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Levi Nathan Auldridge v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 02-05-00409-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; May 3, 2007; Texas; State Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

In this case, the appellant, convicted of intoxication manslaughter, challenged the trial court's denial of a motion for a ten-day continuance following the State's removal of the phrase 'at a high rate of speed' from the indictment. The appellant argued that this deletion constituted an amendment under article 28.10(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which necessitated additional preparation time. However, the trial court classified the change as a non-substantive alteration, asserting that the phrase was surplusage and that the indictment's essential elements remained intact. The court referenced the precedent established in Janecka v. State, affirming that an indictment is not fundamentally flawed if it omits non-essential details while retaining the core elements of the offense. The court ultimately concluded that the indictment still sufficiently described the offense by detailing the act of driving into oncoming traffic and causing a fatal collision, thus upholding the trial court's decision to deny the continuance. Consequently, the conviction was affirmed, as the court found no violation of procedural rights in the modification of the indictment.

Legal Issues Addressed

Amendment of Indictment under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 28.10(a)

Application: The trial court determined that removing 'at a high rate of speed' from the indictment was a non-substantive alteration, not requiring a ten-day continuance.

Reasoning: The trial court ruled that the deletion was a non-substantive alteration and did not require a ten-day continuance.

Essential Elements of an Indictment

Application: The court held that the indictment adequately stated the elements of intoxication manslaughter despite the removal of surplusage, in line with the ruling in Janecka v. State.

Reasoning: An indictment is not fundamentally defective as long as it contains all essential elements of the offense, even if it lacks additional factual details.

Right to Continuance for Substantive Changes in Indictments

Application: The court decided that the appellant was not entitled to a continuance because the removal of the phrase did not constitute a substantive change.

Reasoning: The requirements for a continuance under article 28.10(a) were not triggered.

Surplusage in Indictments

Application: The court found that the phrase 'at a high rate of speed' was surplusage, and the offense of intoxication manslaughter could be proven without it.

Reasoning: The phrase 'at a high rate of speed' is deemed surplusage in the intoxication manslaughter indictment, meaning the offense can be proven without it.