company, subcontracted with Topaz Construction Company, Inc. for tile installation at PHCG Investments' restaurant. While completing the work, Raesz was allegedly asked to perform additional tasks outside the original contract, with promises of extra payment. After Topaz and PHCG refused to pay Raesz's final bill for these additional services, he filed a lawsuit for breach of contract and quantum meruit, claiming an amount due of $28,000, supported by an affidavit and an invoice detailing work performed. 

PHCG and Topaz responded with a general denial and subsequently amended their answer, which included a special denial regarding the existence of a contract and the performance of conditions precedent. Raesz moved for summary judgment, asserting that the defendants failed to file a sworn denial as required for a suit on sworn account. The trial court denied his motion. During the trial, Raesz testified but did not present documentary evidence. After he rested, PHCG and Topaz moved for judgment, resulting in a take-nothing judgment against Raesz.

Raesz appealed, contending that the trial court erred in denying his summary judgment motion and in rendering judgment against him without sufficient evidence. The appeals court found that a denial of a summary judgment motion is not appealable unless there are cross-motions, which was not the case here, thus overruling Raesz's first point of error. Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the court noted that the trial judge, acting as the trier of fact, had the authority to rule on both factual and legal issues after the plaintiff’s case concluded, presuming the trial court's judgment reflected a ruling on the evidence's sufficiency. Consequently, the appeals court affirmed the trial court's judgment.

Neither party requested findings of fact or conclusions of law, leading to a presumption that all factual questions support the judgment, which can be affirmed based on any legal theory supported by evidence. However, the presumed findings can be challenged if a statement of facts is presented. Raesz argued he established the prima facie elements for breach of contract and quantum meruit, but the trial court's verdict at the close of his case suggested he did not meet his burden of proof for either claim.

For legal sufficiency review, the court first looks for supporting evidence for the adverse decision, and if absent, examines if the proponent's evidence is sufficient to prove the critical fact legally. Raesz needed to establish all elements of his claims to prevail. To prove breach of contract, he must show: (1) existence of a contract, (2) duties created by the contract, (3) breach of duty by the defendant, and (4) damages incurred from the breach. Raesz failed to introduce the contract into evidence and did not claim money was owed under it, resulting in insufficient proof of breach or damages.

For quantum meruit, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) valuable services were provided, (2) accepted by the other party, (3) under circumstances indicating expectation of payment, and (4) the reasonable value of services. Raesz did not submit the account detail attached to his pleading as evidence, which is required to be considered. Thus, both claims lacked the necessary evidentiary support to overturn the trial court's judgment.

Raesz claimed he was authorized to perform extra work but failed to provide a specific price or detailed testimony regarding the value of those services. He mentioned a rough estimate of $28,000 but did not substantiate this claim with any competent evidence. His testimony was deemed insufficient to establish a prima facie claim for quantum meruit, referencing a similar case where a plaintiff's estimate was inadequate. The court found no evidence supporting Raesz's breach of contract or quantum meruit claims, concluding that the evidence did not establish any damages or breaches by PHCG or Topaz. Therefore, the judgment was affirmed, as it was not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Additionally, the court clarified that the appropriate motion in non-jury trials is for judgment, not a directed verdict. Raesz's first point of error regarding the denial of his summary judgment motion was noted, but his subsequent points did not address the evidence's sufficiency for a suit on account, leaving that theory unexamined.