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Armando Flores, Jr. v. State
Citation: Not availableDocket: 03-94-00330-CR
Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; May 17, 1995; Texas; State Appellate Court
Original Court Document: View Document
Armando Flores, Jr. was convicted of attempting to commit theft after entering a building without consent, specifically a pawn shop owned by Daniel Talasek. The trial court sentenced him to ten years of probation. Flores challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction, particularly regarding whether he attempted theft after entering the building. Key evidence included police findings of attempted forced entry and Flores being discovered outside the shop with a tire tool and a pillowcase. He admitted to trying to open the back door but claimed he was unsuccessful. Under Texas law, burglary involves entering a building without consent with the intent to commit theft or a felony. Although the prosecution needed to establish both lack of consent and an attempt to commit theft, the court found it necessary to focus solely on the latter. The legal definition of criminal attempt requires both intent and a substantial act towards committing the offense. The court noted that while previous cases allow for an inference of intent when entry is made without consent, the crucial question was whether Flores made an attempt to commit theft after entering. Ultimately, the absence of evidence showing an attempt led the court to reverse the trial court's judgment. In DeVaughn v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals clarified that in a burglary prosecution under section 30.02(a)(3), alleging attempted theft, the State must provide a description of the stolen property and the owner's name upon a timely written request to quash the indictment. Although the current case primarily concerns evidence sufficiency rather than pleading sufficiency, the State must still demonstrate that the appellant attempted to steal specific property after unlawfully entering. The requisite proof includes establishing the appellant's specific intent to steal and actions beyond mere preparation aimed at achieving that intent. Possession of items like a tire tool and pillowcase was deemed insufficient to substantiate an attempt to steal. If the charge had been burglary with intent to commit theft under section 30.02(a)(1), the analysis might differ. After reviewing the evidence favorably for the State, it was determined that no rational fact-finder could conclude the appellant had specific intent or engaged in sufficient acts towards theft. Consequently, the evidence did not support the burglary charge, leading to the appellant's acquittal and reversal of the judgment. The case is governed by the law in effect before September 1, 1994, as the relevant statute remained unchanged by subsequent amendments. The court's ruling on the legal sufficiency of evidence negated the need to address the factual sufficiency challenge.