William Doyle Magee v. John J. Hambleton and Lisa M. Warner

Citation: Not availableDocket: 02-08-00441-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; August 25, 2009; Texas; State Appellate Court

Original Court Document: View Document

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Appellees John J. Hambleton and Lisa M. Warner sought to establish an easement over land owned by Appellant William Doyle Magee in a deed construction case. William appeals the trial court's summary judgment favoring Appellees. 

In 1972, William and Karen Kay Magee purchased a 5.29-acre tract of land in Denton County, with Wood Hollow Road along its eastern boundary. After their 1993 divorce, Karen conveyed her half interest in the eastern 2.75 acres (the "Eastern Tract") to William, creating two tracts: William owned the Eastern Tract, while they co-owned the remaining western 2.50 acres (the "Western Tract"). The 1993 Deed included a 20-foot ingress-egress easement along the northern line of the Eastern Tract, which was necessary for access to Wood Hollow Road, rendering the Western Tract landlocked without it.

On January 26, 1998, William transferred his interest in the Western Tract to Karen, which made her the sole owner of that tract. The 1998 Deed included a clause that the conveyance was subject to existing easements but made no specific reservations. 

Karen later conveyed the Western Tract to Lanita Angel Morris on May 1, 2003, which included both the Western Tract and the ingress-egress easement. Morris subsequently transferred the Western Tract to Appellees on July 7, 2003. Appellees also owned an adjacent tract that provided access to Wood Hollow Road.

In 2004, William attempted to block Appellees' access by installing a gate on the Eastern Tract. He stated that Appellees could access the Western Tract only with his permission. In response, Appellees filed a lawsuit claiming William unlawfully obstructed their easement rights and sought a declaration of their easement status, along with claims of trespass and title disputes based on express, implied, necessity, and estoppel easements.

Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed by the parties, resulting in the trial court denying William's motion while granting Appellees' motion to the extent that it recognized an express ingress-egress easement reserved in the Warranty Deed dated July 16, 1993, specifically in favor of the properties described in the Warranty Deeds dated January 26, 1998, and May 1, 2003, known as the Western Tract. All other relief requested by Appellees was denied, and a final judgment was rendered in their favor, prompting William to file an appeal.

The standard of review for summary judgment requires the appellate court to determine if the movant has met the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as per Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c). The burden lies with the movant, with any doubts resolved against them. The appellate court must accept all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and consider reasonable inferences in their favor, disregarding evidence favoring the movant unless uncontroverted. A summary judgment will only be affirmed if the movant has conclusively proved all essential elements of their cause of action or defense.

William asserts that the trial court erred in interpreting the phrase "saving and excepting" in the 1993 Deed as a reservation of an easement, arguing that only "reservation" language can create an easement under Texas law. Appellees argue that the intent of the parties, as expressed in the 1993 Deed, was to establish the easement in question.

A warranty deed transfers the entire estate owned by the grantor at the time of conveyance, unless reservations or exceptions are explicitly stated. The court's primary role in interpreting a deed is to discern the parties' intent, focusing on the language of the deed itself rather than any unexpressed intentions. All parts of a deed are to be harmonized, as each clause is believed to hold significance. Courts avoid invalidating portions of a deed unless there is a clear conflict that renders parts irreconcilable. 

The determination of the estate conveyed may depend on specified exceptions or reservations, which must be interpreted based on the deed's intent. The terms "exception" and "reservation" are distinct; a reservation creates a new right for the grantor, while an exception prevents certain interests from being conveyed, leaving title with the grantor. Clear language is required to reserve rights or easements, with a presumption favoring grantees in cases of ambiguity. Even if a reservation is unclear, courts uphold the rights granted unless explicitly ignored. Occasionally, a reservation may function as an exception, but this requires clear indication within the document.

The 1993 Deed divided a 5.29-acre tract into two separate tracts, resulting in the Western Tract becoming landlocked. To provide access, Karen included a "SAVING AND EXCEPTING" clause that established a 20-foot ingress-egress easement along the Eastern Tract's northern line for access to the road to the east. William argues that this clause is invalid due to the use of "saving and excepting" instead of "reserving," contending it should be disregarded. However, legal interpretation requires examining the deed's entirety, not just individual phrases. Courts have held that the specific wording of a deed does not necessarily invalidate an easement if the intent is clear, as seen in past cases where the intended easement was upheld despite different terminology. The use of "ingress-egress easement" in the 1993 Deed indicates Karen's intent to create an access right. William's reliance on Coyne v. Butler is misplaced; that case involved a different context concerning mineral interests and did not address the intent behind easement language. The distinctions between the cases underscore the importance of intent and the overall language of the deed in determining the validity of the easement.

The 1993 Deed reserved an easement for ingress and egress over the Eastern Tract, which did not diminish the fractional interest conveyed to William but rather established specific rights affecting the Eastern Tract. Ownership of the easement does not grant any additional interest in the dominant estate. The easement was deemed appurtenant, automatically transferring to subsequent owners of the Western Tract, irrespective of explicit language in the conveyance. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the Appellees, affirming that the 1993 Deed explicitly reserved the easement for their benefit. William's objections and claims regarding the summary judgment and evidence were overruled, leading to the affirmation of the trial court's judgment. The 1993 Deed also included a general description of easements and other rights affecting the property.

The correction warranty deed executed by Morris initially did not reference the easement across the Eastern Tract. Subsequently, Morris executed a second correction warranty deed to include the easement in the property description conveyed to Appellees. Appellees provided copies of the original, correction, and second correction deeds as summary judgment evidence, despite William's objection to the admissibility of the second correction deed, which the trial court overruled. The trial court's final judgment awarded Appellees superior title to the easement, requiring William to cease blocking it, although the court denied Appellees' request for attorneys' fees and costs. 

The excerpt clarifies that an easement, defined as the right to use another's property, was unnecessary for Karen until after she conveyed her interest in the Original Property to William. William's reliance on precedent from Haines v. McLean was found misplaced, as that case dealt with the conveyance of property subject to an existing easement. The current dispute centers on whether the 1993 Deed granted the owner of the Western Tract access via a twenty-foot strip of the Eastern Tract. 

The ruling emphasizes that one undivided interest owner may convey an easement without express authority from other cotenants when no third parties are involved. William ratified Karen's creation of the easement by accepting the 1993 Deed, thereby acquiescing to its terms despite possible prejudice as the owner of the burdened tract.