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Alexis Pichardo, Sr., Individually and as Next Friend of Andrew Warren Pichardo and Alexis Pichardo, Jr., Minors Peggy Pichardo, Individually and as Next Friend of Andrew Warren Pichardo and Alexis Pichardo, Jr., Minors And Richard Anderson v. Big Diamond, Inc., Doing Business as Big Diamond, Inc., 723, and Diamond Shamrock Stations, Inc., Doing Business as Big Diamond, Inc. 723 and as Diamond Shamrock

Citation: Not availableDocket: 02-06-00079-CV

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; January 17, 2007; Texas; State Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

This case examines the constitutionality of Texas Education Code section 37.152(a)(3), under which an individual was charged with failing to prevent hazing during a non-school-sponsored event. The trial court dismissed the indictment, ruling the statute unconstitutional, prompting an appeal by the State. The statute was challenged for vagueness, as it did not specify who was obligated to prevent hazing, which is required for a criminal statute to provide adequate notice of prohibited conduct. The court held that criminal liability cannot be imposed based on omissions unless a specific duty is established by law, a condition unfulfilled by section 37.152(a)(3). The State's arguments that educators have a duty to prevent hazing under various statutes and doctrines, including in loco parentis, were found insufficient, as these do not establish a clear legal duty applicable in the context of criminal prosecution. Ultimately, the court affirmed the trial court's ruling, declaring the statute unconstitutional both on its face and as applied, thereby upholding the dismissal of the charges against the appellee.

Legal Issues Addressed

Constitutionality of Educators' Duties

Application: The court determined that the statute did not impose a clear duty on educators to prevent hazing, as the connections drawn by the State between various statutes did not provide reasonable clarity.

Reasoning: The State's argument that an educator has a duty to prevent hazing relies on sections 22.0511 and 9.62 of the education and penal codes, respectively. However, section 22.0511 only provides civil immunity for actions within the educator's scope of employment and does not impose a general duty of supervision.

Duty to Act in Criminal Law

Application: The court ruled that criminal liability cannot be based on an omission unless a specific duty to act is established by the statute or related law, which was not present in section 37.152(a)(3).

Reasoning: Section 6.01(c) of the Texas Penal Code states that a person does not commit an offense by omitting to act unless a specific duty to perform the act is established by law.

In Loco Parentis Doctrine in Criminal Prosecution

Application: The court held that the in loco parentis doctrine does not apply to criminal prosecution for failing to prevent hazing, as the relationship involves civil liability rather than criminal responsibility.

Reasoning: The State's assertion that educators have a duty to supervise students based on the in loco parentis doctrine is not supported by the cited cases, which focus on civil liability rather than criminal prosecution.

Vagueness Doctrine in Criminal Statutes

Application: The court found section 37.152(a)(3) of the Texas Education Code unconstitutionally vague, as it fails to specify the individuals responsible for preventing hazing, thus not providing clear notice of prohibited conduct.

Reasoning: In the case referenced, section 37.152(a)(3) of the Texas Education Code fails to designate a specific person or class responsible for preventing hazing, rendering it facially unconstitutional due to vagueness.