Richard Lee Mathis v. State

Citation: Not availableDocket: 02-06-00355-CR

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas; October 11, 2007; Texas; State Appellate Court

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Richard Lee Mathis appeals his capital murder conviction, arguing that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained from an allegedly invalid search warrant and refused to instruct the jury on lesser included offenses. The case originates from an incident on October 7, 2004, at Donald Ellis's home, a known drug location, where Mathis and two accomplices confronted Ellis and others for drugs. Mathis assaulted Ellis with a gun, which failed to discharge, and forced a woman, Janice Williams, to accompany him to another drug dealer's house. A confrontation ensued, during which Mathis instructed his accomplice to shoot the dealer, Roney Gibson. After leaving the scene, Mathis and his friends did not take any drugs or money; however, Roney was later found dead. Police obtained a search warrant for Mathis's home, uncovering various items, including clothing and blood samples identified as belonging to Roney. Mathis's motion to suppress this evidence was denied, as was his request for a jury instruction on lesser included offenses. He was subsequently convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. In his appeal, Mathis argues that the affidavit supporting the search warrant lacked sufficient facts for a probable cause determination regarding evidence of Roney's murder in his apartment.

The court in Swearingen v. State established a key distinction in the standard of review for warrantless searches versus those conducted with a warrant. For warrantless searches, the Guzman rule is applied, while for searches with a warrant, a deferential standard based on Gates and Johnson is used. The review focuses on the "totality of the circumstances" present in the affidavit, granting significant deference to a magistrate's finding of a "substantial basis" for probable cause. The reviewing court examines only the affidavit's content, ensuring it provides adequate grounds for believing contraband or evidence will be found. Affidavits must demonstrate a fair probability, not a certainty, of uncovering evidence of a crime. The magistrate's determination is upheld unless there is a lack of substantial basis for concluding probable cause exists. In this case, Detective Cheryl Johnson's affidavit detailed witness descriptions of a suspect linked to a robbery and shooting, identifying the suspect as Richard Lee Mathis, who was further corroborated by a witness identification.

Detective Johnson sought a search warrant for the appellant's apartment based on the belief that evidence related to a crime would be found there. The affidavit specifically requested items including guns, ammunition, drug paraphernalia, blood, and clothing associated with the offense. The court noted a fair inference that evidence could be present at the appellant's residence, affirming the magistrate's decision to issue the warrant due to probable cause established through reasonable inferences from the affidavit. The court referenced prior cases to support the notion that individuals in possession of illegal items tend to conceal them, reinforcing the rationale for the warrant.

In addressing the appellant's second point regarding the trial court's denial of a "benefit of the doubt" instruction for lesser included offenses, the court explained that the trial court is required to instruct the jury on applicable law without expressing opinions on evidence weight. The defendant is allowed time to review and object to the charge before it is presented to the jury. If evidence raises reasonable doubt about the offense's grade or degree, the trial court must provide a "benefit of the doubt" instruction, even when a general reasonable doubt instruction is given. This instruction helps clarify juror uncertainty about the specifics of the offense. However, the court concluded that the absence of this instruction was not harmful if the overall charge left no ambiguity regarding resolving any doubts.

The appellant requested the trial court to add an instruction for the jury stating that if they believed the defendant was guilty of either capital murder or aggravated robbery but could not determine which, they should resolve that doubt in favor of the defendant. The trial court denied this request but provided the jury with detailed instructions regarding the consideration of capital murder and aggravated robbery. The instructions specified that the jury must find the defendant guilty of capital murder if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that he intentionally caused the death of Roney Gibson during a robbery attempt. If the jury did not find him guilty of capital murder, they were to consider whether he was guilty of aggravated robbery, and similarly, if they had a reasonable doubt about his guilt for aggravated robbery, they should acquit him of that charge as well. The court concluded that the existing jury instructions sufficiently addressed the burden of proof and the need to acquit if doubts existed, thus no additional "benefit of the doubt" instruction was required. The trial court's refusal to provide the requested instruction was upheld, and the court affirmed the trial court's judgment.