Walter Riley Robbins v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 02-07-00186-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; October 2, 2008; Texas; State Appellate Court

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Walter Riley Robbins was convicted of driving while intoxicated (DWI) by a jury, which also found him to be a habitual offender, resulting in a four-year prison sentence and a $1,500 fine. Robbins challenged the trial court's decisions on three grounds: the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during his arrest, the refusal to include a jury instruction regarding the legality of the traffic stop, and the sufficiency of the evidence for his intoxication conviction.

On May 19, 2004, State Trooper Scott Meeks stopped Robbins' vehicle after observing erratic lane changes and a passenger not wearing a seatbelt. Initially, Robbins did not pull over immediately, prompting Meeks to activate his siren after following him for an extended distance. During this time, Meeks noted suspicious movements by the passenger, suggesting attempts to hide something. After stopping the vehicle, Meeks instructed Robbins to exit and initially handcuffed him, although the handcuffs were later removed. Robbins claimed he did not pull over immediately because he believed Meeks was pursuing another vehicle and felt intimidated by the officer's demeanor. The trial court denied Robbins' motion to suppress evidence and the jury was subsequently called.

Meeks provided testimony to the jury, reiterating details from the suppression hearing and describing events captured on video from his patrol car. He instructed Appellant to exit his vehicle for safety reasons due to concerns about potential weapons and the occupants' erratic movements. During the stop, Meeks discovered two half-full wine coolers in the front floorboard and learned from another officer that there had been a report of Appellant's erratic driving, which Meeks was unaware of when initiating the stop. He arrested the passenger but had not yet decided on an arrest for Appellant, citing "a couple of clues of impairment."

Appellant failed to produce a driver's license, presenting only an identification card. Meeks conducted a portable breath test, which indicated alcohol presence, followed by several standardized field sobriety tests. Appellant exhibited six out of six clues on the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, and Meeks assigned two clues on the nine-step and turn test, noting that most officers would likely assign five. He observed three out of four clues on the one-legged stand test but did not confirm if Appellant failed a nonstandardized "divided attention test." Appellant claimed to have consumed only one margarita that evening.

Three witnesses testified on Appellant's behalf, stating he had only one margarita and was driving Hudnall home because she was too intoxicated to drive. Hudnall corroborated this, mentioning that she bought a four-pack of wine coolers, opened two, but claimed Appellant did not drink his. Appellant recounted attending a retirement party where he ordered a margarita that he did not finish. Ultimately, Meeks arrested Appellant for DWI.

Appellant testified that about an hour elapsed between receiving a replacement drink and offering to drive Hudnall home, who was intoxicated and requested a ride. He acknowledged providing incorrect information to Officer Meeks about his drinking due to confusion and a desire to end the questioning. Appellant claimed he had only one margarita earlier and had not consumed alcohol before being pulled over. He initially did not stop for Meeks, believing the officer was signaling him to slow down. During the stop, Appellant was confused by conflicting instructions from Meeks regarding hand positioning and did not fully comply. He refused to provide a breath sample at jail, having a prior suspension for a similar refusal, and disclosed three prior DWI convictions in Texas and one arrest in New Mexico, whose outcome he could not recall.

Appellant requested the trial court to include an instruction related to his Fourth Amendment rights in the jury charge, emphasizing that the state must prove any evidence obtained from his stop was lawfully acquired. The court denied this request, leading to a standard jury charge focused solely on determining Appellant's guilt for DWI, without addressing the legality of the stop or Appellant’s constitutional rights.

In his appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence from the stop, challenging both the initial stop and the duration of his detention, as well as the admissibility of the wine coolers and related video evidence.

A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is reviewed under a bifurcated standard. The appellate court does not conduct its own factual review; instead, it defers to the trial judge, who is responsible for assessing the credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony. The appellate court gives deference to the trial court's findings on historical facts, even if not based on credibility assessments, and on application-of-law-to-fact questions that depend on credibility. However, if these application-of-law-to-fact questions do not hinge on witness credibility, the appellate court reviews them de novo. Evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling, and if the record lacks explicit fact findings, necessary implications are made to support the ruling, provided the evidence supports those findings. The appellate court upholds the trial court's decision if it is supported by the record and legally correct, regardless of whether the trial court's reasoning was flawed. Generally, only evidence from the suppression hearing is considered unless the issue was relitigated during the trial, in which case relevant trial testimony is also included in the review. If the defendant did not object to the State raising the issue at trial, they are assumed to have re-opened the evidence, allowing for consideration of that testimony.

Appellant contends that the stop initiated by Officer Meeks was based on insufficient grounds and constituted a pretext for an unlawful seizure. However, the court finds this argument unconvincing, affirming that both the Fourth Amendment and the Texas Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures, not all such actions. An automobile stop qualifies as a seizure, which is justified if the officer has reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation. This suspicion is assessed objectively, considering whether a reasonable person would believe a violation occurred based on the facts known to the officer at the time. In this case, Meeks observed the passenger not wearing a seatbelt, a violation of Texas law. Despite the passenger's claim of typically wearing a seatbelt, her acknowledgment of forgetting to do so during the stop supported Meeks's reasonable suspicion.

Additionally, Appellant argues that being handcuffed during the stop effectively constituted an arrest, rendering the subsequent search illegal. The State asserts that Meeks's actions were a continuation of the detention due to suspected intoxication. The court agrees, emphasizing that during a traffic stop, officers are permitted to request identification, check for warrants, and order occupants out of the vehicle. Officers may also use reasonable force necessary to ensure safety and the integrity of the stop. Thus, the court finds Meeks's continued detention of Appellant justified.

Handcuffing vehicle occupants may be justified for officer safety, particularly if there is a risk of the suspect obstructing further inquiry. During a lawful traffic stop, if an officer develops reasonable suspicion of criminal activity by an occupant, they may continue detaining the occupants to investigate beyond the initial reason for the stop. Reasonable suspicion is a factual determination based on the totality of circumstances at the time. Specific, articulable facts leading to reasonable suspicion can include an officer's training and experience. 

In this case, Officer Meeks observed Appellant's vehicle weaving and noted that Appellant delayed stopping despite the activation of emergency lights and siren, which raised suspicion. Additionally, furtive movements by a passenger and Appellant's failure to comply with commands to keep his hands visible contributed to reasonable suspicion. Given these factors, the court found that Meeks had sufficient grounds to detain Appellant for further investigation and that handcuffing was justified for safety. 

Regarding the wine coolers found in Appellant's vehicle, the court ruled they were lawfully obtained under the plain view doctrine, which does not constitute an invasion of privacy, thus upholding the legality of their seizure. The court overruled Appellant's motion to suppress related to both the detention and the discovery of the wine coolers.

The plain view doctrine allows law enforcement to seize items that are in open view without constituting a search under the Fourth Amendment, provided the officer is at a lawful vantage point and it is immediately evident that the item is associated with criminal activity. This requires a two-prong test: (1) the item must be visible from a location where the officer is permitted to be, and (2) there must be probable cause to believe the item is evidence of a crime. In this case, the Appellant was stopped on a public highway, and it was observed that the passenger left the door open, revealing two wine coolers in plain view. Officer Meeks lawfully seized the bottles, which violated the open container law, thus justifying his actions even without arresting the Appellant for DWI.

Regarding the Appellant's second point, he claimed the trial court erred by denying his request for a jury instruction on the legitimacy of the stop. The State argued that there was no material factual dispute about the stop's lawfulness. The court concurred, referencing Madden v. State, which established that a defendant must meet three criteria to warrant a jury instruction on contested factual issues: (1) the jury must hear evidence raising a factual issue, (2) the evidence must be contested, and (3) the contested issue must be materially relevant to the legality of the evidence obtained. In this case, since the facts establishing probable cause were uncontested, the Appellant was not entitled to the requested jury instruction.

Appellant's request for a jury instruction was denied because it did not pertain to a disputed historical fact, as required under Madden. Instead, it posed a legal question regarding whether the State demonstrated that Meeks’s actions did not violate Appellant's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The court referenced Madden, where it was established that the trial judge determines the facts necessary to establish "reasonable suspicion," and a jury cannot be expected to make such legal determinations. Similarly, Appellant's instruction sought the jury's opinion on a legal matter rather than addressing a factual dispute about Meeks's authority to detain him. Consequently, Appellant was not entitled to the requested instruction, leading to the overruling of his second issue.

Regarding factual sufficiency, Appellant contended that the evidence was insufficient to prove his intoxication beyond a reasonable doubt. The standard of review involves assessing the evidence neutrally, without favoring either party, and determining if the conviction is so weak or contradicted by evidence that it is manifestly unjust. The court emphasized that merely having reasonable doubt is insufficient for reversal; there must be a clear contradiction in the evidence supporting the conviction. The court must respect the jury's role in evaluating credibility and evidence weight, deferring to their determinations unless the record distinctly indicates a different outcome is warranted. An opinion on factual sufficiency must address the critical evidence relevant to the appellant's appeal.

A person is guilty of driving while intoxicated (DWI) if they operate a vehicle in a public place while lacking normal mental or physical faculties due to alcohol or substances, as defined in Texas law. The essential elements of DWI include evidence that the individual drove while intoxicated. In this case, the Appellant challenges the evidence presented by the trooper and the videotape, arguing it does not support a conclusion of intoxication. However, substantial evidence exists for the jury to determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Appellant was intoxicated. This evidence includes testimony from Officer Meeks regarding the Appellant's weaving while driving, failure to promptly pull over, and unsuccessful field-sobriety tests. Additional factors include the Appellant's inability to follow instructions, confusion about his license's location, the presence of open alcohol containers in his vehicle, reports of erratic driving, and his refusal to take a breath test. The Appellant's defense relied on his own testimony and that of friends asserting he had consumed only one margarita and was sober enough to drive. After reviewing the evidence impartially, it is concluded that the jury's verdict is supported and that the evidence against the Appellant's claims is not overwhelming. Thus, the evidence is deemed factually sufficient to uphold the verdict, leading to the rejection of the Appellant's argument.

The trial court's judgment is affirmed after overruling all three points raised by the Appellant. The ruling is delivered by Justices Holman, Gardner, and Walker. The video evidence, while occasionally out of focus and with scrambled audio, shows significant interactions between the officer, Meeks, and the Appellant. Notably, Meeks informs the Appellant that he is being handcuffed for safety, not arrest. The video captures the passenger leaving the door open and Meeks retrieving and pouring out two bottles found in the vehicle. It further establishes that Meeks had already arrested the passenger and learned of the Appellant's suspended license before conducting field sobriety tests. The Appellant failed a coordination test, leading to his arrest. The video also illustrates the Appellant's non-compliance with instructions regarding hand positioning. While there were additional factors justifying further investigation for DWI, the Appellant's argument focused specifically on perceived "custodial activity" and the impression of arrest. The Appellant's request for a jury instruction was not tied to a specific statute, although he mentioned Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 36.13.